In a recent article, Rob Ashlar has attempted to analyze the nature and causes of Western support for the Zionist entity.1 Despite the very real respect I have for Rob, I found the piece frustrating and misguided. In the spirit of camaraderie, I feel the need not only to criticize him but to take up the question myself and provide an alternative. Hopefully, the analysis that follows will not seem merely negative but will yield some positive result.
In Ashlar’s account, there are “two contending theories, colloquially called the Israel Lobby and the Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier.”
“The former theory argues that Western support for Israel is due to the longstanding power and influence of Zionist political lobbying in the US and other Western governments. The latter theory argues that Western support for Israel is due to Israel’s strategic role as Western muscle in the Middle East, serving as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” against Western enemies”
The theoretical problems of the piece are apparent right from this first paragraph. Why are these theories “contending”? There is nothing in the nature of these claims which would make them mutually exclusive. It is entirely possible, and this is in fact the case, that Zionist lobbying influences Western governments and that i$rael’s military complex allows for intense power projection into the region. On what grounds can Ashlar claim that these two approaches are diametrically opposed? On the grounds of “interest.”
“Lobby theory contended that a parochial political lobby made Western governments act against their own imperial interests. In contrast, the Aircraft Carrier theory proposed a very simple position: Western governments support Israel because Israel serves their interests.”
What is actually at stake here is not really a question of “lobbying vs. power projection” but one of “interest vs. noninterest.” Are Western governments and politicians working in their own interests or have they been manipulated into working against their own interests? The solution presented to this problem is Ashlar’s own new-and-improved version of the Lobby argument, which he calls “the Zionist Para-State” but frequently refers to as “ZOG.” Ashlar extends the argument beyond the formal lobby and instead looks at the influence of Zionist and Jewish organizations and communities on the amerikkkan government, but his argument is still ultimately one of amerikkkan noninterest.2
“The US and almost all other Western governments serve Zionism with no regard to even Western strategic interests, still less the democratic demands of Western publics.
Indeed, from a “rational” perspective, nothing explains Western support for Israel.”
It is my contention that this conclusion is not only theoretically untenable but empirically false, and in demonstrating that, I will take up my own approach to the question of amerikkkan interests in the Zionist project and the “special relationship” between the two states.3
The first prejudice that must be overcome in the pursuit of our analysis is the one that argues that one side of the equation must be serving the other’s interests, and that this therefore means they are not serving their own interests. As Ashlar formulates things, either “Western governments support Israel because Israel serves their interests” or “Western governments serve Zionism with no regard to even Western strategic interests.” The U$-i$sraeli relationship is conceptualized as a zero-sum game, where a gain for one means a loss for the other. This is a far too common approach to the issue, the question often being posed as, “Who controls who?”
The reality is that the U$-i$raeli alliance is structured by a large ensemble of mutually beneficial systems and dynamics that ultimately serve the interests of both parties. When we start from an analysis of the real relations between the two, rather than from preexisting models, we discover not a zero-sum game but a deeply symbiotic relationship. Take, as one example, the much talked about but rarely thought about multibillion dollar foreign assistance package extended to i$rael each year. In 2023, the U$ provided $3,309,256,038 in foreign assistance to the Zionist entity.4 What? They’re just giving them billions of dollars? The Zionists must be Occupying our Government! Not quite. Of that total, $3.3 billion or 99.7% was granted in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). This is a program through which the U$ provides grants to foreign governments to fund the purchase of goods and services from amerikkkan military and defense firms.5 The U$ government extends FMF to i$rael, which i$rael redeems in the form of, for example, Lockheed Martin F-35s, and the U$ settles accounts with Lockheed Martin. The U$ is not sending money to i$rael. The U$ is giving i$rael coupons to spend in the U$.
