TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign - hn Reader

TrapDoor is an active cross-registry supply-chain campaign using npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time execution, and Rust build scripts to steal developer, cloud, SSH, and crypto wallet secrets.

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Current dossier state: needs review
Last verified: Not yet independently verified
Am I affected?: env-loader-cli, env-loader-cli, eth-security-auditor, sui-framework-helpers
Immediate action: Audit locks, CI runners, developer workstations, and credential exposure.
Hunting: Has hunting script

Observed fact

Direct-source and cited evidence only.

Informed inference

Analysis is labelled where evidence is indirect.

Unknown

Unverified scope remains explicitly open.

developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564[.]github[.]io
build[.]rs
hXXps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/config[.]json
post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation
hXXps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler[.]js

Analysis

Executive Summary

TrapDoor is an active software supply-chain campaign reported by Socket on May 24, 2026, spanning npm, PyPI, and Crates.io packages aimed at crypto, DeFi, AI, and developer-security workflows Socket opens in a new tab. Socket tracks more than 34 malicious packages and 384 or more related versions/artifacts, while OSV already lists several PyPI malicious-package records tied to the same 2026-05-eth-security-auditor campaign Socket opens in a new tab OSV PyPI list opens in a new tab.

The campaign is notable because each ecosystem gets a native execution path: npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time loaders that execute remote JavaScript, and Rust build.rs scripts that run during compilation Socket opens in a new tab. The payloads target SSH keys, GitHub tokens, AWS and cloud credentials, browser data, environment variables, crypto wallet material, and AI assistant instruction surfaces such as .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md Socket opens in a new tab GitHub repo opens in a new tab.

Key Facts

Threat Type: cross-registry malicious package campaign

Ecosystem: npm, PyPI, Crates.io

Registry: npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io

Affected Packages:

npm: async-pipeline-builder,build-scripts-utils,chain-key-validator,crypto-credential-scanner,defi-env-auditor,defi-threat-scanner,deployment-key-auditor,dev-env-bootstrapper,eth-wallet-sentinel,llm-context-compressor,mnemonic-safety-check,model-switch-router,node-setup-helpers,project-init-tools,prompt-engineering-toolkit,solidity-deploy-guard,token-usage-tracker,wallet-backup-verifier,wallet-security-checker,web3-secrets-detector,workspace-config-loader
pypi: cryptowallet-safety,data-pipeline-check,defi-risk-scanner,env-loader-cli,eth-security-auditor,git-config-sync,solidity-build-guard
crates: move-analyzer-build,move-compiler-tools,move-project-builder,sui-framework-helpers,sui-move-build-helper,sui-sdk-build-utils

Malicious Versions:

env-loader-cli@0.1.0
env-loader-cli@0.1.1
eth-security-auditor@0.1.0
sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0

Known Good Versions:

Fixed Or Safe Versions:

Execution Trigger: npm postinstall, Python import, Rust build.rs

Primary Impact: developer secret theft, cloud credential theft, SSH lateral movement, crypto wallet theft, AI assistant instruction poisoning

Campaign Context: active cross-ecosystem campaign tracked by Socket as TrapDoor

Confidence: medium

Canonical Source: https://socket.dev/blog/trapdoor-crypto-stealer-npm-pypi-crates opens in a new tab

Last Verified: 2026-05-24

Evidence Assessment

confirmed: Socket reports TrapDoor as a cross-ecosystem campaign across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, with 34+ malicious packages and 384+ related versions/artifacts Socket opens in a new tab.
confirmed: OSV lists recent malicious PyPI package records for env-loader-cli, data-pipeline-check, git-config-sync, defi-risk-scanner, cryptowallet-safety, solidity-build-guard, and eth-security-auditor OSV PyPI list opens in a new tab.
confirmed: OSV record MAL-2026-4272 says env-loader-cli runs code during import to exfiltrate credentials, private keys, and sensitive data, and it lists affected versions 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 OSV MAL-2026-4272 opens in a new tab.
confirmed: The attacker-controlled GitHub repository ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices exists on the gh-pages branch and exposes directories and files matching Socket's infrastructure reporting, including payloads, trap-core, .cursorrules, and CLAUDE.md GitHub repo opens in a new tab.
likely: The campaign scope will continue to change because Socket describes the activity as active and says some packages were already removed while others were still live at publication time Socket opens in a new tab.
unclear: No public source reviewed here proves real-world victim count, complete registry removal status, or actor attribution beyond the observed GitHub account and package publishers.

