Find where agent-controlled intent reaches consequential actions without an enforceable authority check. Parses Python, TypeScript, and Go. Other languages are not supported.
Quick start
No install, no config, no cloud account. The first run produces a blast-radius summary:
Your agent can reach 12 consequential actions without a dominating authorization check.
REPOSITORY 4 create_file, merge, delete_ref, publish_release
MONEY 3 process_refund, issue_credit, charge_card
DATA LOSS 2 delete_s3_prefix, purge_workspace
EXECUTION 2 deploy, run_migration
EGRESS 1 notify_customers
Most exposed: app/tools.py:47 process_refund()
Reachable by: @mcp.tool()
Consequence: MONEY
Guard evidence: none found on the analysed path
Model-controlled inputs: payment_intent, amount
12 findings in 340 files (0.42s)
Next:
actenon-scan explain app/tools.py:47
actenon-scan fix app/tools.py:47
Then dig deeper:
actenon-scan explain app/tools.py:47 # show the analysed execution path actenon-scan fix app/tools.py:47 # generate a remediation diff actenon-scan brief app/tools.py:47 # one-page report for outreach actenon-scan scan . --format html # self-contained HTML report actenon-scan scan . --format markdown # paste into a GitHub issue actenon-scan scan . --format sarif # upload to GitHub code scanning
What Actenon Scan detects
Actenon Scan finds places where a model-controlled or agent-controlled parameter reaches a consequential action — a payment, a repository mutation, a file deletion, a shell command, a database write, an email send — without a dominating authority check in the analysed path.
Consequence categories detected:
| Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| REPOSITORY | PyGithub create_file/delete_file, raw GitHub REST, GitPython push/commit |
| MONEY | Stripe refunds, Braintree charges, generic payment SDK calls |
| DATA LOSS | SQL DELETE, s3.delete_objects, file deletion |
| EXECUTION | subprocess, os.system, eval/exec, container creation |
| DATABASE | psycopg2/sqlite3 execute with caller-controlled SQL |
| EGRESS | requests/httpx POST/PUT/DELETE to external URLs |
| MESSAGING | SMTP email, Slack, Twilio, SendGrid, Resend, SES |
| IDENTITY | IAM mutations, access-control changes |
| SECRETS | Secrets-manager reads |
| DEPLOYMENT | kubectl, terraform, helm |
| FILE | File writes, chmod, rename |
| BROWSER | Playwright page.click/fill, Selenium send_keys |
| PROVIDER | Provider-SDK calls (aws-sdk, gcp, azure) |
What it does not establish
The scanner may establish that:
- an agent or model-controlled parameter reaches a consequential action;
- no dominating authority check was found in the analysed path;
- a recognised sink is present.
The scanner does not automatically establish that:
- an attacker can externally reach the agent;
- no guard exists outside the analysed file or supported architecture;
- exploitation is practical;
- the operation is irreversible;
- the finding is a vulnerability.
How to explain a finding
actenon-scan explain path/to/file.py:42
Shows the analysed execution path: agent entry point → model-controlled inputs → execution path → guard evidence → consequence. Includes a mandatory "What this does NOT establish" section.
How to generate a fix
actenon-scan fix path/to/file.py:42 # auto-select mode, print diff actenon-scan fix path/to/file.py:42 --mode guard # repository-native guard actenon-scan fix path/to/file.py:42 --mode approval # framework approval actenon-scan fix path/to/file.py:42 --mode actenon # Actenon proof verification actenon-scan fix path/to/file.py:42 --apply # write the change
Remediation is offered in neutral order: repository-native guard first, framework-native approval second, Actenon proof verification third. Actenon is not forced into every recommendation.
