How authoritarian states use viruses and bots to attack the West

Read the first part here.

The open war in Ukraine is unsettling Western Europe. Before that, the Coronavirus pandemic challenged the certainties of a globalized world. What remains is the realization that a virus is able to affect individual freedom, weaken the economy, and divide society.

More than that, the pandemic has revived an old fear. What if an authoritarian government had a special virus or bacterium developed in secret laboratories and then distributed it over foreign territory? If a pandemic were deliberately planned and brought about?

Two developments are conceivable:

These possibilities are frightening – but are they realistic?

The ideal biological weapon would be a pathogen that is easily transmissible between people and quickly infects each person. Many of those affected would become seriously ill or even die within a few days.

However, despite all modern biotechnologies and an enormously increased knowledge of viruses and bacteria, it is still not possible to build a pathogen with all these desired properties in a laboratory. Nor is it possible to construct a pathogen from already known dangerous germs such as the influenza, corona, Ebola and smallpox viruses or the plague bacterium.

No control over diseases

The problem is: No experts can currently say which gene segments of a pathogen would have to be altered and how in order to craft an efficient biological weapon from known germs. It is equally impossible at present to assemble a completely new pathogen from parts of known germs that would then have precisely defined properties.

At most, such a biological weapon could possibly be created by accident. Since the probability of this is small, a great many experiments would have to be performed. This costs time and money. And requires high-security laboratories – otherwise the experiments would lead to the death of many researchers.

But even if an authoritarian government possessed a modified virus or bacterium that its scientists thought would make a good bioweapon, that agent would have to be tested on humans. This is the only way to know if the laboratory construct is actually the desired bioweapon. Even if a regime were indeed that ruthless, major human trials with many deaths in one country would probably not go completely undetected by the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, let's take this thought experiment one step further. Assuming that such a new bioweapon actually existed, it would be very difficult to use it in such a way that it would harm only the inhabitants of an enemy country. This was impressively demonstrated by the Coronavirus pandemic: If a virus is very easily transmissible between people, it quickly spreads across national borders and to other continents. Moreover, it does not simply disappear on command.

Thus, if an authoritarian government were to release a new bioweapon in an enemy country, it would not be immune to the pathogen finding its way «back home» sooner or later. Its own population would be in danger.

It would not be possible for the attacker to completely protect the population in their own country with a specific vaccine. Many viruses and bacteria constantly adapt as they circulate in the population, which makes vaccines rapidly become less effective. This, too, has been illustrated by the recent Coronavirus pandemic.

A breeding ground for influence operations

A new bioweapon could, however, destabilize the enemy. But here the question arises: What extent of destabilization is useful for the attacker? And how quickly do they then want to achieve control of key infrastructure or businesses?

Undoubtedly, the Coronavirus pandemic has temporarily shaken up many countries, including Western industrialized nations. But now, more than three years after the outbreak, no country is still so badly affected that corporations, government agencies, or infrastructure would be easy prey. What has remained, however, are weakened state finances, resentment against the authorities and increased polarization between segments of the population.

A targeted attack using a virus or bacterium thus involves many incalculable dangers for the attacker. It is therefore much more interesting to surf the waves of an already existing pandemic.

Indeed, that is exactly how the mechanics of hybrid warfare work. It follows a plan of operations that frequently align with existing conflicts or problems: The discourses on migration, energy or even a pandemic lend themselves to furthering divisions within a society.

The operations target the most vulnerable parts of a community. The centers of gravity of the West are its social diversity and the interconnections among individual countries. If an authoritarian power succeeds in dividing a society and removing one or more states from NATO in terms of security policy, it can significantly expand its influence on Western Europe.

One key tactic that aims directly into the centers of gravity is the use of influence operations that exploit the gray area between truth and lies.

Disinformation as a method of reaching the center of gravity with attack vectors was tested during the Coronavirus pandemic. Fake news and half-truths were partly spread via fake profiles on social networks, so-called bots. In some cases, state actors, specifically Russia and China, were behind such information operations.

Emotions favor disinformation

In the case of Covid, the narratives pursued three objectives: to obscure the origin of the virus; to downplay the dangerousness of the virus and discredit protective measures; and finally, to sow distrust of governments and their actions and exaggerate protests. 