Let us, for a moment, look at this process in the abstract, divorced from questions of regional power or global hegemony, and study it in isolation. This system forms a triangle of benefits, serving the interests of all parties involved. From the i$raeli perspective, it is easy to see what they gain. They receive free weapons. FMF constitutes roughly 15% of the Zionist military budget in an average year and gives them access to sophisticated systems they might not have been able to afford otherwise, such as Sikorsky CH-53K helicopters or the previously mentioned F-35s.6 It is equally obvious what amerikkkan weapon’s manufacturers get out of the deal: money. The FMF program is essentially a subsidy for these firms, increasing demand for their products. And despite what “ZOG” type analysis would have you believe, the U$ government also benefits in several ways. First, subsidizing U$ manufacturing has the usual Keynesian motivations and benefits. Second, during periods where the U$ military may not be actively engaged in combat, this external demand helps to prevent the atrophy of the country’s military-industrial base. If there was no money to be made, capital would by necessity flee from weapons manufacturing, and that would leave the U$ vulnerable. Third, by inserting itself as a crucial actor in the military budgeting and strategizing of i$rael, the U$ secures itself a privileged position in i$raeli politics and even some command over the actions of the Zionist Occupation Forces. What we see is not one-sided manipulation or coercion but a harmony of interests. Every side of the triangle reinforces every other side. As such, in the pursuit of its own interests, the amerikkkan government necessarily also serves the interests of i$rael, and the same can be said in the other direction.
Understanding the incentive structures at play here should help to explain why there is basically no support for cutting U$ aid to i$rael at the highest levels of government. To do so would mean not only going against i$rael and facing the wrath of the Zionist lobby but cutting billions from the balance sheets of defense contractors, angering the military industrial complex, and weakening the position of the U$ both domestically and internationally. The reason the i$rael lobby gets its way is because its desires happen to align with the desires of the broader establishment.7 There is a triple coincidence of wants.
What is also obvious from this example is that the “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier” hypothesis, with its narrow focus on “Israel’s strategic role as Western muscle in the Middle East,” can not hope to capture the variety of interests involved. Yes, the U$-i$rael relationship certainly boosts amerikkkan power projection capabilities in the region, but that is far from the only benefit they reap. Many other economic and political motivations need to be considered.
Aside from muscle, the Zionist entity also provides its brains. U$ and i$raeli intelligence agencies work in coordination with each other and share information. The i$raeli intelligence community (kkkommunity), and particularly the Mossad (the Moᛋᛋad), provide critical updates on developments in the Middle East and around the globe. During the Cold War, i$rael was able to infiltrate Soviet information networks and directly seize material from its Arab neighbors which provided amerikkkan officials with details regarding Soviet military capabilities that they could not have discovered for themselves until much later.8 Most critically, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, i$sraeli agencies gathered crucial information about the USSR’s nuclear-equipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, which was then communicated to the U$. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Global War on Terror, the role of i$raeli intelligence became more focused on occurrences in the Middle East, but it lost none of its importance to the hegemonic power of the U$. These intelligence capabilities are in some ways more important to the U$ than the direct power projection provided by i$rael in its role as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” In his infamous and hilarious interview with Tucker Carlson, Ted Cruz invoked intelligence cooperation as a single benefit that he felt justified the entire U$-i$rael relationship.9
“Our military support for Israel is massively in America’s national security interests… The annual cost is $3 billion… We get massive benefits from Israel. Israel shares, the Mossad is one of the best intelligence sources on the planet… If we tried to recreate the national security benefits of our alliance with Israel, it would cost, I don’t know, $30 billion, $300 billion.”
What Cruz is attempting to say, through his stutters and stumbles, is actually an intelligent point, and this is one of the most important subjects for our discussion: i$rael internalizes the costs of U$ empire. While providing military aid and political backing, the U$ has not had to send any sort of substantial economic aid to i$rael in years. The Zionist entity is economically self-sustaining, even if its position as an expansionist settler colony means it is always in need of military and political support. This unique mix of dependence and self-sufficiency makes i$rael an ideal ally for a global superpower like the U$. On the one hand, their military-political dependency will keep them in line, making sure that they fit themselves into your broader strategic interests and goals. On the other, their self-sufficiency means that they are able to take on much of the responsibilities involved in executing and maintaining those plans. i$rael funds, trains, and organizes the Mossad, but the U$ is given access to the information it obtains (for a relatively small fee). As Cruz explains, were the U$ to try to replicate the Mossad on its own, it would be exorbitantly expensive. i$rael has internalized the costs of intelligence.