How to add it to a PR
GitHub Action (sticky comment + SARIF, zero config)
# .github/workflows/actenon-scan.yml name: actenon-scan on: pull_request: push: branches: [main] schedule: - cron: '0 6 * * *' jobs: scan: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: pull-requests: write # for the sticky comment security-events: write # for SARIF upload to Security tab contents: read steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: Actenon/actenon-scan@v1
That's it. The action:
- Scans only changed files on PRs (full tree on push/schedule)
- Posts a sticky blast-radius comment on PRs with findings (updated in place)
- Uploads SARIF to the GitHub Security tab
- Does not fail the build by default
Ready to enforce? Add fail-on: high once you've triaged your baseline:
- uses: Actenon/actenon-scan@v1 with: fail-on: high
All inputs
| Input | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
path |
. |
Path to scan |
fail-on |
none |
Fail at this severity (none/low/medium/high). Default: none. The CLI default is medium (intentionally different — see Exit codes below). |
config |
"" |
Path to config file |
baseline |
"" |
Path to baseline.json for known-findings suppression |
scan-scope |
auto |
changed (PR only), full (entire repo), or auto |
comment-on-pr |
true |
Post sticky blast-radius comment on PRs |
upload-sarif |
true |
Upload SARIF to Security tab |
version |
"" |
Pin scanner version (default: action's own version) |
Outputs
| Output | Description |
|---|---|
findings-count |
Total findings |
high-count |
HIGH-severity findings |
medium-count |
MEDIUM-severity findings |
low-count |
LOW-severity findings |
sarif-path |
Path to the SARIF file |
Pre-commit hook
# .pre-commit-config.yaml repos: - repo: https://github.com/Actenon/actenon-scan rev: v1.1.4 hooks: - id: actenon-scan args: [--changed-only, HEAD] # Optional: scan TypeScript/JavaScript and Go files too. Requires # the [typescript] / [go] extras (auto-installed by pre-commit). - id: actenon-scan-typescript - id: actenon-scan-go
The default workflow does not block merging solely because findings exist
unless you explicitly configure fail-on: high.
Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | No findings at or above the --fail-on threshold |
| 1 | Findings at or above the threshold (or --fail-on-unsupported and unsupported files found) |
| 2 | Usage error (bad arguments, missing file) |
Unsupported files alone do not trigger exit 1 unless --fail-on-unsupported
is passed. A scan that finds 0 supported files but N unsupported files exits 0
with a visible warning in the output.
CLI vs Action: the --fail-on default intentionally differs
| Surface | Default | Why |
|---|---|---|
CLI (actenon-scan scan .) |
medium |
The CLI's exit code is its only machine-readable signal. A scanner that finds 8 unguarded consequential actions and returns 0 passes CI silently — the false-assurance failure this tool exists to close. medium is the near-universal convention for SAST/linter tools (semgrep, bandit, eslint, shellcheck all do it). |
GitHub Action (uses: Actenon/actenon-scan@v1) |
none |
The Action has its own reporting surface — a sticky PR comment + SARIF upload to the Security tab. Findings stay visible even when the check is green. A soft default is defensible for teams adopting the tool against an untriaged baseline. Set fail-on: high once you've triaged. |
Do not "fix" them back into alignment — the two surfaces have different reporting capabilities, and the defaults reflect that.
How to export reports
actenon-scan scan . --format html --output report.html # self-contained HTML actenon-scan scan . --format markdown --output report.md # GitHub issue / PR actenon-scan scan . --format sarif --output report.sarif # GitHub code scanning actenon-scan scan . --format list # old linter-style list actenon-scan scan . --format json --output report.json # machine-readable
HTML reports are self-contained (no external scripts, fonts, or assets), safe to open locally, and include the visible honesty statement: "What this scan verified / did not verify".
How to suppress or baseline known findings
# Suppress a single finding inline — BOTH syntaxes are accepted: # actenon-scan: ignore[REPOSITORY-MUTATION] # actenon-scan: suppress REPOSITORY-MUTATION
# Baseline known findings: actenon-scan scan . --baseline known-findings.json # Generate a baseline from the current scan (locks in today's findings # so only NEW findings appear in future scans): actenon-scan baseline . --output known-findings.json
Scanning a repo that contains test fixtures
If your repo contains security test fixtures — deliberately unguarded code
used to test the scanner or your own security controls — add an
.actenon-scan.json at the repo root to exclude them:
{
"_comment": "Exclude test fixtures that contain intentionally unguarded code.",
"exclude": [
"tests/benchmark/**",
"tests/corpus/**",
"tests/fixtures/**"
]
}The file is auto-detected by actenon-scan scan . — no --config flag
needed. This repo ships one itself; see
.actenon-scan.json.
