Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.
Since the US and Israel went to war with Iran in February 2026, the world has been using more oil than it produces. Oil still passes through Hormuz and the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia's bypass pipeline has restarted. But attacks and restrictions limit shipping, while Russian refinery strikes and export bans add to fuel shortages. Stored oil makes up the shortfall. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.
The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and effects on people and businesses. The charts show what's changed and how storage could change under three possible outcomes, with odds for each. We save the predictions so you can check them against what happens.
Last updated Sep 30, 2026
Brent
$102.59
Sep 29 settlement · down 2.6% · fifth straight close above $100 · November contract · +35% vs pre-crisis ~$76
US diesel (AAA)
$6.41
Sep 30 · eighth straight drop from the Sep 22 record $6.5276 · +72% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.43
Sep 30 · +58% vs Jan $2.81 (AAA)
SPR
283.8M
Sep 25 · down 0.8M in a week — about twice the prior two weeks' pace · down 131.7M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982
US diesel & heating oil
105.2M
Sep 25 · down 2.3M in a week · 14.9% below last year · East Coast stocks 29% below last year
Prices
These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. The captions explain where the readings come from. We leave gaps where data is missing.
US gasoline prices are up 58%
EIA weekly and AAA daily national averages
The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.43, an increase of about 58%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.
US diesel prices are up 72%
AAA national average · dots on selected dates
Diesel cost $3.72 on Feb 27, just before the war. It reached a record $6.53 on Sep 22, then fell for eight consecutive days to $6.41 on Sep 30. That's still about 72% above its pre-war price. It first passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4.
Natural gas prices in Europe are up about 120%
TTF, dollars per million British thermal units ($/MMBtu). Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed prices and market quotes (May–Sep). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.
TTF is the benchmark used to track natural gas prices in Europe. It traded above $28 on Sep 10, its highest level since December 2022, before easing to $27.00 on Sep 11. JOGMEC's Sep 28 report put the Sep 25 price at $24.10, down from $26.70 a week earlier but still about 120% above the price before the strait closed. JOGMEC attributed the drop to warmer-weather forecasts and hopes that US–Iran talks would ease tensions. The Sep 14 and Sep 22 points are converted from euro quotes (€81.98 and €72.10 per megawatt-hour). The Sep 14 quote is for a contract for difference (CFD), a financial contract that tracks gas prices. Unplanned maintenance at Norway's Asgard and Troll fields and tanker attacks have reduced supplies as prices have risen.
By January 20, European gas storage had fallen to 48%, compared with a five-year average of 63%. With less gas in storage, Europe was buying liquefied natural gas (LNG) for immediate delivery during the season when the strait closed.
Natural gas prices in Asia are up about 135%
JKM, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed spot prices and market quotes (May–Sep). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.
JKM tracks the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. It reached the high-$28s on Sep 10 — its highest level in roughly two and a half years — and was around $28.50 on Sep 11, according to JOGMEC. Its Sep 28 report put the Sep 25 price in the low-$25s, shown here as about $25.20 — down from the low-$27s on Sep 18, but still about 135% above the price before the closure. JOGMEC linked the Sep 25 decline to reports that Iran had proposed reopening the strait under certain conditions. Damaged production units at Qatar's Ras Laffan complex — about 17% of the country's LNG export capacity — are expected to be offline for 3–5 years, forcing Asian buyers to look elsewhere for supplies. With little gas in storage, the region has less to fall back on when supplies are disrupted or the weather increases demand.
Brent and WTI prices are up about 35% and 33%
Brent: selected observations and monthly averages. WTI: weekly FRED spot prices and recent futures closes.
Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) are crude oil price benchmarks. On Sep 29, Brent settled at $102.59 a barrel, down 2.6% — its fifth consecutive close above $100. WTI's November contract settled at $89.38, down 3.5% on the same contract. The gray line shows WTI, which is also used in the fuel price spread chart beside this one.
The Brent line includes March's intraday peak and July's monthly average. Most WTI readings are weekly spot prices from the Federal Reserve's FRED database; recent ones use futures closing prices. The dots mark selected dates to keep nearby points legible; the fuel price gap calculation uses the full WTI series. Hollow dots mark rounded estimates from the sources.
