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By Augusto Lopez-Claros

January 28, 2026

Amid the ongoing economic and geopolitical upheaval catalyzed by America’s 180-degree systemic repositioning under Donald Trump, countries now finding themselves decoupled from the erstwhile democratic superpower are exploring new political and economic configurations.

Among the possibilities is the expansion of the European Union as a liberal counterweight to autocratic hegemony, most interestingly to include what Prime Minister Carney has called “the most European of non-European countries”, Canada.

While Carney dismissed speculation on Canada joining the EU at last year’s NATO summit, that was before the full geopolitical consequences of this broader U.S. repositioning became clear—most notably through actions and signals emanating from across the American political system, including territorial claims against Greenland, a development of direct strategic concern to both Canada and the EU.

From The Economist to an array of Canadian opinion writers to half of Canadians themselves per an Abacus Data poll conducted last March, the idea of Canada joining the EU was gaining traction even before 2026 dawned with a whole new series of reasons for both Canada and Europe to take the proposition more seriously.

Past and Prologue

For the past half century, the two driving forces of the European Union have been history and geography. The EU was born out of the ashes of World War II and reflected an understandable desire on the part of Europe’s leading politicians to secure a more stable basis for peace and prosperity, and to anchor Germany in formal schemes of international cooperation.

Less-often acknowledged, but no less important, was the recognition that uncoordinated national sovereignty had proven catastrophically inadequate to the challenges of industrialized warfare and economic interdependence.

The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 was an inspired start, as was the goal, years later, under the Treaty of Rome, of expanding to a European Economic Community (EEC) focused largely on liberalizing trade within a common market.

This is not to say that the Treaty of Rome lacked overt political ambition. On the contrary, Jean Monnet, the Community’s father and chief visionary, was already thinking well beyond trade liberalization.

Indeed, Monnet’s statement reflecting that thought — that for national sovereignty to be effective it needs to be “transferred to larger spheres, where it can be merged with the sovereignty of others who are subject to the same pressures,” and that “in this process, no one loses; on the contrary, all gain new strength”— offers a roadmap for the EU’s long-term evolution.

Monnet’s insight was not romantic federalism but institutional realism: sovereignty preserved through pooling rather than erosion. There are distinct echoes of it in the vision Mark Carney articulated at Davos.

Geography is Destiny? Not Anymore

The second driving force for the EU has been geography. As time went by, new members were brought in, provided they were able, at least formally, to abide by a set of common policies.

Naturally, this process took in countries on the Union’s periphery, and it came to a climax in 2004 with the accession of 10 new members. There is little doubt that this first phase of growth has been, in aggregate terms, brilliantly successful.

War among EU member states has been effectively vanquished. Its members are among the most prosperous nations in the world. Differences are settled—not always efficiently, but predictably and peacefully—through negotiations and famously tedious committee meetings; and a set of supranational institutions has been created which, for all their limitations, are showing increasing degrees of maturity and effectiveness. Measured against Europe’s epic history, this achievement remains extraordinary.

Yet there are several reasons why this model has come under strain, and why incrementalism alone may no longer suffice.

Globalization has reduced the relative importance of geography as a determinant of economic growth and prosperity. Sharp reductions in the cost of transport, communications, and information processing have drastically diminished the economic significance of location.

Increasingly, the most competitive economies in the world are those that have succeeded in upgrading human capital, building open and reliable institutions, enforcing the rule of law, and sustaining a predictable political and social environment.

Empirical evidence from growth economics increasingly points to policy quality and institutional depth—not proximity—as the decisive variables.

A New Business Model

In light of this, the EU ought to be conceived less as a political geography delineated by a colour-coded map and more as a community of states sharing enforceable values, rules, policies, and institutions—many of which are, in practice, increasingly detached from physical location.

Some voter fatigue with EU expansion may therefore have less to do with a weakening of commitment to the European project per se and more to do with the perception that enlargement, driven primarily by geographic logic, has at times outpaced institutional readiness.

The experience of democratic and rule-of-law backsliding in countries such as Hungary has reinforced this concern, not because enlargement was misguided in principle, but because conditionality proved easier to negotiate than to enforce.