The Zionist entity absorbs R&D costs. Not only are there dozens of joint projects between i$raeli and amerikkkan research and development teams, but i$rael also takes on these projects independently before turning over the results to the U$. While the U$ has provided plenty of funding for the Iron Dome, the initial costs of its development and production were taken on by i$rael alone before turning over certain rights and portions of the project to the U$ in exchange for funding.10 As a reliable customer for U$ weapons manufacturers, i$rael is often early to adopting new weapons and systems. They test them out on innocent civilians (and, rarely, on actual militants) and then report back on their performance, aiding amerikkkan firms in the development of their products.11
The Zionist entity absorbs personnel costs. While the U$ military budget is bloated by the price of paying a volunteer army in a country with a relatively high standard of living, i$rael makes use of conscripts and therefore does not have to offer competitive wages.12 Not only does amerikkka not have to pay the costs of maintaining i$rael’s soldiers, but their soldiers don’t even cost as much. It is expensive to put amerikkkan boots on the ground. i$raeli boots are cheap. And amerikkkans don’t care if i$raeli soldiers get blown to bits. They might care if it happens to amerikkkan soldiers. In direct conflicts, i$rael thus also absorbs the costs of losing personnel and the social costs of public unrest.
These are just some of the ways in which the costs of U$ empire are internalized by the Zionist entity. I encourage all anti-Zionists to take up the task of identifying and describing the others, but for now, I hope they are enough to demonstrate the point. Whatever price tag can be placed on the support provided by the U$ to i$rael, it is a minute fraction of what it would cost for them to provide for themselves all the benefits which i$rael provides. U$ support for i$rael is not a gift. It is an exchange, and a highly profitable one. Remember that in Joe Biden’s famous Zionist rant he refers to i$rael as, “the best $3 billion investment we make.” It’s an “investment.” Investments must see a return, and from the calculations of the U$ state, no investment sees a higher return than the one they have made in i$rael.
There is a lesser known quote from Genocide Joe which demonstrates this even more clearly. In February of 1986, two years before Biden’s first failed attempt to become president, he held a meeting with i$raeli ambassador to the U$ Meir Rosenne.13 At one point, early in the meeting, Rosenne thanked Biden for consistently championing U$ aid. In reply, Biden told Rosenne that the aid was more important to the U$ than it was to i$rael. He concluded by saying, with the honesty politicians reserve for meetings behind closed doors, “That’s our best investment, where we get the biggest bang for our buck.”
To say “i$rael internalizes the costs of U$ empire” is also to say “The U$ externalizes the costs of U$ empire.” But that is precisely what empires have always sought to do. If you want to be the hegemon of the capitalist world-system for any substantial period of time, you have to try to offset the costs of running the planet. Those who wish to stay in power delegate the responsibilities of maintaining the balance. It is just as Giovanni Arrighi said: “The secret of capitalist success is to have one’s wars fought by others, if feasible costlessly and, if not, at the least possible cost.”14
The central argument that I have been trying to drive home is that U$ support for i$rael is not due to any one single factor but to a great number of factors, all of which reinforce each other. The process is overdetermined. In an effort to demonstrate this even further, I will now look at the problem from yet another perspective.
It must always be remembered that the U$-i$rael alliance was forged in the context of the Cold War. The Zionist entity was conceived not only as a European outpost in the Orient15 but also as a base of support for the global hegemon, and it has continued to serve that purpose even after the baton of global hegemony was passed from the brits to the amerikkkans. A core motivation in the amerikkkan decision to take over the Zionist project was in fact its immense potential as a weapon in the great power conflict with the USSR, particularly after the Six-Day War in 1967.
This anti-Soviet aspect of the relationship was perhaps expressed best by Ronald Wilson Reagan himself.16 During his first campaign for presidency in 1979, Reagan wrote a piece for the Washington Post titled, “Recognizing the Israeli Asset,” in which he speaks rather bluntly about the topic.17 If Soviet influence was allowed to spread through the Middle East, the U$ and its european allies would be put in an incredibly precarious position, with european markets and manufacturers (especially those dependent on oil) at the mercy of Soviet designs. Without many strong allies in the region, i$rael’s strategic importance was hard to overstate. Reagan described “Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf kingdoms” as “weak and vulnerable,” which meant they were unreliable allies. The Zionists were incredibly impressive by comparison.
“Her intelligence services provide critical guidance to ongoing regional development, the technical know-how of her specialists could be used to service American equipment in a crisis, and her facilities and airfields could provide a secure point of access if required at a moment of emergency. Further, Soviet planners must constantly take into account the effective dominance of the Israeli forces and especially its air force, over critical zones of access and transit in the region. In a moment of crisis the knowledge that this air force can create a zone of danger and uncertainty to the U.S.S.R. must greatly restrict Soviet options and thereby facilitate the tasks of American planners.”