Impact Determination

Analysis table
Classification	Criteria	Required evidence	Required action	Closure condition
Confirmed compromise	a TrapDoor npm, PyPI, or Crates.io package is present and npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust `build.rs` executes or the reported process, file, or network indicators is observed.	Artifact inventory plus runtime telemetry showing npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust `build.rs` executes or listed C2/process/file indicators.	Isolate affected hosts or runners, preserve artifacts, and rotate reachable credentials from a clean environment.	Affected artifacts are removed, exposed credentials are replaced, and downstream audit modules show no suspicious follow-on use.
Presumed exposed	a TrapDoor npm, PyPI, or Crates.io package was installed, pulled, imported, built, or executed during the exposure window, but telemetry cannot prove exfiltration.	Lockfile, package cache, workflow, image pull, extension inventory, build log, or deployment record tied to the exposure window.	Rebuild from clean artifacts and rotate credentials available to the affected environment.	Credential owners confirm revocation of old material and clean artifacts are deployed.
Potentially exposed	The package, workflow, image, extension, or module appears in dependency or deployment records, but package install, import, or build execution is not established.	Manifest, lockfile, build, deployment, or endpoint records plus a named telemetry gap.	Collect the missing execution and telemetry evidence before narrowing scope.	Every hit is dispositioned as confirmed compromise, presumed exposed, or not exposed.
Not exposed	No affected version, artifact, mutable reference, or indicator appears in source, lockfiles, build outputs, deployments, package caches, or runtime telemetry.	Repository search, dependency inventory, build/deployment export, package cache query, and runtime telemetry query results.	Preserve the negative search output and keep the prevention controls active.	Search evidence covers developer endpoints, CI runners, production deployments, and package or image caches.
Unknown	Required inventory, build, endpoint, network, or audit telemetry is unavailable.	A gap statement naming unavailable systems, owners, and time windows.	Keep the asset in scope and make conservative rotation or rebuild decisions for high-value environments.	The missing evidence is recovered or the risk owner accepts residual uncertainty.

Minimum Evidence To Collect

Minimum Evidence:

Dependency, workflow, extension, image, or module inventory covering developer endpoints, CI runners, and production deployments.
Positive or negative search results for env-loader-cli 0.1.0, env-loader-cli 0.1.1, eth-security-auditor 0.1.0, sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0.
Execution evidence for npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust build.rs executes.
Process, file, DNS, proxy, firewall, or package-manager telemetry for listed indicators.
Inventory of credentials, tokens, deployment paths, and downstream systems reachable from exposed environments.

Timeline

2026-05-22T20:20:18Z Socket's earliest observed package, eth-security-auditor@0.1.0, is uploaded to PyPI Socket opens in a new tab.
2026-05-22T20:22:04Z Socket reports the eth-security-auditor wheel publication time Socket opens in a new tab.
2026-05-24T05:42:09Z OSV publishes MAL-2026-4272 for env-loader-cli OSV MAL-2026-4272 opens in a new tab.
2026-05-24 Socket publishes public TrapDoor campaign research Socket opens in a new tab.
2026-05-24 This local feed check found no existing Halting Problems coverage for TrapDoor, ddjidd564, eth-security-auditor, env-loader-cli, sui-framework-helpers, trap-core.js, or ddjidd564.github.io.

What Happened

Attackers published packages with benign-sounding names that map to high-value developer workflows: wallet checking, DeFi risk scanning, Solidity deployment validation, model routing, prompt engineering, environment bootstrapping, and Sui/Move build helpers Socket opens in a new tab. That naming strategy matters because developers in crypto, AI, and security tooling are more likely to have valuable SSH keys, cloud tokens, GitHub credentials, and wallet files on the same machines where package installation happens.

The campaign does not rely on one registry-specific trick. Socket reports npm postinstall execution, PyPI import-time execution that downloads JavaScript from attacker-controlled GitHub Pages and runs it with node -e, and Crates.io build.rs execution during Rust compilation Socket opens in a new tab. OSV corroborates the PyPI side for env-loader-cli, stating that the package executes during import and exfiltrates credentials, private keys, and sensitive data OSV MAL-2026-4272 opens in a new tab.

Initial Access

The known initial access vector is package publication to public registries rather than compromise of an established upstream project. Socket lists packages across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, and OSV confirms malicious PyPI package entries associated with campaign 2026-05-eth-security-auditor Socket opens in a new tab OSV MAL-2026-4272 opens in a new tab.

Package or Artifact Tampering

The artifacts are malicious packages, not just vulnerable packages. Socket identifies shared infrastructure and behavior across package names, including trap-core.js, campaign marker P-2024-001, GitHub Pages content under ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/, and attacker-owned repositories and pull requests Socket opens in a new tab. The GitHub repository itself shows a broad payload and lure surface, including payloads, trap-core, .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, PAYLOAD.md, and multiple security-themed directories GitHub repo opens in a new tab.