Had the EU been framed more explicitly as a union defined by institutional performance and policy convergence rather than territorial contiguity, it might well have expanded more slowly and more selectively, allowing for longer periods of consolidation and deeper internal alignment—particularly in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement.

From Proximity to Values

This suggests that EU leaders intent on consolidating the achievements of the past 50 years should resist defining the Union’s future solely in terms of absorbing its immediate periphery.

Instead, they should consider whether credible candidates might exist beyond Europe’s borders—states that have already demonstrated a sustained commitment to sound macroeconomic management, institutional integrity, democratic accountability, and respect for agreed rules, and that would be willing to submit themselves fully to the discipline of the EU’s market, legal order, and supranational institutions.

Let the EU, then, consider the idea of becoming a club of like-minded nations. Let it even consider changing its name, if necessary, to reflect this broader conception—not as an act of cultural dilution, but as a strategic redefinition of what membership signifies.

One could imagine, for example, a Union of Democratic States: an institution defined not by geography, but by shared commitments to democratic governance, the rule of law, open economies, and supranational cooperation.

Geography, after all, may be the least durable criterion in a world increasingly shaped by borderless networks — for better and worse — rather than borders.

The Ideal New Member

Canada has already surpassed many EU members in the quality of its macroeconomic management. Its institutions — property rights protection, judicial independence, regulatory coherence, trade openness, and social security systems —operate at levels that would place it comfortably above the EU average.

In terms of low corruption, regulatory clarity, and overall investment climate, it already outperforms several long-standing EU members, including Italy and Greece, as well as many newer members from Central and Eastern Europe.

Aside from the obvious fact that Canada’s only physical border with the EU is the 1.2 kilometre one on Greenland’s tiny Hans Island in the Nares Strait, Canada maintains an open trade regime and could, from a technical standpoint, transition relatively smoothly into the EU’s tariff-free internal market.

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership signed last June in Brussels, and the participation of Canada in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) procurement program secured in December, attest to both trade synergies and the confluence of interests more broadly.

Canada is a resource-rich country with a sophisticated, diversified economy, comparable to Europe in terms of innovation, market size, and human capital. It ranks ahead of many EU states in higher education quality, corporate research and development spending, patent registrations, and the diffusion of advanced technologies —from broadband infrastructure to digital services.

In short, Canada already behaves like a de facto member of the club in all but name.

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union limits eligibility for EU membership to “any European State” that respects and commits to the Union’s core values. That geographic requirement, however, is not immutable: the Treaty can be amended under Article 48, through unanimous agreement of all Member States and ratification in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

Canada’s membership would immediately expand the EU’s global footprint and underscore its identity as a values-based institutional order rather than a regional bloc.

More importantly, it would generate powerful demonstration effects elsewhere—much as EU accession prospects did in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union — in Latin America, East Asia, and beyond.

The alternative—already visible in parts of Europe itself—is a drift toward illiberal populism, economic underperformance, and strategic marginalization.

Looking ahead, one trend is difficult to ignore: technological change is binding economies, societies, and risks ever more tightly together, while quietly reshaping how political belonging is experienced, especially among younger generations. As traditional guarantors of the rules-based order retreat, this emerging transnational outlook may create more political space for institutional innovation than is often assumed.

As Mark Carney argued in his recent speech in Davos, the burden of sustaining an open and cooperative international system can no longer rest on a single hegemon.

In a more fragmented world, middle powers have both the incentive and the responsibility to step forward—individually and collectively—to reinforce shared rules, strengthen institutions, and provide stability where global leadership is lacking.

The time has come to think of Europe less in terms of physical proximity, and more in the language of the 21st century — an era in which institutions transcend borders, and shared rules and values, not maps, define the boundaries of political community.

Augusto Lopez-Claros is the Executive Director of the Global Governance Forum, a Swiss-based nonprofit foundation. He has written extensively on issues of international cooperation. His latest book Global Governance and International Cooperation: Managing Global Catastrophic Risks in the 21st Century, coedited with Princeton´s Richard Falk, was published by Routledge in 2024.