Starting with Sep 23, the WTI line uses the November contract. It closed at $90.52 on Sep 22, about $4 below October's $94.59 — which is why the line steps down on Sep 23 even though the November contract itself rose. Switching contracts can change the line even if oil prices haven't moved.
The gap between diesel and crude prices has doubled
Retail fuel price minus WTI, dollars per barrel. EIA/AAA fuel prices; FRED and recent futures closes for WTI.
This chart subtracts the price of crude oil from the retail price of fuel, with both expressed in dollars per barrel. The difference covers refining, transportation, and retailing. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper.
The gap between diesel and crude prices rose from about $89 in January to $181.8 on Sep 23, its highest value on the chart. It fell to $179.0 on Sep 24, rose to $180.7 on Sep 25, then fell to $179.9 on Sep 26, $179.2 on Sep 27, and $178.4 on Sep 28. It rose to $181.1 on Sep 29 when WTI fell 3.5%, then eased to $180.0 on Sep 30. It briefly narrowed to $148 on Sep 10, when crude prices rose faster than pump prices. The gap between gasoline and crude prices rose to $95.8 on Sep 23, dipped to $93.7 on Sep 24, then rose to $96.2 on Sep 25 before falling to $96.1 on Sep 26, $95.6 on Sep 27, and $95.4 on Sep 28. It rose to $97.8 on Sep 29, then eased to $96.9 on Sep 30.
The calculation uses retail prices from EIA and AAA, minus WTI from FRED, with futures closes for Sep 10–11 and Sep 14–29. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so the values differ. Some readings fall on days with no same-day WTI price; the chart pairs those with the nearest available trading day's price, within 1–3 days. The Sep 21 reading uses the Sep 21 WTI settlement. The Sep 22 reading uses the October contract's final closing price on Sep 22 ($94.59); the Sep 23 reading uses the November contract's settlement on Sep 23 ($92.16); the Sep 24 reading uses the November contract's settlement on Sep 24 ($94.61); the Sep 25 and Sep 26 readings use its settlement on Sep 25 ($92.41); the Sep 27–28 readings use the Sep 28 settlement ($92.60), and the Sep 29–30 readings use the Sep 29 settlement ($89.38). Because the November contract's Sep 23 settlement was lower than the October close, the Sep 23 spread reads higher than the Sep 22 spread even though pump prices barely moved. No missing prices are estimated.
Supply
When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show changes in stored oil, how stocks could rise or fall under different scenarios, and how much oil remains in the US emergency reserve.
The world is using more oil than it produces
Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has needed stored oil every month. The IEA's latest report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.7 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil, and expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027. Global production fell to 100.1 million barrels per day in August, with more than 10 million barrels per day of Gulf production still shut down. Saudi production alone fell by 2.3 million barrels per day that month, to 5.97 million.
The IEA has coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from 32 countries. Withdrawals from China's commercial stockpiles are estimated at about 2–3 million barrels a day, based on customs data, while its official reserve remains untouched. In its Sep 9 report, the EIA separately estimates that global commercial stocks have fallen about 400 million barrels this year; that figure and the IEA's estimate of 507 million barrels withdrawn since February cover different sets of stocks over different periods.
World production minus consumption, million barrels/day. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), Table 3a, January–August 2026; forecasts aren't shown. Gulf production outages peaked at 11.2 million barrels/day in May; lower consumption and supply from elsewhere offset much of the loss. Separately, the IEA estimates that observed stocks fell by 507 million barrels since February, an average of 2.8 million barrels/day, including 95 million barrels in August.
Oil shipments through Hormuz fell 77%
EIA estimates that crude oil shipments through Hormuz fell from 15.9 million barrels a day in late 2025 to 3.7 million in April–June 2026. Refined fuel shipments fell too. Crude shipments through Bab el-Mandeb rose, while traffic through the Suez Canal and Egypt's SUMED pipeline stayed near its late-2025 level.
These April–June figures are from before the Red Sea closed in July. For more recent traffic, see Kpler's ship counts in the map caption at the top of the page.
