Whether or not the Hannibal Directive was used on that day likely depends on many factors:
Whether or not information previously received from foreign intelligence services regarding the plan for the imminent attack was used. (12)
Reports from the Israeli military “scout” team that alerted authorities to preparations and training in Gaza. (12)
The two IDF battalions that reportedly completed their redeployment from the Gaza border to the West Bank shortly before October 7. (12)
The attack by several terrorist groups originating from Gaza using motorcycles, paragliders, etc.
Etc.
I am attempting here to illustrate the context in which this directive was likely implemented on October 7, 2023, as the State of Israel’s response to the initial attack.
This directive is an old story. In fact, a very old story: see the Wikipedia article (1). And it is yet another source of controversy!… The controversy, without changing anything on the ground, sows doubt and numbs public criticism. That, in itself, is already its first “benefit.”
Of course, this kind of directive would be contrary to international law and also contrary to Judeo-Christian morality. And it seems unthinkable that it would be used by the Israeli military, since the IDF is presented, cloaked in the mantle of virtue, as “the most moral army in the world.”
But opinions often diverge between those who, for ages, have denounced the abominable practices of the IDF, and those who support the idea of the “purity of Israel’s weapons” and its concern for “human dignity.” Among the latter is the majority of Israeli public opinion, which overwhelmingly endorses Ariel Sharon’s statement: “The IDF is the most moral army in the world.” (id. Ehud Barak — 2009) (id. Netanyahu — 2025)
The “purity of arms” is defined as follows: “(…) A soldier shall not use his weapon or authority to harm uninvolved civilians or prisoners and shall do everything in his power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity, and property.”
And “human dignity”: “The Israeli army and its soldiers have an obligation to protect human dignity. Every individual has intrinsic value, regardless of ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender, or status.”
But all of this is “The Spirit of the IDF,” which was prominently displayed in 2001 and has remained the official message ever since.
But in 2005, the revised Code came into effect. (2) This “2005” Code thus states that preventing harm to its own combatants must take priority over preventing harm to non-combatants on the opposing side. This is the exact opposite of international law. And this is by far the most common situation on the ground: Israeli Army statistics indeed report a civilian fatality rate among Palestinians of 83% in the Gaza War. (15)
This 2005 Code, on the other hand, seems inspired by biblical injunctions from a different era. (Deut. 20:16).
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Source: https://fraimcpa.com/pitfall-purchasing-double-standards/
Let’s return to October 7, 2023, and the potential impact of implementing the hypothetical Hannibal Directive. Who should be held responsible for the 1,200 wrecked vehicles and the many deaths — men, women, and children?
This “directive” is associated with the Carthaginian general Hannibal, who is said to have preferred to be poisoned rather than handed over to the Romans (around 183 B.C.).
The “Hannibal Directive” is, as we have seen, a secret and controversial directive issued by the Israeli military, under which the military is authorized to open fire on its own soldiers during kidnappings in order to prevent their capture by the enemy. See the confirmation in the French Ministry of the Armed Forces study (13), p. 54
The Washington Post (August 2014) (5) states that the Hannibal Directive was implemented in 1986 but was not made public until 2003, in an article in Haaretz (May 2003) (6) which specifies and confirms that this procedure was kept secret by the Israeli military. It stipulated that “the abduction of soldiers by enemy forces must be thwarted, even if this meant shooting the abductees.”
The IDF faces criticism even from within its own ranks for applying the adage “Better dead than captured” to its soldiers. (7) (Le Monde)
“Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups planned and prepared a large-scale attack that they knew would provoke a violent military response from Israel, which they had anticipated. This meticulous preparation for the October 7 attack therefore ruled out any improvisation.” (13) (French Ministry of the Armed Forces)
A team of Israeli female military “lookouts” monitored movements inside Gaza day and night (using cameras and drones). Their testimony is revealing. (12) (RadioFrance) In summary: “We knew everything they were doing…” More at (14). And the warnings they issued were ignored.
By coincidence, on October 7 — just the week before — the Israeli army had just completed its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. According to the IDF, “There was widespread panic, and decisions began to be made without verified information” (8) (Haaretz)
The delay in military Isreali intervention is also partly explained by the soldiers themselves: “That evening, I asked the soldiers, ‘Where were you? It was 6 p.m., but where were you?’ Some told me they had been called to the West Bank to retrieve their equipment. For some time now, they have been gradually moving more and more soldiers to the West Bank to protect the settlers.” (12) (RadioFrance)
Israeli pilots admit to the failures of October 7 in several books written in Hebrew: “Was I going to shoot at our soldiers or at the terrorists?” (9)
An Israeli helicopter reportedly fired artillery shells at Israeli festivalgoers on October 7. (MiddleEastMonitor) (24H Algérie) (10)
The same goes for tanks: On October 7, an IDF tank reportedly deliberately fired on a house where 14 hostages were being held. This resulted in the near-total destruction of the house, which was partially burned. All the terrorists (except one, who surrendered) were killed, as were twelve of the hostages, including two 12-year-old teenagers. (Libération) (11)
In her Article (3) dated June 28, Caitlin Johnstone reports that “The Israeli press reports that police documents related to security at the Nova music festival, held on October 7, 2023, were mysteriously deleted in early January 2024.” (4).
That’s really unfortunate! Because Netanyahu had promised that a more in-depth analysis of the events of October 7 would be conducted “later” — that is, after “Hamas” had been eradicated.
::::::::::::: NOTES ::::::::::::::
(1) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannibal_Directive
(2) — https://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/tsahal-l-armee-la-plus-morale-du-258810
(3) — https://www.caitlinjohnst.one/p/were-expected-to-remember-october
(4) — https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-900608?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
(12) — ttps://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinfo/podcasts/le-choix-de-franceinfo/alertes-non-prises-en-compte-soldats-redeployes-de-gaza-en-cisjordanie-pourquoi-le-massacre-du-7-octobre-aurait-pu-etre-evite-2667447
(14) — Excerpt from (12): “When I was an observer, I was in front of the Hamas group in Khan Younes. You could see training sessions with up to 30 Hamas members practicing how to take a soldier hostage, how to kill someone, how to breach the barrier, and how to shoot at a tank to make it explode,” she describes. “They have models — large models of our barrier, our border, and large tank models. Everything! We knew everything they were doing…” (…) “The fact that these warnings weren’t heeded makes me so angry. So many people have been left grieving because of the IDF’s incompetence. And little importance is given to the words of the female soldiers who serve as lookouts.”
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