How to configure custom guards
# Register a guard by name without a config file: actenon-scan scan . --guard my_authorize --guard require_permission # Or use a config file: actenon-scan scan . --config actenon-scan.json actenon-scan init --format json # write a default config
Custom sinks and reachability signals (config-only, no code changes)
You can extend detection without forking the repo. The config file's sinks
and reachability keys are merged with the defaults at load time:
{
"guard_patterns": ["my_authorize"],
"sinks": [
{
"id": "MY-PAYMENT-CHARGE",
"category": "payments",
"severity": "high",
"description": "Custom payment SDK charge call",
"match": {
"type": "qualified_call",
"qualified_names": ["my_payments.charge"]
},
"priority": 20
}
],
"reachability": {
"tool_decorators": ["my_agent_tool", "component"],
"tool_base_classes": ["MyAgentBase", "dspy.Module"]
}
}This is how you add support for an unrecognised agent framework (e.g.
Haystack @component, DSPy dspy.Module, ControlFlow @task) without
waiting for an upstream release. See default_rules.json for the full
schema and CONTRIBUTING.md for the match-type reference.
Every claim above is machine-verified
The claims: machine-verified badge links to a CI gate
(verify-claims.yml) that fails on
every PR, push to main, and once a day if any factual claim this README
makes about the package stops being true:
- Zero runtime dependencies — scan's single most important credibility
claim (it is what lets a security team deploy scan unilaterally into a
codebase that has adopted nothing). Read from
pyproject.toml, not prose. - Install commands — every
pip installin this README is resolved against the live registry; the Python version badge is generated, not hand-edited. - The ecosystem table — rendered from the protocol's
ecosystem.yaml, never hand-edited.
If a claim drifts, the badge goes red before a human notices.
The Actenon ecosystem
Scan is one of the independent repositories that together close the execution gap — the gap between upstream authorization and the execution edge that actually performs a consequential side effect.
| Repository | Role | Depends on | Packages |
|---|---|---|---|
actenon-protocol |
The neutral wire contract — what every artefact looks like on the wire | — | actenon-protocol (PyPI) · @actenon/protocol-types (npm) |
actenon-kernel |
The open verifier — defines what a valid proof is | actenon-protocol |
actenon-kernel (PyPI) |
actenon-permit |
The developer on-ramp and authority broker | actenon-kernel, actenon-protocol |
actenon-permit (PyPI) · @actenon/sdk (npm) |
actenon-scan ← you are here |
The independent static-analysis scanner | — | actenon-scan (PyPI) |
Optional: actenon-cloud — a managed control plane (source-available; see its LICENSE). Not required by any component above; every capability in this ecosystem works without it.
Performance
Measured against a pinned real repository, not a synthetic tree:
langchain-ai/langchain @ fa7ce76, 1,954 Python files scanned. The pin,
every figure below, and the raw crossover table live in
tests/benchmark/perf-fixture.json.
Scan time depends on your core count, so the range is stated across the machines actually measured rather than as a single number you might not be able to reproduce:
| langchain, 1,954 files | serial | default (auto) |
|---|---|---|
| 10-core Apple Silicon | 1.9s | 0.96s |
| 2–4 core CI container | ~5.2s | ~5.2s (stays serial) |
Other repositories on the 10-core host: crewai (957 files) 2.4s → 1.1s, openai-agents (539) 2.1s → 0.67s, mcp-python-sdk (586) 0.6s → 0.29s.
Why the default is not always parallel
Parallelism is not free, and it does not pay off everywhere. Measured, it is ~2.5x faster on a 10-core machine and ~10% slower on a 2–4 core CI runner, where there are no spare cores to absorb the workers.
So --jobs auto-tunes: it parallelises only at 8+ cores and 250+
files, and stays serial otherwise. The 5–7 core range is unmeasured and
therefore treated as serial — the default is the mode that is never slower,
not the one that is sometimes faster.
--jobs N always overrides the auto-tune. --jobs 1 forces serial.
Findings are identical either way; that equivalence is a test, not a claim.
Pre-commit path: --changed-only scans a 1–3 file diff in ~150ms.