As mentioned previously, i$raeli intelligence was already playing an important role in the Cold War at the time this piece was published, and it only grew in importance after. Zionist campaigns throughout the Middle East destabilized and weakened Soviet allies, creating power vacuums and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the U$. Zionism ultimately served as an important lever for elevating the U$ above the USSR in the power struggle over the Middle East, which was crucial to the survival of amerikkkan global hegemony.
Today, in the era of great power competition with China, i$rael continues to serve as a key player in the amerikkkan strategy to maintain dominance. One of the motivations for U$ involvement in the Twelve-Day War between i$rael and Iran this year was the possibility of a strategic advantage over China. Michael Flynn, retired U$ general and former national security advisor to Trump, laid out his analysis of the situation in an interview with Steve Bannon while the war was still ongoing.18
“A positive US relationship with an Iranian regime, so whatever the regime is that rises up out of the ashes, if we have a positive relationship with that regime, that really benefits the United States of America, particularly against China, and it weakens China… A victory by Israel establishes the perception, if not the reality, of US global dominance, and certainly Israeli dominance in that region.”
Even if the U$ could not establish a friendly regime in Iran, the destruction of the Iranian state would, in Flynn’s analysis, at least “allow the United States to fully shift to focusing on China.” In this same interview, Bannon refers to the need for, “a strategic pivot out of the Middle East… to actually confront the existential threat to the country, the Chinese Communist Party.” Flynn, in agreement, refers to China as “the principle 21st century adversary” of the U$.
Iran is a significant partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the overthrow of the Iranian government (or even its severe disfigurement) would seriously slow down its development.19 On May 25th, 2025, China and Iran celebrated the launch of a direct rail link between the two countries, with a freight train of solar panels leaving from Xi’an and arriving in Aprin.20 China has hopes of building further trade routes that run not only into Iran but through Iran to the Middle East and Europe.21 It seems significant that within three weeks of the successful launch of the China-Iran rail connection, i$rael was bombing Iran. As economist and historian Michael Hudson put it, “If the United States can overthrow the Iranian government, this interrupts the long transportation corridor that China already has constructed and hopes to extend further west.”22 This would be a serious blow to China’s economic and political prospects.
The U$ also used the war as an opportunity to try to break the Iran-China alliance. While it must be admitted that the alliance is not all that strong to begin with, it is clear that Iran has closer ties to China than to the U$, and Iran would undoubtedly ally itself with China in the context of a world war sparked by conflict between the two superpowers. It is in the amerikkkan interest to try to pull the two apart, and the war provided them with the perfect opportunity.
As the war heated up, Iran began to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, shutting off a waterway used to transport around 20% of global oil and gas. Yet i$rael and the U$ continued to escalate. Rather than seeking to appease the Iranians themselves, the U$ tried to entangle China in the conflict. U$ secretary of state Marco Rubio called on the leadership in Beijing to dissuade Iran from taking such a radical action.23 This put China in a peculiar position. If the U$-i$rael alliance continued to push Iran, they might close the strait. As Rubio acknowledged, China heavily depends on the Strait of Hormuz for the transport of their oil imports. In contrast, while the U$ would certainly feel the price shocks caused by such a supply chain disruption, the strait is of very little importance to amerikkka as far as actual transport routes. The costs of a closure would be disproportionately felt in China and Asia. China therefore has a serious incentive to ensure that doesn’t happen. However, to intervene and try to convince Iran to step down for no compensation would be to betray an ally completely. Worse, to do so after the U$ has suggested the idea would be to act in full accordance with the wishes of the global hegemon, the rival power. If Iran closed the strait, it would do serious damage to China, perhaps permanently eroding their alliance. If China stepped in to prevent Iran from doing so, acting on the suggestions of a country actively attacking Iran, they would have effectively joined the enemy axis of power. The U$ was pitting the two against each other.
This strategy ultimately did not succeed because Iran did not close the strait and China did not step in. Maybe this is because of the short duration of the conflict, but maybe it is because both parties understood the game that was being played. That does not mean the amerikkkan attempt to split their alliance was entirely unsuccessful though. While China did not intervene against Iran, they also did not intervene on their behalf. The U$ put its full support behind i$rael, but China basically sat on the sidelines and watched the bombs fall on Iran. The message was clear. Of the two rival superpowers, only one of them can be relied on to show up for its allies.24 The entire affair had the ghouls at the RAND Corporation praising the closer alliance represented by the West and celebrating the fact that, “Iran had no support from its partners.”25
In hindsight,26 it was probably foolish of anyone to expect China to move against i$rael. China is the second most important partner to i$rael after the U$, being both the leading source of their imports and a partner in economic development.27 The Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) even operates the port in Haifa, a multibillion dollar project.28 Just two weeks before the start of the war, Chinese officials were posting on twitter (formerly “X”) about their desire to deepen economic ties with i$rael.29 It is clear that China favors economic development over political strength, the sovereignty of their allies, or basic moral consistency.
