51st Edition - Fall 2025

Young Americans feel the country is off course and their futures are unstable.

Across every measure — national direction, personal finances, and day-to-day security — instability is the dominant reality shaping how young Americans see their lives and their future.

• Only 13% say the U.S. is generally headed in the right direction, while 57% say things are off on the wrong track; 28% are unsure.

• Partisan differences are stark: just 4% of Democrats say the nation is headed in the right direction (84% wrong track), compared to 33% of Republicans (27% wrong track, 39% unsure). Only 7% of independents say the right direction (61% wrong track).
• Forty-three percent (43%) of young Americans say they are struggling or getting by with limited financial security — and this strain is especially pronounced among Black and Hispanic young people and those without a college degree. More than half of Hispanic (51%) and Black (50%) respondents report financial hardship, compared with 39% of white peers. Financial insecurity is also sharply higher among non-degree holders (53%) than among college students (28%) and graduates (32%).
• Only 30% believe they will be better off financially than their parents, with college students (34%) and graduates (35%) slightly more optimistic than those not in college and without a degree (28%).

Economic pressure is the defining force in young people’s lives.

The economy dominates their attention: inflation, high costs, and stagnant wages shape how they see the country, their futures, and even their politics.

• Thirty-seven percent (37%) identify inflation as their most urgent economic priority, far outpacing every other issue.

• Partisan differences reveal distinct economic pressures. Inflation is the dominant concern across the board — especially among Republicans, where nearly half (48%) cite it as their top issue. Among Democrats, inflation (36%) still leads but healthcare (23%) follows as a significant concern. Independents mirror the overall pattern (34% inflation) with no other issue in double digits.
• Housing registers consistently across political parties, with similar levels among Democrats (11%), Republicans (12%), and independents (12%) citing this as the issue they would most like government to prioritize.
• Tax concerns highlight clearer divides: only 3% of Democrats name taxes as their top issue, compared with 13% of Republicans.

AI is reshaping how young Americans think about work — mostly in negative ways.

Across measures of meaning, opportunity, and job security, young Americans see AI as more likely to take something away than to create something new.

• By more than a 3:1 margin, young Americans believe AI will take away opportunities. A 44% plurality say AI will reduce opportunities, while only 14% expect gains. Another 17% foresee no change and 23% are unsure — and this skepticism cuts across education levels and gender. Majorities or pluralities in every subgroup expect AI to take away more than it creates: 45% of college students (vs. 16% who expect more), 42% of non-degree holders (11% more), and 49% of college graduates (18% more), as well as 40% of young men (15% more) and 48% of young women (12% more).
• Democrats are more skeptical than Republicans. Half of young Democrats (52%) believe AI will take away more opportunities than it creates, compared with just 37% of Republicans.

• These concerns extend directly to job security. A majority (59%) see AI as a threat to their job prospects — significantly more than immigration (31%) or outsourcing of jobs to other countries (48%). Majorities of both Democrats (66%) and Republicans (59%) view AI as a threat to future job prospects, making this one of the few areas of cross-party agreement.
• Young people worry AI will undermine the meaning of work. Forty-one percent (41%) say AI will make work less meaningful, compared to 14% who say it will make work more meaningful and 19% who think it will make no difference; a quarter (25%) say they are unsure.
• Trust in AI depends heavily on context. Young Americans trust AI for school and work tasks (52% overall, 63% among college students) and for learning or tutoring (48% overall, 63% among college students). But trust drops sharply for personal matters: only 25% trust AI for medical advice, 23% for advice about personal life, and 18% for mental health support.

Young Americans lack confidence in national leadership — but still prefer Democratic control in 2026.

Young Americans hold persistently low views of national leadership, reflecting a belief that political leaders are not responsive to the economic and technological pressures they face. Despite this widespread skepticism, Democrats maintain an advantage heading into 2026 — not because of heightened enthusiasm, but because many young voters view the alternative as less aligned with their priorities.

• Approval ratings remain chronically low. President Trump stands at 29% approval overall (-2 since Spring 2025 release) — 26% on the economy, 25% on healthcare, 32% on immigration, and 35% on illegal immigration. Congressional Democrats (27%, +4 since Spring) and congressional Republicans (26%, -3 since Spring) fare no better. Among young men, who were a key voting bloc in 2024, President Trump’s approval stands at 32%; among young women it is 26%.