Million barrels per day · Annual averages for 2023–24; quarterly averages from 2025
Strait of Hormuz
Suez Canal & SUMED pipeline
Bab el-Mandeb
Sources: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (March 3, 2026) and Global Energy Security Data (August 12, 2026). Hollow dots mark EIA estimates: annual averages for 2023–24 and quarterly averages from 2025. Lines connect those averages. All three charts use the same scale. The 77% headline uses EIA's total for Hormuz, 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day; the two rounded components shown add to 4.8 in April–June. The figures cover global traffic, and a cargo can pass through more than one route. Ship tracking became less reliable around Hormuz in 2026, so those estimates may miss some traffic.
Oil stocks in OECD countries fell to a five-year low in May
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of Western Europe. This chart shows crude oil and refined fuels stored on land by companies and governments in those member countries. These stocks help make up for interruptions in supply. China isn't an OECD member, so its stockpiles aren't included.
In May 2026, the latest month shown, stocks were at their lowest in the EIA data since January 2021. The shaded band shows the range for each calendar month from 2021 through 2025. Stocks fell below that range in April and May 2026.
Company and government oil stocks held on land. EIA international data, monthly, January 2021–May 2026, in million barrels. Shaded range: 2021–2025. The vertical line marks the start of the war on February 28, 2026.
How oil in storage could change through 2027
The three lines show how oil in storage could change if shipping recovers, the standoff continues, or the corridor closes. For each scenario, we make assumptions about how much oil the world produces and uses.
Each line starts at zero in August 2026. Values below zero mean less oil in storage than in that month; values above zero mean more. Zero means no change, not empty storage.
These projections depend on those assumptions. They don't account for further cuts in oil use as stocks fall. You can read the assumptions and see how we check the predictions on the model page.
Select a comparison to see the EIA's September 9 forecast or what would happen if the June–August 2026 trend continued (−47.7 million barrels a month). Both use the same starting point as the scenarios.
Change since August 2026, in million barrels. We adjust production and consumption from the EIA's September 9 outlook for each scenario. The EIA comparison uses that forecast without our adjustments. Recent trend repeats IEA-reported changes. The two agencies' figures cover different sets of oil stocks.
The model's odds for each outcome
Our estimates, updated when events meet the rules on the model page.
The bars show our estimated chance of each outcome and how those estimates have changed. The colors match the three lines above. A higher percentage means we think that outcome is more likely. It doesn't tell you how accurate the storage projection will be.
The repaired Saudi bypass pipeline is carrying about 3.5M barrels a day, close to the 4M it carried before the drone strikes, and tanker loadings at Yanbu have resumed (Wall Street Journal, Sep 28). We moved the odds toward standoff based on that report, making an exception to our rule requiring official confirmation or an assessment that repairs would take only days.
Reuters reported that the bypass pipeline had restarted at a reduced rate, with the first cargo at Yanbu scheduled to load on Sep 22. We moved the odds back toward standoff on that report.
Oil loadings at Yanbu, the pipeline's export port, stopped while the pipeline remained shut. Oil could no longer leave through the Saudi bypass. In Libya, guards shut the Hamada–Zawiya pipeline, halting two oil fields.
The Saudi bypass pipeline was suspended, and the Houthis held the entire Red Sea coast. An official pipeline restart would return the odds to 10/50/40.
corridor holdsstandoffcorridor lapses
Show earlier odds (Jun 30–Sep 9)
Tanker losses reached 10 per week, Brent passed $100, and Jazan was affected.
An area was closed to shipping, and a base in a third country was hit for the first time.
Vessel tracking showed 7% of normal crossings through Hormuz and did not support reports that 8.6M barrels a day were passing through.
Our first estimate: about a 65% chance that the conflict would ease.
Tankers can pass through Hormuz under an Iran–Oman agreement or with US escorts. Traffic gradually returns to normal over one to two quarters.
In this scenario, Brent moves toward $70–80.
Fighting continues at the current level. Tanker attacks and shipping restrictions continue, some Iranian facilities remain out of service, and the repaired Saudi bypass operates at a reduced rate. The strait stays partly open.