The growing ties between China and i$rael are yet another site of struggle for the U$. As Rob Ashlar acknowledges in his piece, the Zionists have been rather open to going wherever the power lies. From the british, to the french, to the amerikkkans, they have only ever stuck with a backer as long as it benefited their settler colonial project. As the Chinese-i$raeli economic and political connection strengthens, there is always the possibility (though I personally find this unlikely) that they jump ship from the sinking U$ empire and into the refreshing waters of the Chinese century. U$ support for i$rael is not only useful for crushing China’s allies but also for making sure i$rael never becomes one of them. The massive benefits the U$ collects from its Zionist investment would be torture for it in the hands of a rival.
Reagan’s piece contains another key insight into the “special relationship” between the U$ and i$rael: “Israel's strength derives from the reality that her affinity with the West is not dependent on the survival of an autocratic or capricious ruler.”
We are often told that “Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East,” but the reality is that i$rael is the only country that the West can allow to be any kind of democracy. Saudi or Egyptian support for the U$ comes overwhelmingly from their authoritarian rulers. It is a common refrain from anti-Zionist scholars and activists that, were these governments democratic, they would have destroyed i$rael and lifted the boot of the U$ off their throats a long time ago. What nation in the region would vote against the Palestinians and in favor of i$rael? What nation would vote in favor of U$ global hegemony and vassallage to european and amerikkkan powers? U$ power in these countries relies on stifling democracy and propping up dictatorships, but that is far from a sustainable model in the long run. The Zionist entity, in sharp contrast, has a reliable mass base to draw on. While the fall of a dictator may mean the end of an allied regime in other countries, i$raeli support for a partnership with the West can endure a hundred changes of government.
The West, and in particular the U$, has been able to maintain dominance over much of the Middle East, but only in i$rael have they truly achieved hegemony, the consent of the populace. As Reagan put it, “Israel has the democratic will,” something no other nation can seriously claim to offer amerikkka. i$rael will always receive preferential treatment because they can provide something more than the other countries in the region. Jordan can only offer a state.30 The Zionists can offer a people. The U$-i$rael alliance runs far deeper and remains more stable than any other amerikkkan pact in the region for this exact reason. There is a difference between dominance and hegemony.
Why is it that the population of the Zionist entity can so easily be relied on to stay loyal to the West? I have a theory. It’s really more of a random guess. Take it with a grain of salt. But maybe, possibly, it’s because that’s where they’re fucking from. They’re a european settler colony and their current prime minister (Satanyahu) went to high school in Pennsylvania.31 Asking why Zionists are loyal to the West is like asking why a German is loyal to the West. Because that’s them! They are the West!32
I once again must remind the reader that this is by no means an exhaustive list of the reasons why the U$ supports i$rael. I have not even touched on, as just one example, the fact that many amerikkkan firms have capital investments in i$rael that would almost certainly be disrupted or destroyed if the Zionist entity were to collapse. What I have been trying to do is demonstrate how I believe we should approach the issue, and how we should approach every issue, so that others may take up the task. We must develop a concrete analysis of a concrete situation.33 And what kind of concrete analysis would we be conducting without a discussion of the contradictions inherent to all concrete objects of study?