• A generation facing economic and technological uncertainty does not see national leaders as responsive or capable. These numbers reflect a deeper lack of trust in institutions during a moment of widespread anxiety about affordability, opportunity, and the future of work.
• Despite this skepticism, Democrats hold a meaningful advantage for 2026. Among registered voters, 46% prefer Democratic control of Congress, compared with 29% who prefer Republican control, and 24% who are unsure. Democrats lead across nearly every major subgroup:
  • Young men: +12 (43%–31%)
  • Young women: +19 (47%–28%)
  • White young voters: +8 (44%–36%)
  • Black young voters: +42 (52%–10%)
  • Hispanic young voters: +22 (47%–25%)
  • Independents: +23 (40%–17%)
  • College students: +13 (45%–32%)
  • Non-degree holders: +8 (39%–31%)
  • College graduates: +23 (57%–24%)

Partisan identity is driven by frustration more than loyalty.

Young Americans hold deeply negative views of both parties — and their alignment reflects dissatisfaction rather than genuine enthusiasm. The low congressional approval levels above set the broader context: the problem is not one party, but the political system itself.

• Negative impressions dominate. When asked for one word to describe each party, 58% used a negative word for Democrats — most commonly “weak” — and 56% used a negative word for Republicans, most often “corrupt.” Only 16% offered a positive word for Democrats (26% neutral), and just 17% offered a positive word for Republicans (27% neutral).

• Gender differences are modest. Negative words for Republicans came from 56% of young men and 55% of young women, with positive words at 16% and 18%, respectively. For Democrats, 64% of young men and 53% of young women used negative descriptors, while positive words came from 13% of men and 19% of women.
• Many distrust both parties simultaneously. Forty percent (40%) volunteered negative descriptors for both parties, underscoring broad bipartisan frustration.
• Democrats face sharper internal criticism. Nearly 48% of young Democrats described their own party negatively, while only 35% offered something positive.
• Republicans show somewhat stronger in-group loyalty. Only 25% of young Republicans used a negative word to describe their own party — far lower than the negativity Democrats expressed toward theirs. Forty-six percent (46%) of Republicans used a positive word.

Young Americans are losing faith in big ideological labels — even as movement identities that challenge the party establishment remain strong.

Support for capitalism, socialism, and democratic socialism has declined since 2018, reflecting a generational retreat from traditional ideological categories, even as movement-driven identities inside each party remain persistent.

• Support for capitalism continues to erode among young Americans, with polarization persisting across most demographics.
  • Overall: 39% support (down from 45% in 2020)
  • By party: 25% of Democrats (down from 39% in 2020), 59% of Republicans (down from 67% in 2020), 37% of independents (down from 42% in 2020)
  • By education: 45% of college students, 34% of non-degree holders, 45% of college graduates
  • By financial security: 31% of those struggling/getting by, 42% comfortable/stable, 54% doing well
• Support for socialism is modest and trending downward, despite rising support among Democrats.
  • Overall: 21% support (down from 30% in 2020)
  • By party: 47% of Democrats (up from 41% in 2020), 6% of Republicans (down from 11% in 2020), 16% of independents (down from 29% in 2020)
  • By education: 22% of college students, 18% of non-degree holders, 29% of college graduates
  • By financial security: 25% struggling/getting by, 22% comfortable/stable, 13% doing well
• Democratic socialism retains broader appeal than socialism, though support has fallen sharply outside the Democratic base.
  • Overall: 29% support (down from 40% in 2020)
  • By party: 63% of Democrats (roughly the same as 2020, which was 64%), 5% of Republicans (down from 8% in 2020), 24% of independents (down from 32% in 2020)
  • By education: 30% of college students, 24% of non-degree holders, 43% of college graduates
  • By financial security: 33% struggling/getting by, 32% comfortable/stable, 19% doing well
• Movement identities — from democratic socialism to MAGA — hold substantial support within both parties.
  • Among Republicans, 53% support the MAGA movement, and 43% identify as MAGA. These questions were not asked in 2020.
  • Compared with 2020, Democrats are less likely to identify as democratic socialists (2020: 46%, 2025: 38%) or socialists (2020: 22%, 2025: 18%).
• Independents — the plurality (43%) of young Americans — reject both movements. Only 24% support democratic socialism and just 13% support MAGA — underscoring the broader ideological ambivalence outside the two-party coalitions.
• Fewer young Americans identify as “capitalist,” dropping from 29% in 2020 to 19% in 2025 — with declines across Democrats (22% to 9%), Republicans (48% to 37%), and independents (26% to 16%).

The generational pattern is clear: among younger Americans broadly, support for big economic ideologies is fading, but support for identity-driven, anti-establishment movements inside each party remains remarkably strong.

Young Americans are divided on vaccine safety — and their public health priorities reveal deep partisan and demographic splits.

