Stalin, the Machiavellian Prince – ANANYA

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To what extent was Joseph Stalin a Machiavellian Prince in his rise to and consolidation of power?

The Prince, a political treatise written by the Italian philosopher, politician and diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli during the Italian Renaissance, is well known for its descriptions of what he believes to be the characteristics and actions of a successful leader. Originally intended for the Medici family in order to persuade them to free Italy from a foreign presence (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011) but also to re-establish Machiavelli’s place in Italian politics, The Prince was highly controversial both in 1513 when it was originally published and now; Machiavellianism – defined as “a personality trait involving manipulativeness and deceit, cynical views toward human nature, and a cold, calculating attitude towards others.” (Taylor, 2018) – is one of the three ‘Dark Triad’ personality traits in psychology, which truly emphasizes the negative connotations of Machiavellianism.

Machiavelli wrote The Prince in Florence, Italy, in 1513. The political climate at the time was turbulent; neighbouring city-states shifted their alliances with Florence rapidly and city-states rose and fell suddenly, so it was difficult to determine how political alliances would carry on over long periods of time. Furthermore, within Florence there was some political turbulence as well; the Medici family, an Italian family that gained a lot of wealth and prestige along with it even going so far as to be described as the “wealthiest family in Italy, perhaps Europe.” (Van Helden, 1995) had been deposed, and Machiavelli gained a role as a diplomat under the new regime. However, in 1513 after the Medici family reclaimed Florence, Machiavelli was accused of conspiring against the Medicis and was tortured on the rack and imprisoned (Pierpont, 2018). This was when he wrote ‘The Prince’, and it is clear that the context in which he wrote greatly influenced his ideas.

Machiavelli wrote many works on history and politics, but The Prince is perhaps his most notorious piece of writing. Known for his logical, pragmatic tone and controversial ideas, Machiavelli and anything associated with him has become taboo. In ‘Henry VI Part III’, Shakespeare describes Machiavelli as “murderous Machiavel” (3.3.139), and Kissinger, when asked whether Nixon’s (and by extension, his own) foreign policy was influenced by Machiavelli’s writings, adamantly denied any association between his work and any Machiavellian influences (“Machiavelli: The Prince”, Documentary on Machiavelli, Part 1., 2009) due to the connotations of being a Machiavellian leader. However, Machiavelli is also heralded as one of the greatest political thinkers ever, and Machiavellian traits are encouraged in every profession from leaders to CEOs to managers. The fascination with Machiavelli has been present as long as controversy has; he has been the inspiration for timeless characters like Shakespeare’s Richard III (Donkor, 2016).

A Machiavellian person is someone who is cunning and deceptive, presenting themselves as someone trustworthy and pious, but behind closed doors is ruthless, frugal, and unafraid to lie, amongst other things such as “appearing to be religious” (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011, p. 71). Overall, Machiavelli emphasises the importance of the ends justifying the means, and so arguably any action can be excused as long as it achieves the intended or desired outcome. This is particularly pertinent when looking at Joseph Stalin, the General Secretary of the USSR from 1922 until his death in 1952, who used ruthless means to rise to power as well as to ensure he did not lose it. Born in Georgia in 1878, Stalin began his career in Russian politics at an early age when he joined the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Davis and Harris, 2005). Stalin quickly rose to power, overcoming his opponent, Trotsky, and used extremely deceptive methods to gain not only his position but a strong base of supporters. He maintained loyalty through his Purges, which not only eradicated any political opponents but also ensured that people remained loyal by creating an environment of fear. Stalin further had huge amounts of public support due to his cult of personality, the method through which Stalin used the media and propaganda amongst other tools to create an image of a godlike leader, garnering respect and admiration from the people. However, it can also be argued that Stalin was not Machiavellian, but rather that he was a replication of the Tsars he himself had overthrown. Ultimately, one must question whether Stalin acted in the interest of the Russian peoples and Soviet society, or if it was in order to consolidate his power and further his personal dictatorship.