Brent stays in the $100–120 range. Oil stocks keep falling through 2027. We assume Gulf production stays at the same level.
The shipping route closes for a prolonged period or the fighting gets worse. More tankers are lost, shipping restrictions remain, and the bypass, Abqaiq, and Jazan stay out of service for months.
Brent rises above $130. Shortages spread from the US East Coast to Russia, Europe, China, and aviation fuel.
We use judgment to assign these odds and set rules in advance for changing them. A pipeline restarting or a shipping agreement breaking down could prompt a change; a quiet week alone wouldn't. You can read the rules and see what we're watching on the model page.
US commercial crude stocks have recovered from their July low
These stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They stood at 427.3 million barrels on Sep 25, up from 404.5 million on Jul 24. The EIA's Sep 30 report shows stocks rose by 0.9 million barrels, their second weekly increase in a row. Crude imports fell by 179,000 barrels a day that week, to 5.7 million a day. Stocks were 10.8 million barrels above the same week last year and 2% above the five-year average. SPR releases have helped supply commercial oil users this year. Moving oil from the reserve to commercial storage leaves the combined amount unchanged.
EIA weekly stocks, excluding the SPR, in million barrels. The Jul 24 low was 22.2M below the same week in 2025.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level in 44 years
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Sep 25, puts it at 283.8 million, down 0.8 million barrels — about twice the amount withdrawn in each of the prior two weeks. Weekly withdrawals had fallen from 3.1 million barrels in the week ending Aug 28 to 1.2 million the following week and 0.4 million in each of the next two weeks. For comparison, the reserve peaked at 727 million barrels in December 2009 and stood at 270.5 million in August 1982. The releases help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf.
SPR withdrawals could pause even if the crisis continues
The Department of Energy releases oil from the SPR through contracts and scheduled deliveries. A supply shortage doesn't automatically trigger withdrawals. On Sep 29, DOE offered companies loans of up to 40 million barrels, with bids due Oct 6 and deliveries under awarded contracts scheduled for November and December. Contracts haven't been awarded yet, so withdrawals could pause as earlier deliveries end. Withdrawals averaged about 112,000 barrels a day in the latest reported week. The pace can change with each release decision.
The red lines mark the model's reserve thresholds, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels. The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum.
Refining
Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.
Replacing Gulf crude can raise costs for refineries
Straight-run (distillation) yield, % of barrel volume
Crude oil comes in different forms, and they don’t all produce the same mix of fuels or need the same processing. Replacement oil has to suit the refinery's equipment. Heavier crude needs extra processing, which consumes energy and, in some steps, hydrogen. Lighter crude can overwhelm equipment that handles its lighter components while leaving other units underused. The refinery may have to cut output or pay for modifications. Lower output spreads fixed costs over fewer barrels, raising the cost per barrel.
These examples compare US shale, Gulf crude, and heavy sour crude (diluted bitumen) using three of the 42 lab reports, called assays, in ExxonMobil's public library. It's a small sample, chosen for availability and contrast. The bars show straight-run yields: the parts separated by heating the oil, before further processing into finished fuels. The parts used for diesel and jet fuel make up 39.2% of WTI Light – Export, 34.9% of Upper Zakum, and 18.1% of Kearl.
The heavier parts need more equipment. Most complex refineries can process vacuum gas oil, but the heaviest residue needs specialized equipment, such as a coker, to break it down. Residue makes up 31.4% of Kearl, compared with 16.5% of Upper Zakum and 4.1% of WTI. That helps explain why heavy crude from Canada or Venezuela can't quickly replace missing Gulf supplies. The next chart shows how much of each type the world produced before the war; the diesel price gap chart shows how fuel prices have diverged from crude prices.