Confidence in vaccines is broad but shallow, skepticism is concentrated in specific groups, and young people overwhelmingly turn to medical experts rather than political figures for trustworthy information.

• Only 34% are very confident vaccines are safe, while another 33% are fairly confident — meaning two-thirds express some confidence, but “strong” confidence is limited.
• Partisan differences are stark: 84% of Democrats are confident in vaccine safety (60% very confident), compared with 54% of Republicans (only 15% very confident) and 65% of independents (30% very confident, 36% fairly confident).
• Racial gaps in vaccine confidence are substantial. While 74% of white young Americans are confident in vaccine safety (41% very confident), confidence drops sharply among Black youth (46% confident; only 17% very confident) and Hispanic youth (58% confident; 27% very confident). Nearly half of Black respondents (47%) say they are not confident vaccines are safe.

• Concerns about a supposed vaccine–autism link persist among some young Americans. Twelve percent (12%) of young Americans believe there is a link between vaccines and autism, 58% say no, while 27% are unsure. Republicans (25% say yes, 41% no, 34% not sure) are about five times more likely than Democrats (4% yes, 81% no, 13% not sure) to believe there is a link. Among independents only 9% believe there's a link (57% no, 31% not sure).
• Young Americans are divided on which childhood public health issue the government should prioritize. Addressing the childhood mental health crisis and reducing the consumption of ultra-processed foods are tied for first overall (28% each) when asked which of four public health issues they would most like the government to address. Encouraging more physical education and reducing the overuse of prescription medications for children follow, at 13% each. A strong plurality of Democrats (40%) want the government to prioritize the childhood mental health crisis. Republicans, by contrast, rank reducing the consumption of ultra-processed foods as their top concern (32%). Independents are split: 29% prioritize reducing ultra-processed food consumption, while 26% say the mental health crisis should come first.
• There is widespread opposition to removing vaccine requirements for schoolchildren, though views differ sharply by party. Overall, 58% of young Americans oppose eliminating vaccine mandates for attending public school, while 23% support the change and 15% say they do not have an opinion. Clear partisan divides emerge:
  • Democrats: 18% support, 72% oppose, 8% don't know
  • Republicans: 35% support, 48% oppose 17% don't know
  • Independents: 21% support, 57% oppose 20% don't know

    Similar to broader patterns in vaccine confidence, we also find differences by race and ethnicity. Black and Hispanic young Americans are less likely to oppose removing vaccine mandates — and more likely to say they are unsure — compared with their white peers.

  • Young white Americans: 24% support, 62% oppose 12% don't know
  • Young Black Americans: 20% support, 47% oppose 25% don't know
  • Young Hispanic Americans: 25% support, 52% oppose 19% don't know
• Perspectives on childhood obesity also diverge. When asked what they believe is most responsible for America’s high obesity rate, 29% of young Americans cite individual health and lifestyle choices. Roughly a fifth point to lack of access to nutritious food (21%), aggressive marketing and portion sizes by food companies (19%), or insufficient government regulation of the food industry (17%).

  These views are strongly shaped by partisanship. A plurality of Republicans (41%) attribute obesity primarily to individual choices — compared with 20% of Democrats and 29% of independents. Democrats, by contrast, are more likely to identify lack of access to nutritious food as the main driver (31%).

• When it comes to reliable medical advice about vaccines, young Americans overwhelmingly trust medical and scientific experts. Seventy-nine percent (79%) trust their own doctor a great deal or fair amount, followed by scientists and researchers (76%) and the AMA (64%). Trust in pharmaceutical companies is notably lower (43%), and confidence in influencers and podcasters is extremely low (14%). Only 27% express confidence in vaccine advice from HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. with slightly more than two-thirds expressing not very much (29%) or no confidence at all (40%).

Trust between young Americans is collapsing.

Trust between young Americans is collapsing. A significant share do not assume good intentions from people who see the world differently, and everyday political conversation now feels more dangerous and unpredictable. The instinct to pull back — to protect oneself from judgment, conflict, or misunderstanding — is becoming a defining feature of how young Americans navigate political differences.

• Only 35% believe Americans with opposing political views still want what’s best for the country (30% disagree, and 31% neither agree nor disagree). Agreement is equally low among Democrats (31%), Republicans (34%), and independents (39%).
• Nearly half (47%) of young people avoid political conversations because they worry about how others will react (23% disagree with the statement, and 27% neither agree nor disagree). This tendency is common across party lines, but Republicans feel it more acutely: 46% of Democrats, 54% of Republicans, and 45% of independents say they avoid political discussions out of concern for how people might respond.
• Feeling judged for sharing political beliefs is common — and felt most intensely by young Republicans. One-third (33%) of young Americans agree that people often make them feel judged when they share their political views (24% disagree, and 39% neither agree nor disagree). These concerns are most pronounced among Republicans: nearly half (48%) agree that they often feel judged, compared with 30% of Democrats and 28% of independents.