Aside from his claim that the ends always justify the means, Machiavelli is perhaps most notorious for his argument that it is better to be feared than loved, dedicating an entire chapter of the treatise to the dilemma. He states “is it better to be loved rather than feared, or vice versa? The answer is that one would prefer to be both” but that “it’s much safer to be feared than loved”. Machiavelli gives a variety of reasons for this: it keeps the Prince’s subjects “loyal and governed”; in the long run it reduces crime, in particular, “public disorder, muggings and murder”; and it keeps the army in check (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011). Similarly, Stalin was seen as a ruthless dictator, violently quelling any dissent. During his time as Premier of the Soviet Union, Stalin conducted a series of ‘purges’ in which he removed members of the Communist Party, often executing them secretly. Some historians argue that the purges were uses to rid the Party of “lazy, undesirable members”, whereas others argue that they were to rid the party of “critic, potential rivals and their supporters” (Oxley, 2001). The first purge, known as the Chistka, came after a large increase in membership of the Bolshevik Party as a result of the change in direction of politics in the Lenin Enrolment, and coinciding with the removal of leaders of the Left – Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev – and the beginning of the criticisms of the leaders of the Right – Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. Between 19928 and 1930, 11% of the Party was purged, in 1933, a further 20% were removed, and in 1936 another 9% were removed, totalling a removal of 40,000 members of the Party (Oxley, 2001). Between the second and third show trials, there was another purge known as Ezhovschina or the ‘Great Purge’, in which the NKVD (Soviet secret police) arrested, imprisoned and executed a huge number of people. They attacked army officials first, despite the looming threat of Hitler’s rise in Germany – a country that had already invaded Russia once in Stalin’s lifetime – but they also moved onto kulaks, political prisoners, priests, and others. Not only did Stalin create an atmosphere of fear that would go on to be known as the Great Terror, but his treatment of the kulaks, the class of ‘rich’ peasants, was also a prime example of his ruthlessness in order to promote his view of communism. As part of the first Five Year Plan, which focused largely on the development of Soviet agriculture, which involved the collectivisation of farms. The kulaks revolted against this idea as it involved the state seizing their grain, livestock and machinery. In response to this, Stalin introduced his policy of dekulakisation, in which he planned to liquidate the kulak class. Around 6-7 million kulaks were affected as a result (Livi-Bacci, 1993). It is evident that Stalin did not fear to appear ruthless, often choosing to use violent methods to achieve his final goal. He ruthlessly removed people from the Communist Party and liquidated an entire class in order to achieve complete collectivisation. Stalin’s purges and treatment of the kulaks clearly reflects Machiavelli’s belief that the ends justify the means, and it is evident that Stalin does not fear the hatred of his peoples so long as he can maintain control and power over them. As a result, it is evident that Stalin was a Machiavellian Prince in this respect in his rise to and consolidation of power.

However, although Machiavelli argues that it is better to be feared than loved, he also argues that “Avoiding contempt and hatred” the title of the 19th chapter of The Prince, is paramount, and that “It’s seeming to be virtuous that helps.”, and that “Nothing wins a ruler respect like…a display of remarkable personal qualities.” (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011). Stalin, in spite of his ruthlessness, exemplified this as well. His use of a cult of personality was extremely effective as a legitimation technique, continuing Lenin’s legacy by applying routinised charisma to create charismatic authority and construct legitimacy (Strong and Killingsworth, 2011). Stalin used a variety of means to present himself as a charismatic leader, particularly through the arts, in the form of propaganda posters and music, as well as in the media, through the state-sponsored magazine Pravda (meaning truth) and his doctoring of photographs. The poster in figure 1 (Karpovsky, 1948) is an accurate representation of what propaganda presented Stalin to be. He is surrounded by workers from miners to members of the Soviet military and is also surrounded by women, children and flowers. This presents him as a man of the people, particularly the proletariat, vital for a leader of a communist state, and associates him with images of innocence, purity and virtue. The presence of the colour red, the Soviet flag, and Lenin, all intrinsically link Stalin to the Communist Party and Lenin’s revolution. Throughout Stalin’s propaganda schemes, Lenin plays a large part in developing Stalin as a charismatic leader. Lenin had essentially been deified by the Soviet public, and anybody associated with him immediately gained the support of the Soviets. This is why when Trotsky did not appear at Lenin’s funeral, he lost support from the public, and was also the reason why Stalin edited images, placing himself closer to Lenin in order to appear one of Lenin’s more devout disciples, or remove disgraced figures like Trotsky, as seen in figure 2 (Goldstein, 2018). Stalin, as a result, was able to gain massive respect from the people, who adored him. He was able to control his image, control the presentation of his regime, and avoid contempt or hatred. It was particularly effective because Stalin was able to control the way the Soviet people thought, twisting their view of his opponents and presenting himself as godlike and almost inhuman in his perfection. For this reason, it is clear that Stalin, like Machiavelli, valued the importance of not being hated. Stalin was a Machiavellian Prince when gaining the respect and avoiding the hatred of his people during his rise to and consolidation of power through his use of legitimation techniques like the cult of personality.