WTI Light – Export · Light sweet (US shale), 47.4° API, 0.07% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 39.2%
butane and lighter 3.0% (gases)
Upper Zakum · Medium sour (Gulf), 33.4° API, 2.09% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 34.9%
butane and lighter 3.1% (gases)
Kearl Blend · Heavy sour (diluted bitumen), 19.8° API, 3.83% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 18.1%
butane and lighter 1.4% (gases)
naphtha (light + heavy) — becomes gasoline after further processingkerosene — jet fueldieselvacuum gas oil — cracked in most complex refineriesvacuum residue — needs a coker or residue hydrocrackerbutane and lighter gases
First-stage yields by volume, not finished fuel output. Upper Zakum stands in for Arab Light; Kearl stands in for Venezuela's Merey; no public assays of Arab Light or Merey are in that library. These are examples, not averages for their classes. Naphtha combines light and heavy naphtha; vacuum gas oil (VGO) is the 350–550 °C portion; residue is what remains above 550 °C. Assays: WTI Light – Export, WTLEX26Y, Feb 27, 2026; Upper Zakum, UPZAK26B, Jan 23, 2026; Kearl Blend, KEARL23B, Oct 26, 2023. Dates as printed in the reports. Source: ExxonMobil's crude oil assay library. Processing requirements: EIA. Lighter-crude constraints: EIA's study of processing light shale oil.
Refineries built for medium-sour crude can't easily switch supplies
million barrels per day · world, annual
A refinery's equipment is built around the oil it expects to process. For a plant designed for medium-sour crude — oil with a medium density and high sulfur content — switching supplies changes the work that equipment has to do. Lighter oil can leave some units underused; heavier oil leaves more residue to break down. Major changes take years: ExxonMobil's Beaumont expansion began construction in 2019 and started operating in 2023.
The chart below shows how the world's supply of different types of crude changed before the war. Medium-sour crude accounted for 32.8% of production in 2024. Its share had been falling while light, sweet crude grew from 18.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2024. Refiners had invested in equipment for heavier oil before the shale boom, so the growing supply of lighter crude doesn't suit every plant equally well.
The war has cut supplies of the medium-sour oil those plants were built to use. The IEA's September report put lost Gulf production at more than 10 million barrels a day (August 2026). Several of the Gulf's main export grades sit in this chart's medium-sour band (26–35° API): Arab Light (32.8°), Arab Medium (30.2°) and Basrah Medium (27.9°, Iraq's largest export grade since 2021). The IEA does not break the shut-in down by grade, so how the loss splits across the bands is not known. The production data ends in 2024; the annotation above the 2024 column shows the loss reported in 2026, across all grades.
World crude production, million barrels per day. Eni's ten quality classes are grouped into five; “other grades” combines six classes and unassigned production (0.7% in 2024). Reported years: 2010, 2015 and 2019–2024. Source: Eni, World Energy Review 2025 (21 Oct 2025), using IEA data; table on printed p96, definitions on p9 (PDF pages 98 and 11). Annotation: IEA Oil Market Report, 11 Sep 2026 (August 2026 data); it marks the total loss, not a single grade. Gulf export-grade properties:Wikipedia(Arab Light, Arab Medium) andPetro-Logistics(Basrah Medium, 27.9° API / 3.0% S, Iraq's main export grade since 2021; Basrah Light export stopped in Jan 2022). Gulf losses also include lighter grades such as Murban and heavier grades such as Arab and Basrah heavy. Refinery configuration: IEA and EIA. Beaumont construction timeline: ExxonMobil.
OECD refineries made less gasoline and diesel than a year earlier
In June 2026, total refinery output in OECD countries was about 1% lower than in June 2025. Gasoline and diesel output fell. Jet fuel and other kerosene rose. The comparison doesn't tell us how much of the change was caused by the war.
Estimated million barrels per day · June 2026, change vs June 2025
Oil coming in
Oil entering refineries39.3 −1.0%
After refining
Refinery output40.9 −1.0%
Products coming out
Gasoline13.2 −2.0%
Diesel & heating oil12.1 −1.5%
Jet fuel & other kerosene4.6 +9.7%
Other products11.0 −3.2%
US refineries ran below 95% of capacity for a second straight week
Share of available refinery capacity in use, weekly.
US refineries operated above 95% of their available capacity every week from Jun 5 through Sep 11, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28. In the week ending Sep 25, they used 92.5% of their capacity and processed 554,000 fewer barrels a day than the week before. For the January–September weeks shown, refineries used an average of 90.7% of their capacity in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.
EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), weeks ending Friday. Utilization is the amount processed divided by available capacity. Both lines cover the same Jan–Sep period. Monthly processing volumes were 16.3–17.3 million barrels/day (STEO Table 4a), above 2025 in every month. The fuel price gap chart in Prices shows how fuel and crude prices compare.
Global refining
Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's August and September reports show the size of the decline.
Global refining, August
81.4 mb/d
summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)
Refining forecast, 2026
−2.6 mb/d
IEA forecast vs 2025 (OMR, Sep 11)
Q3 forecast revision
−370 kb/d
Reduction in the Q3 refining forecast (OMR, Aug 12)
Estimates put Russia's lost refining capacity at 20–54%
Estimated capacity remaining, as a share of capacity before the strikes
Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The chart shows about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April and about 70% by Aug 29, according to the Moscow Times. The red bar shows how much current estimates differ: Ukraine's General Staff puts the capacity lost at more than 45% of designed capacity as of Sep 21, Russian Forbes at 54% (Sep 9), and the IEA at more than 20%. You can compare these estimates with the reported outages and export restrictions below.
Russian refinery outages and fuel shortages
Capacity out of service
>30%
Aug 29, Moscow Times — up from ~25% in April
Ukraine's General Staff: more than 45% of designed capacity out as of Sep 21 (up from 42.7% on Sep 9) · Russian Forbes: 54% (Sep 9) · RBC-Ukraine: ~14% of capacity out of service in the first 20 days of September
Refineries struck, Sep 20–Sep 26
6 plants
Moscow refinery (Sep 20) · Kuibyshev, near Samara (Sep 21–22) · Ufa (Sep 21–22) · Perm, seventh-largest at ~257 kb/d (an earlier shutdown was reported on Aug 24) (Sep 25) · Novoshakhtinsk, ~110–140 kb/d, the largest fuel supplier in southern Russia (Sep 25) · Ilsky, ~125 kb/d — three people killed (Sep 26)
Ufa: strike and fire confirmed, halt unverified (Gen Staff, Sep 22); the other five have confirmed halts; no restarts reported (Reuters, RBC-Ukraine, ISW, Gen Staff)
Major refineries still offline
both out
Kirishi, Russia's second-largest, ~404 kb/d nameplate (S&P Global, Mar 2026), fully halted, hit twice in a month (UA.NEWS, Sep 2) · Ryazan, Moscow's main supplier, ~344 kb/d nameplate (S&P Global, Mar 2026) — both primary units, 12Mt/yr, offline since Sep 6 (Reuters, Sep 10)
These figures describe plant capacity, not measured lost output. Bloomberg reported every major Lukoil refinery offline on Aug 25.
Gasoline shortages at gas stations
45–53%
Share of stations without AI-92 (45%) and AI-95 (53%) gasoline, mid-September — 33% and 38% at the end of August (gdebenzin, via UNN, Sep 22); rationing measures are back in about two-thirds of regions (Independent, Sep 22)
Gasoline prices +21% YTD, national average 78.51 rubles/liter as of Sep 14 (Moscow Times); authorities are preparing for further shortages (UNN)
Jet fuel now imported
military + civilian
Ukraine's military intelligence agency reports that Russia is importing Jet A-1 aviation fuel from South Korea and Egypt after a year of refinery strikes (Aug 29), and that Russian military aviation has a kerosene shortage. The jet-fuel export ban runs through Nov 30
ISW (Sep 26) assesses that Russia's long-range strike campaign depends on jet-powered Geran drones; a kerosene shortage would constrain that capability
Novorossiysk — main Black Sea port
hit
The fuel-oil terminal and city were hit; 4 people killed (Sep 8–9)
Crude exports fell from 800 to 350 kb/d between Jul and Aug; all three export routes are now under attack
When Russia’s export bans expire
Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. The diesel export ban is scheduled to expire on Sep 30, though an extension through the end of October has been reported. The jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.
Sep 30, 2026
diesel exports — scheduled to expire; extension to Oct 31 reported (Vedomosti, Sep 15)
Nov 30, 2026
jet fuel exports
Jan 31, 2027
gasoline & the remaining diesel
Imports aren't making up the difference. Fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route are running at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects countries that rely on Russian fuel: Kyrgyzstan imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.