Execution Trigger

npm packages use lifecycle execution after installation, PyPI packages execute during import and invoke remote JavaScript, and Crates.io packages use Rust build scripts Socket opens in a new tab. The Rust side is especially relevant because build.rs executes during compilation, before a developer directly runs package functionality; docs.rs shows a source listing with build.rs for sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0 docs.rs opens in a new tab.

Payload Behavior

Socket reports that TrapDoor steals SSH keys, Sui/Solana/Aptos wallet data, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, browser data, crypto wallet extension data, environment variables, API keys, and local development configuration files Socket opens in a new tab. The npm payload validates stolen AWS and GitHub credentials and attempts SSH-based lateral movement, which makes developer workstations and CI runners potential bridges into broader infrastructure Socket opens in a new tab.

Exfiltration / C2

Propagation

Socket reports SSH-based propagation attempts and attacker pull requests that tried to add .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md files to AI and developer-tooling projects Socket opens in a new tab. This makes TrapDoor broader than ordinary credential theft: the campaign also experiments with developer-assistant instruction surfaces as a persistence and social engineering layer.

Obfuscation or Evasion

The main evasion layer is workflow disguise. The packages present themselves as wallet safety tools, security scanners, build helpers, and AI/developer utilities Socket opens in a new tab. Socket also reports zero-width Unicode in AI-facing files, Fernet and ECDH encryption in npm payloads, and XOR encryption with key cargo-build-helper-2026 in Crates.io packages Socket opens in a new tab.

Campaign Execution Flow

The following sequence diagram maps the execution flow of the TrapDoor campaign across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io registries, highlighting the harvesting, lateral movement, and exfiltration vectors: [1]

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    actor Dev as Developer / CI Runner
    participant Registry as Registry (npm/PyPI/Crates)
    participant AttackerGit as Attacker GitHub Pages<br/>(ddjidd564.github.io)
    participant LocalSys as Local Workstation / Runner
    participant Exfil as Exfiltration C2

    Note over Dev, Registry: 1. Initial Compromise Vector
    Dev->>Registry: Installs or imports malicious package
    Registry->>LocalSys: Delivers compromised package artifacts

    alt npm installation (postinstall lifecycle)
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: Trigger postinstall script hook (trap-core.js)
    else PyPI Import-time execution
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: python -c "import eth-security-auditor" executes
        LocalSys->>AttackerGit: Fetch payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js
        AttackerGit-->>LocalSys: Return remote JavaScript payload
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: Spawn 'node -e' to run remote JavaScript payload
    else Crates.io cargo build
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: cargo build triggers build.rs script execution
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: XOR decryption with cargo-build-helper-2026 key
    end

    Note over LocalSys: 2. Secret Harvesting Phase
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Extract SSH keys (~/.ssh/*)
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Collect Cloud Credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP)
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Extract Solana/Aptos wallet keys & browser data
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Scan workspace (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md)

    Note over LocalSys: 3. Lateral Movement & Egress
    LocalSys->>Exfil: Exfiltrate ZIP archive with stolen credentials [1]
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Attempt SSH connection to local network neighbors

Affected Assets and Blast Radius

Affected Assets:

ecosystems: npm,PyPI,Crates.io
packages: async-pipeline-builder,build-scripts-utils,chain-key-validator,crypto-credential-scanner,defi-env-auditor,defi-threat-scanner,deployment-key-auditor,dev-env-bootstrapper,eth-wallet-sentinel,llm-context-compressor,mnemonic-safety-check,model-switch-router,node-setup-helpers,project-init-tools,prompt-engineering-toolkit,solidity-deploy-guard,token-usage-tracker,wallet-backup-verifier,wallet-security-checker,web3-secrets-detector,workspace-config-loader,cryptowallet-safety,data-pipeline-check,defi-risk-scanner,env-loader-cli,eth-security-auditor,git-config-sync,solidity-build-guard,move-analyzer-build,move-compiler-tools,move-project-builder,sui-framework-helpers,sui-move-build-helper,sui-sdk-build-utils
versions: env-loader-cli 0.1.0,env-loader-cli 0.1.1,eth-security-auditor 0.1.0,sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0
repositories: github.com/ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices
ci_cd_systems: developer CI runners,GitHub Actions,GitLab CI,CircleCI,Travis CI
container_images:
developer_tools: Cursor,Claude Code style CLAUDE.md workflows,Rust cargo build,Python import workflows,npm install workflows

Credentials At Risk:

