Xray-core concealed a certificate verification bypass vulnerability
github.comI get the impression that much of Xray's usage is in mainland China, do many other ecosystems use it? If not, why not?
Naively I would expect solutions out of Mainland China to be more sophisticated due to the internet restrictions within the country and the number of people who are digitally-connected.
But perhaps they cover for usecases one doesn't see outside the gfw.
You can also use it to get around captive portals where some traffic is still allowed. Some Airline flights where messaging services are free only check the SNI, so setting the Xray domain to whatsapp.com or something similar usually works.
What if ESNI/ECH is being used?
I'm assuming you'll have to configure your DNS to use the captive portal DNS which would defeat ECH. The only time I was able to get this working as a captive portal bypass I was using a hardcoded remote IP as my Xray host so DNS wasn't an issue.
Xray is huge in Russia now. Often the only way to set up a tunnel to the outer Internet.
As to the vulnerability reported - I think it's still better to place Xray behind a reverse proxy and make that manage the TLS stuff.
There are other countries that routinely block traffic like Iran or Russia, but there are also some simple methods that go right past the GFW many times, like VPN traffic that is tunneled through regular TLS, or even just plain SSH.
The "new hotness" is randomizing your TLS fingerprints and masquerading as legitimate web traffic/domains, as well as tunnel/proxy/VPN setups that utilize multiple endpoints at once to spread out the "suspicion" of all your traffic going through a single host all the time.
Xray-core's pinnedPeerCertSha256 treated an inserted leaf as the pinned cert, and the fix commit never called it a vulnerability.
Your LLM left out the clear hypocrisy and the part where the fixed version still had a vulnerability
His comment actually added value, but yours doesn't seem to have the same value.
Mine specifies the value that I thought was missing, though?
Fixing the code is only half of incident response. Without an advisory, affected-version range, and downstream notification, users cannot know whether they remain exposed.
The reaction to Xray-core is disappointing