Effects on the economy
Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. Below, you can compare oil use with last year's levels and see the latest recession estimates, interest rates, and possible effects on food prices.
World oil use fell about 4% in May compared with last year
World oil and other liquid fuel use, million barrels/day. EIA STEO, Sep 9 release; January–August, 2026 vs 2025.
World oil use fell 4.3 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 4%. The gap narrowed to 3.6 million in July and 0.8 million in August. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy. The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. OPEC expects a different result: demand growth of 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026. That's a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.
EIA STEO Table 3e, Sep 9 2026; forecast completed Sep 3. The release lists Jan–Aug as historical data, though world and regional consumption figures are estimates. They include fuel used by refineries and ships. Forecasts from Sep 2026 onward aren't shown.
Where oil use fell in July
Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.
16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption
Estimates of US recession risk
These estimates, published between June and September 2026, put the chance of a US recession over the next 12 months at 15% to 50%. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket puts the odds at 32%, but covers a longer period, through the end of 2027. Keep that difference in mind when comparing the figures.
The Fed raised rates on Sep 16
The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to help a slowing economy, but inflation makes that harder when prices are still rising too quickly. August producer prices rose 5.4% from a year earlier. Consumer inflation held at 3.4%, with energy up 16.3%, while core inflation eased to 2.4%.
On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.
Fed's target rate, Sep 16
3.75–4.00%
Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'
Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28
60%
Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll check this prediction after the October decision
August producer prices (BLS, Sep 10)
5.4% YoY
+0.4% for the month · July revised to 4.8% annually · energy +4.2%, diesel +24.1% annually · 10-year yield 5.255% on Sep 29, its highest close of the war
The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.
Borrowing costs and inflation
Borrowing costs and everyday prices are both at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed said inflation remained high and the economy was growing at a solid pace.
US 10-year Treasury yield
10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Sep 29 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, and 29: Yahoo closing values.
The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.
The 10-year yield closed at 5.255% on Sep 29, its fifth straight close above 5% and the highest close of the war. A preliminary business survey showed activity growing at its fastest pace in over four years, increasing expectations that the Fed would raise rates again. Its Sep 16 close of 5.006% was the first above 5% since the war began.
The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The market's measure of expected inflation over the next 10 years eased to 2.36%. That suggests investors are seeking higher returns after inflation, even as their inflation expectations have fallen.
US producer prices are rising faster than consumer prices
CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · Jan – Aug.
Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and stayed there in August. Prices rose 0.4% in August alone, with gasoline's 3.9% increase accounting for more than a third of that rise. The annual rate of core inflation, which excludes food and energy, eased from 2.5% to 2.4%, although its 0.3% monthly increase was above expectations. Producer prices rose faster, peaking at 5.9% in May and increasing 5.4% in August compared with a year earlier. July's reading was revised to 4.8%. Energy explains much of the increase, with diesel up 24.1%. Businesses can face these higher costs before consumers see them in prices (BLS, Sep 10–11).
Higher energy costs can take more than a year to reach food prices
Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.
The timeline uses delays seen after energy prices rose in 2007–08 and 2022 to show when food prices could rise. It's a rough comparison with those periods, not a forecast from this model.
Gulf–India tanker shipping costs
+411%
$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)
TTF gas (Europe)
$24.1/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Sep 25 (published Sep 28) · down from $26.7 on Sep 18
JKM gas (Asia)
≈$25.2/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Sep 25 (published Sep 28) · low-$25s, down from low-$27s on Sep 18
Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate periods based on the 2007–08 and 2022 price increases. The effects on food prices can take more than a year to appear.
What to watch next
Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.
Any day
Whether the Saudi bypass keeps recovering. The repaired East–West pipeline is carrying about 3.5M barrels a day (WSJ, Bloomberg, Sep 28), roughly 87% of the 4M it moved before the Sep 10 strikes, and tanker loadings at Yanbu resumed Sep 27. Aramco is targeting about 4M a day within a few weeks.