Machiavelli also argued that “if [The Prince] really has to have someone executed, he should only do it when he has proper justification and manifest cause.” (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011). This is likely to avoid provoking hatred amongst the people, something Machiavelli constantly cautions the readers of his treatise to avoid. Stalin, although infamous for the abysmal human rights during his time in power due to a variety of factors, from dekulakisation, to collectivisation and the subsequent famine and loss of over 8 million lives, to the treatment of prisoners in gulags, to his heavy-handed use of the NKVD, to the purges and show trials. Stalin’s regime saw a huge mistreatment of human life, and the human cost was massive. However, despite the constant purges from the Politburo, cases of death in gulags (especially of political prisoners), and politically motivated disappearances, Stalin justified the executions he admitted to, which is clear in the show trials. The show trials, lasting from 1936 to 1938, were a series of trials broadcasted to the world in which Stalin tried various political prisoners, found them guilty, and executed them. These prisoners were often opponents of Stalin, from the leaders of the Left and Right he had purged from the Politburo, army officials, or leaders of the NKVD. They were often forced to confess while being tortured, or with the promise that their families would be protected, and they would be promised their lives in exchange from an implication of other comrades, although many of them were shot regardless. Their crimes were often “impossible”, such as when Zinoviev, Kamenev and fourteen others were accused of working with Trotsky, who was now living in exile in Mexico City. Fourteen of the sixteen admitted to the charges and implicated others, and eventually, all sixteen were charged and executed. The following year, there was a second show trial in which all of the accused were found guilty and all but two condemned to death after they implicated other comrades. Finally, the last of the major show trials occurred in 1938. Bukharin admitted his guilt in court to save his wife and children, as Piarakov had in 1937 but refuted specific accusations during the trial. Bukharin, Rykov and the other accused were shot (Oxley, 2001). Internationally, these trials were ridiculed as they were clearly a façade Stalin used to justify the murder of his enemies, but in Russia, where there was a massive hate campaign in the media surrounding the accused, the public wholeheartedly bought into the story they were fed by the state, and as a result, Stalin’s executions had proper justification and manifest cause, validating his actions. Therefore, Stalin was a Machiavellian Prince in his rise to and consolidation of power.

Stalin was also particularly effective in neutralising his enemies such that neither they nor the idea of them would pose a threat to his rule. He would do this either by condemning them publicly, as he did with Trotsky or by removing his enemies from the collective consciousness of the people, which he achieved much the same way that he achieved his cult of personality. Stalin doctored images to remove those whom he had also removed from Soviet politics, such as in figure 3 (Soviet Photo Staff, n.d.). As a result, Stalin so completely and successfully dismissed of his enemies that his subjects would not stop to think about manifest cause or justice, again adding to his Machiavellianism.