First, allow me to discuss what I will call, for the sake of shorthand, “the contradictions of inertia.” The modern amerikkkan decision to support i$rael is not made in a vacuum. It always exists in the context of the two entities’ prior history. Once the relationship has been established and the dynamics are in place, it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle. The costs of separation rise to such heights that they make a divorce practically impossible. What would be the cost of canceling all joint military and intelligence projects between the two parties? What would be the cost to U$ capital were i$rael to stop giving them preferential treatment, or even for i$rael to collapse and those projects to fall under new management? The larger the investment, the harder it becomes to pull out. Even if the Zionist project were to become a net negative for the U$, which I don’t think has happened quite yet, what would it take for the U$ to acknowledge its sunk costs and move on? Like many colonial and imperialist powers before them, it is far more likely that the inertia of the project would carry them toward further and further investment until they were forced to declare the whole enterprise bankrupt. This kind of logic can be seen in amerikkka’s “forever wars,” where structural inertia has caused them to carry on completely failed campaigns years after their expiration date.34 To invest is to take on risk, and the more you invest, the more risk you are stuck with. The deeper amerikkka embeds itself into the Zionist entity, the larger the damage that will be done to the U$ if Zionism faces its ultimate defeat. So every time i$rael is threatened, amerikkka must step in to protect its interests, and it must do so by investing even more. This is what I am calling a contradiction of inertia. The more the U$ invests, the greater their vulnerability, and the greater their vulnerability, the more they must invest. Eventually, from the amerikkkan perspective, the Zionist project becomes too big to fail.
There is another contradiction of inertia which effects the prospects of U$ regional, and even global, hegemony. The U$ initially supported i$rael so that it could gain dominance over the Middle East and North Africa. It has served that purpose well. However, in supporting i$rael, the U$ has basically guaranteed that any future Palestinian state would not see it as an ally. There is no chance, should the Zionist entity collapse, that what comes after will have a positive view of amerikkkan interference in the region. The opportunity costs for not supporting i$rael rise every day that the i$raelis continue to torture and murder the people most likely to take their place. On top of this, i$rael may have been a useful tool for gaining dominance over other countries in the region, but its treatment of the Palestinians and its campaigns against its neighbors have necessarily spread not only anti-Zionist but anti-amerikkkan sentiment within those nations. It’s like hiring a hitman who announces the name of his employer to the families and friends of his targets. Perhaps, decades ago, there was some chance of the U$ having genuine hegemony in these countries, the kind that Reagan yearned for. But the choice to use i$rael to achieve dominance has destroyed that. The U$ support for i$rael creates new enemies for the U$ all the time. And who do they have in the region to deal with their enemies? The Zionists. So they double down. They invest more in i$rael. They create more enemies, and their prospects in the region get ever bleaker.35 Hegemony slips further and further away, and amerikkka is left with an increasingly unstable dominance.
Not only are there new enemies being created all the time, but the Zionist entity, as a settler colonial state, is inherently destabilizing to the region. The creation of thousands upon thousands of refugees a year and the pressure put on neighboring states to enter into an arms race with i$rael are certainly not conducive to the kind of stability that planners in wa$hington depend on. As other nations are destabilized or have their economies stifled by arms races, refugees, or the upkeep of an authoritarian state, who is left in the region for the amerikkkans to depend on? Once again, the Zionists are their best option. They support the Zionists, who create even more instability in the region, and the instability forces them to extend greater support to the Zionists.
To summarize these three contradictions of inertia:
Investment in i$rael -> greater damage if i$rael is lost -> to prevent loss, greater investment -> greater damage if i$rael is lost -> etc
Support for i$rael -> creates enemies -> support i$rael to deal with enemies -> creates more enemies -> etc
Support for i$rael -> creates regional instability -> i$rael is seen as more reliable than its unstable neighbors, so receives more support -> creates more regional instability -> etc
What these contradictions demonstrate is that the question, “Is amerikkka serving its own interests?” does not necessarily require a “yes” or “no” answer. As every true dialectician knows, it is entirely possible for history to advance in a double movement. The U$ is both acting in its own interests and against them. Just as the premises which facilitated the Nazi economic boom eventually became its Achilles heel,36 and just as the secrets to Japan’s forty year slump lay in an analysis of the “Japanese miracle,”37 so too does the ultimate betrayal of amerikkkan interests descend from a completely rational pursuit of amerikkkan interests.38
There are other contradictions of course, but let us focus on only one more for the time being. There is a contradiction which all metropoles must face in dealing with their colonies. It is essential that the colony be independent, and yet this very independence is a source of conflict with the metropole. If i$rael were merely an amerikkkan state, number 51, it would no longer serve as a means of externalizing the costs of empire. It would become the responsibility of the U$ to organize, train, and fund i$raeli intelligence and military personnel. The massive price tag Ted Cruz talks about, which he correctly insists they can not afford to replicate, would fall squarely on the U$. The costs would be astronomical, and the logistics would be unfathomable. It is in amerikkka’s own interests that i$rael remains an independent state. However, this independence also means that the Zionists are able to act in ways the U$ does not approve of. In fact, it sometimes puts the interests of the two entities completely at odds with each other, though only for moments at a time. As long as i$rael remains dependent on U$ backing, they know not to wander too far off from amerikkkan strategy, but that doesn’t mean they won’t push the limits. Occasionally, the U$ might have to yank the leash. Reagan had to tell them to cool down in Lebanon,39 and Obama had to pull them out of Operation Protective Edge.40 The U$ may also pursue strategies that anger the i$raelis. They were not happy in the slightest at the possibility of a nuclear deal with Iran. Unlike the amerikkkans, the Zionists have no real leash to pull, so they must find other tactics to get their way, such as creating fake reports or psyops of imminent danger from Iran.41 Strife and struggle exist within the U$-i$rael relationship. It is by no means a completely harmonious arrangement. Yet, for the last 60 years, the interests of the two have ultimately been more compatible than not. No lovers' spat can break up the happy couple.