What Scan recognises as a guard
Scan recognises three classes of guards. A sink is "guarded" if a recognised guard call appears lexically before the sink in the same function body, OR a recognised guard decorator wraps the function containing the sink. (This is a v1 lexical-precedence heuristic — documented limitation.)
30+ vendor-neutral guard patterns
Recognised out of the box, no Actenon required:
authorize,check_permission,require_permission,has_role,require_roleverify_proof,verify_token,verify_signaturejwt_required,require_jwt,validate_jwtopa_eval,casbin_enforce,cedar_authorizeverify_api_key,verify_mtls,verify_client_certrequire_auth,require_authz,auth_requiredcan,may,is_allowed,check_accessauthorize_request,authorize_action- …and the rest in
actenon_scan/detectors/guards.py
Actenon-specific guards
Recognised when you are using the Actenon ecosystem:
verify_pccb,PCCBVerifier,PCCBVerifier.verifyProtectedExecutor,ProtectedExecutor.executeActenon,Actenon.local,Actenon.cloudBroker,Broker.execute,Broker.execute_via_adapterGateway,Gateway.executeBoundaryMiddleware,BoundaryVerifier,BoundaryVerifier.verify_boundary
Custom guards
Register your own guard function names:
actenon-scan init # Edit actenon-scan.json: # { # "guards": ["my_internal_check", "company_authorize", "acme_can"] # } actenon-scan scan ./my-agent-code
Custom guards are first-class — Scan does not privilege Actenon guards over yours.
Remediation routes — 7 per finding, 3 are Actenon-free
Each finding ships with seven remediation routes. Scan does not pretend Actenon is the only answer.
- Add an existing internal guard. If your codebase already has a guard function Scan didn't recognise, just add it via
actenon-scan initand the finding disappears. - Register the guard with Scan. Same as above — Scan treats your guards as first-class.
- Use Actenon Kernel (proof verification). For when you want proof-bound execution at the resource boundary. The Kernel is the trust anchor; it works without Permit or Cloud.
- Use brokered Actenon protection (Permit + adapter). For when you control the agent framework and want credentials never to reach the agent. The recommended developer on-ramp.
- Use resource-owned verification. For when the resource itself is the protected endpoint (FastAPI route, Express endpoint, Go handler). The Boundary Kit automates this.
- Use Cloud-managed Actenon. For when you want a hosted control plane with 9-layer evidence bundles. Optional.
- Redesign the boundary. Sometimes the right answer is to remove the consequential action from the agent's reachable tool surface entirely.
Cloud is optional. Local brokered protection (route 4) works without any Cloud login.
What's in this repo
| Component | Location |
|---|---|
| CLI entry point | actenon_scan/cli.py |
| Scan engine (AST walk + sink detection + guard check) | actenon_scan/engine.py |
| Sink detector (consequential-action rules) | actenon_scan/detectors/sinks.py |
| Guard detector (vendor-neutral + Actenon + custom) | actenon_scan/detectors/guards.py |
| Reachability analysis | actenon_scan/detectors/reachability.py |
| Default rules (16 categories) | actenon_scan/rules/default_rules.json |
| Rule loader | actenon_scan/rules/loader.py |
| Baseline (known-findings suppression) | actenon_scan/baseline.py |
| Suppression directives | actenon_scan/suppress.py |
| Brief (one-page outreach report) | actenon_scan/brief.py |
| Explain (execution-path analysis) | actenon_scan/explain.py |
| Fix (remediation diff generator) | actenon_scan/fix.py |
| Pretty reporter | actenon_scan/report/pretty.py |
| JSON reporter | actenon_scan/report/json_out.py |
| SARIF reporter | actenon_scan/report/sarif.py |
| GitHub Action | action.yml |
| Security policy | SECURITY.md |
| Contributing guide | CONTRIBUTING.md |
Independence
Scan depends on nothing at runtime. No Permit, no Kernel, no Cloud, no Protocol. actenon-protocol is a dev-only dependency, used solely by the drift-gate test (tests/test_protocol_drift.py) to verify that Scan's guard vocabulary and refusal-code references stay in sync with the Protocol's catalogue — it is not installed when you pip install actenon-scan. See pyproject.toml.
Scan is a standalone security tool. You can adopt it without adopting anything else from Actenon, and you can stop using it without affecting any other Actenon component.
License
Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.