Machiavelli also argued that a Prince will “always need local support to occupy a new territory.” (Parks, 2011, p. 7) in order to avoid any rebellions or uprisings that accompany the taking of a new land. This is another policy that Stalin seemed to adopt: in his rise to power, he made sure to garner as much support within the Politburo as he could. Stalin’s most influential, although underrated, role within the Party was as General Secretary. This allowed him to decide who would be allowed into the Politburo. As a result, the majority of the members in the Politburo owed their position to Stalin and so he could easily gain support for his ideas, policies and also eventually for his rise to power. It was this majority that allowed him to remove his enemies in the first purge so easily. In this first battle for dominance from 1922 to 1929, Stalin formed an alliance known as the ‘Triumvirate’ with Zinoviev and Kamenev which allowed him to vote Trotsky out of the Politburo. Stalin then turned on Zinoviev and Kamenev and expelled them from the Party. Bukharin then criticised Stalin’s policies, leading to him losing his role as president of Comintern, editor of Pravda, and both he and Rykov were removed from the Politburo. Tomsky was also removed as the head of trade unions. Consequently, Stalin was able to remove his enemies and opponents from the Politburo, stripping them of power and making sure that he had a much stronger grasp on it. Machiavelli recommends support from the people in order to establish control over the people and anybody else who may want to test the Prince’s control. Stalin achieves this in part through his cult of personality, but his control over the Politburo allows him to stop any fracturing of the Communist Party while also maintaining his place as Premier of the USSR.

In Chapter 21 of The Prince, Machiavelli further argues that in the case of conflict between two neighbouring countries, a Prince should side with one of them, but he should avoid siding with the more powerful ally because if they win then he is vulnerable to attack from the more powerful ally whereas the weaker ally would be indebted to him (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011). Stalin again clearly embodied this in his attitudes toward Germany in the lead up to and during World War II. In 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a Ten-Year Non-Aggression Treaty known as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in which both parties agreed not to attack one another. This pact also expanded the USSR’s sphere of influence into Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia, as well as expanding both countries into Poland, removing the country altogether. It can be argued that between Britain and Germany, the latter was weaker. Unlike Britain, Germany’s empire was small and confined primarily to Europe, and Germany was still to some extent struggling with the economic effects of the interwar years: 1929 Wall Street Crash and subsequent Depression, as well as the sanctions placed on them by the Treaty of Versailles following the Frist World War. Britain also had access to oil-rich colonies and strategic bases in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, as well as a more powerful naval and air force, as well as a better wartime leadership. By signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, Stalin was ensuring that the more powerful ally could not turn its force onto the Soviets.

On the other hand, however, Stalin had previously also been trying desperately to enter an alliance with the Allied powers and had turned to Hitler’s regime when he realised that they were unlikely to sign an agreement with a communist power that they viewed as fascist. Machiavelli recommends that the Prince “declares himself unambiguously for one side against the other” because, after a conflict, the winner will not want an ally who is “half-hearted” and is not reliable in times of duress (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011), and Stalin’s actions clearly contradicted this. It is also important to look at the relationship between Germany and the USSR; The Soviet Union had already once been invaded by Germany within Stalin’s lifetime, were a lot closer to the USSR than Britain was, and could easily make the journey over land. For that reason, Britain’s naval superiority was of little use to Stalin and, contextually, Germany was a much stronger enemy to the Soviet Union that they would have preferred to have as an ally. The USSR also later joined the Allied powers in sending troops to fight the Nazi forces. However, Churchill had not sent aid to the Soviets on the Western Front in time, causing a massacre of Russian troops – exactly the response Machiavelli had predicted. By siding with whom they perceived to be stronger in hopes that they would not be attacked, as well as changing sides in an alliance during the War, Stalin’s actions did not fit into Machiavelli’s guidelines, and so Stalin was not a Machiavellian Prince.

This contradiction between the two can also be seen in Machiavelli’s insistence that a Prince must permanently have their army ready for war, even going so far as to call it the “art of war” (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011). Not only was Stalin constantly purging high ranking officials in the Red Army as well as the NKVD, but he also believed that Hitler would honour their Non-Aggression Pact at least until 1942 and so did not prepare the Red Army for invasion. This proved to be disastrous in the face of Operation Barbarossa, the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. In the lead up to the invasion, there was increasing evidence that Hitler intended to invade Russia, from reports of sightings of German planes in Russian airspace and even warnings from Churchill but Stalin refused to believe that Hitler would break the pact. Consequently, the German offensive took place on June 22nd, 1914, and devastated the Russian forces as they were unprepared. All the territory gained under the Nazi-Soviet pact was quickly lost. The only reason that the Soviet Union were able to recover was not due to Stalin’s actions so much as Hitler’s failures; the German forces were caught at the outskirts of Moscow as they were not prepared for the winter, and Russia was eventually able to regain the land they lost (Acton, 1995). Had Stalin continued to maintain the Red Army, they would have been more prepared and likely would not have suffered as large a loss of life. It is evident that Stalin was not Machiavellian in his military technique, especially during World War II, and so was not a Machiavellian Prince during his consolidation of power.