The restart restores an export route around Hormuz. We moved the odds to 10/50/40 on Sep 29 based on these reports, making an exception to our pipeline-restart rule. Watch for official confirmation or a drop in Yanbu shipments.
Any day
Whether the US and Iran agree on the steps to reopen the strait. Iran received the US response to its seven-day plan through Qatari mediators on Sep 29 (Reuters); the two sides disagree on the order of the steps, not what they involve. The plan would expand June's agreement and includes steps on Iran's nuclear program.
Watch for a signed deal, a change in the blockade, or a resumption of attacks. A deal or further attacks could change how much oil gets through.
Any day
Whether Houthi attacks in Bab el-Mandeb spread to non-Saudi shipping. The Houthis have been striking Saudi territory and vowed 'severe consequences' after the Mawiya market strikes near Taiz (Sep 27, Reuters).
An attack on a non-Saudi vessel would raise the odds that the corridor closes. Watch whether attacks spread from Saudi territory to shipping.
Any day
US measures to lower diesel prices. Trump said he is 'very seriously' considering a diesel export ban (Bloomberg, Sep 27). The White House is also weighing fuel-tax suspensions and wider use of tax-exempt diesel normally reserved for off-road use. It urged the EU to release emergency diesel stocks on Sep 29 (Reuters).
A ban would keep more US diesel at home but leave less for buyers abroad. Reserve releases could ease prices. Watch for an official decision.
Any day
Ship traffic through Hormuz. Kpler's daily crossing counts have varied — 14 on Sep 23, 9 on Sep 24, 5 on Sep 26, none on Sep 27 — and Windward's separate tracker counted 17 on Sep 28. The trackers cover different sets of ships. Vessels with tracking off can be missed, so a low count doesn't mean oil stopped moving.
Watch whether more ships can pass safely. Kpler estimated oil exports through the strait at 13.2M barrels a day over the week ending Sep 23, about three-quarters of the pre-war level (CNBC, Sep 25).
Any day
Europe's winter fuel preparation. The EU's energy commissioner warned member states on Sep 26 of a 'price crisis linked to a supply crisis' and urged governments to build gas stocks.
If high prices persist into winter, European governments may cap prices, ration fuel, or release reserves.
Oct 6–7
Bids for more SPR releases are due Oct 6 at 11:00 a.m. Central. DOE is offering loans of up to 40M barrels from Big Hill and Bryan Mound, with deliveries under awarded contracts scheduled for November–December. This is its sixth request; the first five led to four completed exchanges, with more than 133M barrels awarded.
Companies still need to bid and win contracts, so withdrawals could pause before the scheduled deliveries.
Oct 6–7
The next EIA report is due Oct 7 at 10:30 a.m. Eastern and covers the week ending Oct 2. The Sep 30 report showed SPR stocks fell by 0.8M barrels in the week ending Sep 25 — about twice the prior two weeks' pace. Diesel and heating-oil stocks fell 2.3M to 105.2M, 14.9% below last year.
Watch whether SPR withdrawals continue at the higher pace. The report covers the week before the Oct 6 bid deadline. Deliveries from the new offering are scheduled for November–December.
Where shortages could appear next
These estimates show where shortages could worsen if the crisis continues. The dates are based on published stock levels, customs data, and export-ban schedules. The timing could be a week or two earlier or later.
Each weekly EIA report (next: Oct 7)
US East Coast — US diesel and heating-oil stocks fell to 105.2M barrels in the week ending Sep 25, down 2.3M that week. At the four-week average rate of 3.8M barrels a day, those stocks are equivalent to about 28 days of use. East Coast stocks are 29% below last year.
Oct 31
Russia — Russia announced on Sep 30 that it was extending its diesel export ban through Oct 31. With more than 30% of refining capacity damaged, Russia may have little fuel available to export.
≈ mid-October
China — Commercial oil stocks could begin to fall faster than normal.
≈ late October
Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, making it harder for traders to find supplies. If the strait closes fully, this could happen by mid-October.
≈ late October
Europe, at the pump — Consumers could face fuel shortages and higher prices, increasing pressure on governments to respond.
Nov 10–30
Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.