The civic fabric feels fragile — and increasingly unsafe — as fewer young Americans believe people on the other side want good outcomes for the country.

U.S. democracy is widely seen as unstable -- and confidence in its performance is low across young Americans.

Young Americans increasingly view the democratic system as struggling, and this pessimism spans political, economic, and educational lines. Assessments of how well democracy is functioning today remain sharply negative, even as most young people still say it is important that the United States remains a democracy.

• Two-thirds (64%) describe the United States today as a democracy either in trouble (45%) or one that has already failed (19%), while only 32% describe it in positive terms (6% healthy, 26% somewhat functioning).
• Partisan differences are stark. Democrats are the most pessimistic: only 18% describe U.S. democracy in positive terms (4% health and 14% somewhat functioning), while 80% say it is in trouble or has failed. Among Republicans, 58% say it is healthy or somewhat functioning, and 41% hold negative views. Independents look more like Democrats than Republicans: 27% express positive views and 70% express negative ones.

• Economic stability shapes these assessments. Young people who are struggling or getting by are the most negative: 70% say democracy is in trouble or failed, compared with 63% of those who are comfortable or stable and 61% of those doing well. Positive views rise with financial stability: only 28% of struggling young people describe democracy positively, compared with 36% of those comfortable and 39% of those doing well.
• Most young Americans still say it is important that the United States remains a democracy — though this has softened somewhat since 2021. In 2021, 78% said it was important that America is a democracy. In 2025, that number has declined to 72%. Strong majorities of Democrats (88% today, 89% in 2021), Republicans (73% today, 80% in 2021), and independents (66% today, 67% in 2021) say it's important — but only Republicans have shown a decline since 2021.
• Young Americans see colleges, universities, and immigrants as strengthening America — but remain skeptical of other democratic institutions. When asked whether or not several institutions strengthen or threaten America, we found that half (50%) say colleges and universities strengthen the country (15% a threat), and 42% say immigrants strengthen the country as well (24% threat). These are among the few institutions we asked about that receive net-positive ratings from this generation.

  At the same time, skepticism toward other pillars of democratic life is widespread. Half of young people (50%) view the mainstream media as a threat, and only 17% see it as a source of strength. Political parties are also viewed more negatively than positively: 29% say the Democratic Party strengthens America and 33% say it poses a threat; for the Republican Party, 24% see it as a strength and 45% as a threat.

Across groups, the message is consistent: young Americans see democratic strain as part of the broader instability defining their lives — and even the value they place on democracy is beginning to soften.

A strong majority of young Americans reject political violence — but some see it is acceptable under certain circumstances.

Across the measures we tested, most young people do not endorse political violence. But a substantial minority tell us that they are willing to justify it in certain, situational contexts — and those attitudes reflect emotional and economic strain far more than political identity.

Sixty-one percent (61%) fall into the “no violence” category of our index, while 29% show some acceptance (1–2 items) and 10% show high acceptance (3–5 items). In total, 39% of young Americans say political violence is acceptable under at least one circumstance. The item-level data show where this openness comes from:

• 28% say political violence is acceptable when the government violates individual rights.
• 12% say it is acceptable when election outcomes are fraudulent.
• 11% say it is acceptable when someone promotes extremist beliefs.
• 11% say it is acceptable when someone else encourages violence.
• 10% say it is acceptable when peaceful protests fail to accomplish their goals.

Traditional political identities (Democrat, Republican, Independent) do not explain political violence among young Americans, and ideological labels account for far less than underlying structural conditions. Advanced statistical testing confirms that partisanship and ideology are not significant predictors of support for political violence — a pattern consistent with academic research showing only weak correlations between these identities and openness to political violence. Instead, higher acceptance clusters among young people facing greater economic precarity, lower trust in institutions, higher social alienation, and stronger beliefs that others hold harmful intentions.

Attitudes toward political speech reflect a related tension. Some young Americans are willing to restrict speech they consider harmful or destabilizing, revealing similar patterns of perceived threat and vulnerability.

It is important to note that this is only one set of measures, and the study has not been duplicated. These items do not predict how young Americans would respond when presented with alternative solutions or democratic pathways. Still, the pattern is clear: most reject political violence outright, but a meaningful minority sees specific situations in which it may be justified — and those views are shaped more by instability and strain than by ideology alone.