As previously mentioned, Machiavelli encouraged a Prince to avoid executing his enemies unless he had just cause, however, it is also important to bear in mind that historians also believe that Stalin often executed his political enemies without any justification, instead blaming them on something else. For example, Kirov, a rising opponent of Stalin within the Politburo who was gaining huge amounts of popular support, was shot dead on the steps of his office in 1936. Although not necessarily organised by Stalin, the assassination was used by him to further his political message and establish the show trials. Many historians believe that Stalin had a role to play in his murder, and even Khrushchev alludes to Kirov’s murder being sanctioned by somebody with great authority in the Politburo (1956). This is also seen similarly in the murder of Trotsky in 1940. Trotsky was killed while in exile in Mexico City by Mercader, and although The Soviet government denied responsibility, Stalin gave Mercader the Order of Lenin and, after he was released from prison in 1961, he was granted the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Fulford, 2016), showing clear support for his actions. These executions did not have just cause, however, if they were sanctioned by Stalin, it did not matter as even to this day it has not been confirmed that Stalin did call for these assassinations. Furthermore, even the assassinations that were ‘justified’ took place as a result of coerced confession, under torture and threats to the men’s families, delegitimising the executions and casting doubt on the USSR and on Stalin as a leader. He conducted these show trials – particularly those of the sixteen previously mentioned – in order to try the men for the attempted assassination of Stalin (Oxley, 2001). Stalin’s actions increasing seemed to be coming from a place of paranoia, causing chaotic actions that could have damaged Stalin’s hold on power in the Soviet Union rather than protected it. Therefore, Stalin was evidently not a Machiavellian Prince in his rise to and consolidation of power.

Doubts can also be cast on Stalin as a Machiavellian Prince due to his use of violence. In The Prince, Machiavelli writes “get the violence over as soon as possible; that way there’ll be less time for people to taste its bitterness and they’ll be less hostile.” but Stalin blatantly does the opposite. The period of political oppression and suppression encompassing the purges and the show trials (between 1963 and 1968) has come to be known as the Great Terror due to Stalin’s ruthlessness in dealing with any opposition. Due to his extensive use of violence, from the intense hard labour in bad conditions in the gulag to the liquidation of the kulaks, to his generous wielding of the NKVD as a tool to spread terror, Stalin ensured that the Russian people lived in fear of wronging him and facing these same repercussions. Although these kept the people in check, it also left the population exhausted, reducing efficiency and therefore Soviet society as well as the Soviet economy suffered as a result. This long-term destruction was prevalent in every facet of society. Machiavelli emphasises the importance of at least pretending to be religious, but Stalin not only maintained an atheist state but destroyed Churches and purged priests (Oxley, 2001). Furthermore, Machiavelli also cautioned against taking lands from the people, claiming that they would sooner forget their father being murdered than their lands taken away from them (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011), and yet Stalin violently took lands away from the kulaks during the process of collectivisation, and in order to create a Marxist state. In his practices, Stalin often contradicted Machiavelli’s key proclamations, and this could have backfired greatly, creating an atmosphere of hostility and forcing power out of his hands (this almost occurred with the kulaks, who refused to give up their property and lands to the state, and Stalin used violence to crush their dissent). Not only were Stalin’s actions extremely violent, but the acts of defiance and, more commonly, mistakes that triggered the response were often minuscule. People would be afraid to be the first to stop clapping for Stalin for fear of the NKVD coming to take them (Rampell, 2017), and others would find themselves in gulags for minute crimes. It is evident that Stalin did not follow all of Machiavelli’s teachings and, in fact, often opposed them, meaning he was not a Machiavellian Prince in his rise to and consolidation of power.