I should add, “for now.” Zionist interest and british interests were aligned for even longer, and yet the Zionists had no qualms about the end of british hegemony. If another patron were to come along, willing to take over the maintenance fees for the colonial project, I doubt they would shed too many tears about a declined amerikkkan position. If amerikkka ever genuinely threatened the expansionist settler colonialism at the heart of Zionism, by recognizing a Palestinian state and calling for a return to the pre-1967 borders for example, I’m sure the i$raelis would start actively looking for a new backer. It is completely possible for the slight separation between the colony and the metropole to grow into a break. That is, after all, how the U$ itself was founded. At this point in time, I find that extremely unlikely, but it is possible.42 Until that day, the U$ and i$rael will continue to occasionally bump heads, while always able to find a reason to stay together. The independence that is their strength is also a weakness.
To return to the article that prompted this piece, I think the differences between our approaches should be more than apparent by now. What separates us in the final analysis is what we make of “interests.” Ashlar’s piece takes what I think is the popular approach, the one I see most often in discussions of the topic. Humorously, it is the perspective favored by everyone from comrades like Rob to fascists like Tucker Carlson, from professional scholars like John Mearsheimer to unemployed shitposters on social media. While I trust the reader, this popularity may make it worthwhile to draw out the differences explicitly.
First, the problem of the U$-i$rael alliance is often framed as, “Whose interests are served by this? Israel or America?” As we have demonstrated, this is a false dichotomy. The alliance emerges from not only a number of common interests but from a coincidence of wants which make the exchange beneficial to both sides. Second, there is a tendency to be reductive. Focus is placed on a single factor (such as domestic Zionist campaigning in the “Israel Lobby” hypothesis or power projection in the “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier” hypothesis) at the expense of all others. Similarly, people look at each factor in isolation, find each insufficient, and declare that the entire thing must be simply the result of irrational actors and ideological madness, failing to see that rationality only emerges from the aggregate of the factors under investigation. In this article, I have instead favored a concrete, many-sided analysis, deriving a complex model from reality rather than imposing an abstract one upon it. Third, many have failed to grasp that an “interest” may itself be contradictory, that it is not so simple as deciding whether something “is” or “isn’t” in a party’s interests. They have gone looking for a simple determination, something that exists in formal logic but rarely in reality. This also means they have failed to think historically, to see how a thing may change over time or even undermine and transform itself. I have instead tried as best as I can to think historically (and, as a result, dialectically).
It is my hope that I have encouraged others, in some way, to take up my approach. Perhaps I have made individual claims that can not hold up to scrutiny, or facets of the argument must be refined for accuracy. I will be the first to admit that there are large gaps in this piece that need to be filled by further study. But you will find that the only way to criticize them is to take up the method I have tried to demonstrate. You will have to concretize the argument even further, to take it in even more directions. You will need to be even more conscious of history, able to see the long trajectories of the social structures under investigation. I welcome all scientific criticism of this kind. In fact, I demand it. Rob Ashlar was absolutely right about one thing: If we want to fight Zionism more effectively, we need a better understanding of what upholds it in the first place.
Unfortunately, I believe the solutions suggested by my analysis are the kinds of things best talked about in private. Like a Bolshevik before the revolution, my audience includes the censors. Among the many lessons I learned from the uprising in 2020, I know that when words come before actions, jail comes before change. I will just say this: Only the Palestinians and the Yemenis understand what needs to be done. The Iranian leadership only understood it for twelve short days.