Although it is hardly likely that China intentionally manufactured the Coronavirus in a laboratory in Wuhan, these influence operations as a whole follow an overarching goal: to discredit and weaken the West and divide society. 

This is not a new goal. Russia in particular has been trying to destabilize Western countries by various means for years. Prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, cyber units from Russian intelligence agencies conducted influence operations. Among other things, they stole e-mails from the Democrats, which they published afterwards. This so-called hack-and-leak action was intended to help presidential candidate Donald Trump.

In Europe, the Kremlin maintained good relationships with right-wing populist parties. In 2014, Marine Le Pen's French Front National even received a multimillion-dollar loan from a Russian bank that is said to have close ties to Russia's power elite.

The Coronavirus pandemic was an ideal topic for influence operations: Uncertainty was great, many people were afraid, and the interventions in everyday life were massive – and correspondingly controversial. Such emotions give impetus to rumors, misinformation or even conspiracy theories.

It is the ideal breeding ground for influence operations. These operations utilize existing narratives and either exaggerate them or modify them slightly.

Fake news portals

In such information operations, direct links to the Russian state can usually only be proven in isolated cases. In some instances, Western intelligence agencies made accusations to this effect without specifically disclosing their evidence. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that these operations took place with government support, and not only because the narratives in question correspond to Russian interests.

During the Coronavirus pandemic, the entire Russian disinformation ecosystem came into play. This includes Kremlin-affiliated news channels such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and its offshoots around the globe, which partly disseminated false or at least misleading reports.

Bots on social media, i.e. fake profiles that automatically spread disinformation, also played a key role. Bots often spread their messages along with statements from vaccine skeptics or opponents to state health measures. The result is a difficult-to-follow mix of genuine criticism, exaggerated claims and targeted misinformation – the fuel for influence campaigns.

An example from last year illustrates what such complex operations may look like. Starting in spring, suspected Russian actors built a network of fake media websites, as well as fake profiles and groups on social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter.

The originators of the websites created deceptively real replicas of over two dozen European news portals such as «Bild», «Daily Mail» or the French «20 minutes». They used these websites to publish false reports, which were then spread by accounts on Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, sometimes also as paid advertisements. 

Although there is no evidence that this was a Russian state campaign, the effort put in by the creators and the costs for the ads placed on Facebook alone suggest a professional organization in the background. In addition, tracking software was used to measure the campaign – possibly in order to report activity to superiors.

Cyberattacks as part of another line of operations

It is quite conceivable that cyber attacks could have concrete political consequences. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, for instance, found himself in need of explanation because parties were held at the seat of government despite lockdown regulations. If foreign actors are able to publicize such internal events through hacked emails, for instance, and fuel public sentiment through additional social media campaigns, a government may come under political pressure. It is conceivable that a government may fall or at least be temporarily incapacitated as a result.

In a tense situation, cyberattacks may create additional pressure. If hospitals are already at a standstill due to a pandemic, an IT system failure caused by an attack can quickly lead to chaotic conditions. This can cause fear and a feeling of helplessness in the population. Trust in the authorities may also be damaged, which in turn would be in the interest of the attacker.

This illustrates a next line of operations in the invisible war: a covert conflict involving sabotage operations against critical infrastructures. The internet is an ideal space for attacks that cannot be clearly attributed. In the language of specialists: The attribution of cyberattacks is difficult. State actors are able to hire a criminal group to cover their tracks: It is considered certain that there are links between criminal ransomware groups and Russian intelligence services.

The Kremlin also uses this method on the ground: The Wagner Group, as a private army, was first employed in Syria, later in the Sahel and now also in Eastern Europe to do the «dirty work.» Since their mysterious attempt to march on Moscow, the government has publicly distanced itself from the force and its financier, but continues to profit from their services – simply without any demonstrable connection.

Modern war is invisible, has no clear fronts, and is fought in the heart of the West. To fend off the authoritarian onslaught, liberal states must protect their centers of gravity: the diversity of open societies and political-economic interdependence. A first step to achieve this is to recognize the danger in the first place.

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