It can also be argued that Stalin was not a Machiavellian Prince, but rather a reincarnation of the Tsars he himself had rebelled against. This is the central argument for Orwell’s Animal Farm, and is one that is commonly held; Stalin himself is often referred to as the ‘Red Tsar’. Both the Stalinist and Tsarist regimes were autocratic states ruled by a single figure, with heavy censorship and very little autonomy for their peoples. Under both regimes, there was an atmosphere of fear created by the presence of the secret police, forcing discipline and subservience to the leader. Both regimes also followed the nationalist and racist policy of Russification, in which there was a movement to maintaining Russian culture at the expense of all others, leading to events such as the 1866 crushing of the Polish rebellion and huge waves of anti-Semitism in both regimes (Oxley, 2001). The Tsars and Stalin have regimes that share many qualities, validating the idea that Stalin was simply another Tsar ruling Russia, rather than a Machiavellian Prince.

Joseph Stalin had many qualities and beliefs that are in line with those laid out by Machiavelli in The Prince, but simultaneously, there remain many differences between the two. Stalin and Machiavelli both shared the belief that the ends justify the means, although they disagreed on how much violence should be used as a result. They also agreed that it is better to be feared than loved as it allows them to rule with little to no problems from the public, although they again differ on how to eliminate enemies. While there are a number of shared similarities and common traits, there are also stark contrasts. For that reason, Machiavellism is perhaps not the doctrine that Stalin followed, and the label of a Prince is not the aptest in describing him, but he was unafraid to take action that would be criticised on the world stage in order to maintain an ironclad grip on the USSR. Both Stalin and Machiavelli did not fear repercussions for their actions and, while many of the things they believed, preached and did were morally ambiguous at best and inhumane and immoral at worst, this disregard for the status quo is what has immortalised them in historical and political thinking. Machiavelli emphasised the importance of having control over the public, the army, and the way one is perceived, all of which Stalin was able to successfully manage. Simultaneously, however, Machiavelli also underscores the importance of having complete control over the army and maintaining military prowess, and while Stalin never had to combat a coup and the Red Army emerged superior after World War II, his blind trust in Hitler and bad planning prior to the War could have been catastrophic.

Yet despite this, Stalin became the leader of a global superpower, not only maintaining his power over Russia but developing the country so rapidly that they were almost on par with the West in a matter of years. Yet despite this, he was denounced a mere three years after his death in Khrushchev’s first act as Premier of the Soviet Union (1956). While Stalin maintained a vice-like grip on his power, once he died, his impact dissipated. Many historians argue that towards the end of his regime, he was highly paranoid and was acting as a result of fear of losing his power. However, whether Stalin was acting out of paranoia or not, his actions appear to parallel those that would be expected of a Machiavellian Prince. This is also mirrored in the way Machiavelli’s life declined – from celebrated political advisor to an enemy of the state, both men faced downfalls and yet continue to be notorious to this day.

Machiavelli claims that “there are two ways of doing battle: using law and using force. Typically, humans use laws and animals force. But since playing the law often proves inadequate, it makes sense to resort to force as well. Hence a ruler must be able to exploit both the man and the beast in himself to the full” (Machiavelli and Parks, 2011), and Stalin embodies this; he combined political thinking with an atmosphere of fear to create one of the most notorious regimes in recent history. While Machiavelli and Stalin disagree on a variety of ideas where Stalin shares similarities with the tsars, it is evident that, to a large extent, Joseph Stalin was a Machiavellian Prince in his rise to and consolidation of power.

Appendix

Figure 1

Karpovsky, N. (1948). Long live the Komsomol generation! Stalin. [image] Available at: https://theyorkhistorian.com/2015/09/18/stalins-cult-of-personality-its-origins-and-progression/ [Accessed 13 Oct. 2018].

Figure 2

Goldstein, G. (2018). Lenin gave a famous speech to a crowd of Soviet troops in Sverdlov Square, Moscow, in 1919. In the foreground was Leon Trotsky and Lev Kamenev. During Joseph Stalin’s government, the photograph was edited. [image] Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lenin%27s_speech.jpg [Accessed 13 Oct. 2018]

Figure 3

Soviet Photo Staff (n.d.). Soviet leader Stalin and the disappeared water commissar, Nikolai Yezhov. [image] Available at: http://www.famouspictures.org/altered-images/#TrotskyWhatTrotsky [Accessed 13 Oct. 2018].

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