Is a steak knife a weapon? Oregon Supreme Court takes a stab at it

SALEM, Ore. (CN) — The line between kitchen utensil and weapon came under scrutiny Thursday as the Oregon Supreme Court pondered whether a steak knife counts as a weapon under a state statute prohibiting weapons for probationers.

The question landed before the high court when Anthony Richard Cortes attended a probation meeting with the handle of a nine-inch-long steak knife protruding from his backpack. The knife had a four-and-a-half-inch blade. His probation officer determined he violated the weapons condition of his probation and a trial court, along with the Oregon Court of Appeals, agreed.

Cortes, all the while, argued that the knife was a utensil and a tool for eating, and the weapons condition needs to distinguish between weapon, tool and utensil.

Before the state Supreme Court, Cortes implored the court to adopt his proposed definition of a weapon: an instrument designed for combat.

“I think that the plain meaning context and legislative history of weapon as used in the statute all supports defendants,” Francis Geiringer, senior deputy public defender representing Cortes, argued.

Justice Rebecca Duncan questioned how the word “design” became part of the definition, as it’s not included in the dictionary definitions, and Geiringer pointed to the definitions of the word “instrument.”

But the court had questions about adopting this proposed definition.

“So what do we do with the fact that something can be not designed for combat, but it can be certainly used as a weapon — a baseball bat?” asked Justice Stephen Bushong.

The justice proposed a hypothetical of if a probationer walked to the plate in a softball game with a bat — clearly not a weapon. But what if the probationer approached a street fight at midnight?

“He’s probably possessing a weapon, don’t you think?” Bushong questioned.

Geiringer conceded that, in that case, the probationer is likely violating the general condition of probation, but argued that the legislature could have adopted a more specific definition of weapons in the probation statute but declined to do so. Also, he said, the state’s definition of a weapon is far too broad.

“It’s, you know, bread knives, butter knives, generally objects that a reasonable person is not going to walk into their kitchen and say, this doubles not only as my kitchen but also as an armory,” Geiringer said, adding that there isn’t enough evidence in the record to prove that Cortes was using the knife as a weapon.

Justice Roger DeHoog asked whether a chef’s knife would be considered a weapon under Cortes’ definition.

“Would it be excluded simply because it’s not designed for combat, even though it’s much larger than a steak knife, often much sharper, much pointier?” DeHoog asked.

But Geiringer remained steadfast that it would not count as a weapon under Cortes’ definition.

The state, however, offered a competing definition of a weapon: something that is generally designed for physical injury or harm, and also something that is used in that manner.

The knife’s handle being exposed out of the top of Cortes’ backpack could be viewed as a form of brandishing — which would support the inference that he was using it as a weapon, argued Assistant Attorney General Robert Koch.

“What we’re trying to deal with is what do you do when you have something that the same instrument, depending on context, might have a legitimate purpose and a weapon purpose?” Chief Justice Kate Flynn said.

Koch pointed to discussions of knives within a 1984 Oregon Supreme Court case that restricted switchblades as arms and included an acknowledgement of the tools serving a dual purpose, including a kitchen knife, specifically as an example of something that is a weapon.

“So I guess I’m confused. Is it the state’s position that probationers with this condition in Oregon can’t have a kitchen block of knives in their kitchen?” Justice Bronson James asked.

“I guess it depends on what’s in that block of knives,” Koch said.

Bushong asked whether the state believed anything with a dual purpose qualified as a weapon under the statute, which Koch denied.

James remarked that, unlike criminal cases where an object’s status as a weapon is judged after its use, probation conditions aim to guide future behavior, raising the question of how someone on probation can be properly warned if an object’s classification depends on how it’s used.

The state disagreed and argued that probationers are fairly warned not to use something to physically threaten another person. Bushong asked if the state’s position on the probation violation would change if Cortes’ knife had been wrapped in a napkin with a fork, spoon and cup, but Koch said it would not in part due to the size of the blade.

“I do want to clarify then, it is the state’s position that probationers in Oregon, subject to this general condition of probation, cannot possess kitchen cutlery in excess of four inches?” James asked.

“Yes,” Koch responded, adding that any probationer with dreams of becoming a chef can ask for an exception.

Bushong asked about if Cortes instead had a hammer poking out of his backpack. But because “knives are knives” and hammers haven’t served as instruments of combat throughout history, it would be a different story, Koch responded.

Turning to intent and swinging back over to the baseball metaphor, the justices questioned at what point the state believes an object with a dual purpose becomes a weapon.

The justices posited: Baseball bat at home plate? Not a weapon. Baseball bat in the hands of an angry person with the intent to hit the pitcher? Not a weapon. Baseball bat wielded at the pitcher? Weapon.

“Correct,” Koch confirmed. But, because of the length of Cortes’ knife, even if he approached a picnic table with a steak on it, he would still be in possession of a weapon, he argued.

“Yes, because it is that large of a knife with that large of a blade,” Koch said.

On rebuttal, Geiringer argued that while the length of the blade might indicate whether it’s being used as an instrument of combat, there’s no indication that four-and-a-half inches was ever intended to be a definitive threshold.

The state Supreme Court didn’t indicate when it would rule.