SSH private keys
GitHub tokens
AWS credentials
cloud credentials
browser profile data
crypto wallet data
environment variables
API keys

Not Currently Known To Affect:

official Laravel framework packages
established upstream projects unless they accepted malicious PRs or installed listed packages

Indicators of Compromise

The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) can be used to scope exposure across local repositories, systems, and telemetry exports:

Domains

build.rs
ddjidd564[.]github[.]io

Urls

hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/
hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/config[.]json
hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light[.]js
hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler[.]js

Downstream Abuse Audits

Compromised workstations expose active API credentials, requiring immediate rotated revocation. The following platforms are at risk:

GitHub OIDC and PATs: Attackers harvested SSH private keys and Git Personal Access Tokens. Auditors must inspect recent action runs and release logs during the exposure window.
Cloud IAM Credentials: AWS, Azure, and GCP session tokens. CloudTrail and Activity Logs should be queried for AssumeRole or write operations originating from unexpected IP addresses.
NPM and Package Registries: Publishing tokens and credentials. Registry profiles must be audited for unauthorized version publishes or token additions.

Sources

Socket: TrapDoor Crypto Stealer Supply Chain Attack Hits 34 Packages and Hundreds of Versions Across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io opens in a new tab - Role: PRIMARY_RESEARCH - Impact: Campaign scope, package names, execution triggers, infrastructure, payload behavior, and IOCs.
OSV PyPI malicious-package list opens in a new tab - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Recent PyPI malicious-package records associated with the campaign.
OSV MAL-2026-4272: env-loader-cli opens in a new tab - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Affected versions, import-time exfiltration behavior, campaign label, and infrastructure IOCs.
GitHub: ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices gh-pages opens in a new tab - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Directly observable attacker-controlled infrastructure, payload directories, .cursorrules, and CLAUDE.md.
docs.rs: sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0 source opens in a new tab - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Direct package source listing for a Crates.io package named in the campaign.

Timeline

Timeline
Date	Event	Description	Source

May 24, 2026	TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign	Unknown	Socket
May 22, 2026	First seen	First seen recorded for TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign.	Socket
May 24, 2026	Discovery	Discovery recorded for TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign.	Socket
May 24, 2026	Disclosure	Disclosure recorded for TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign.	Socket

Affected Software

Affected Software
Package	Ecosystem	Version Range	Status	Confidence	Source

env-loader-cli	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
env-loader-cli	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.1	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
eth-security-auditor	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
sui-framework-helpers	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
PyPI/env-loader-cli	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
PyPI/env-loader-cli	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.1	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
PyPI/eth-security-auditor	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	0.1.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
async-pipeline-builder	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
build-scripts-utils	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
chain-key-validator	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
crypto-credential-scanner	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
defi-env-auditor	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
defi-threat-scanner	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
deployment-key-auditor	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
dev-env-bootstrapper	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
eth-wallet-sentinel	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
llm-context-compressor	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
mnemonic-safety-check	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
model-switch-router	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
node-setup-helpers	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
project-init-tools	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
prompt-engineering-toolkit	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
solidity-deploy-guard	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
token-usage-tracker	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
wallet-backup-verifier	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
wallet-security-checker	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
web3-secrets-detector	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
workspace-config-loader	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
cryptowallet-safety	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
data-pipeline-check	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
defi-risk-scanner	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
git-config-sync	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
solidity-build-guard	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
move-analyzer-build	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
move-compiler-tools	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
move-project-builder	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
sui-move-build-helper	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub
sui-sdk-build-utils	npm, pypi, crates.io npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io	1.0.0	Malicious	65%	Socket; docs.rs; osv.dev; GitHub

network_patterndeveloper or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io

domainbuild.rs

urlhttps://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json

network_patternpost-install GitHub or AWS credential validation

urlhttps://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler.js

urlhttps://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js

file_pathtrap-core.js

file_path.cursorrules

urlhttps://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/

commandpython -> node -e

file_pathCLAUDE.md

domainddjidd564.github.io

commandcargo -> build.rs

commandnpm -> node trap-core.js

file_pathbuild.rs

Tested Hunting Scripts

Hunt Manifest: local repository and exported telemetry scope

Show tested hunting scriptscripts/local_repository_and_exported_telemetry_scope.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generated offline hunt scanner; regenerate with generate_scanners.py."""
import importlib.util
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sys

PACKAGES = [
    "async-pipeline-builder",
    "build-scripts-utils",
    "chain-key-validator",
    "crypto-credential-scanner",
    "defi-env-auditor",
    "defi-threat-scanner",
    "deployment-key-auditor",
    "dev-env-bootstrapper",
    "eth-wallet-sentinel",
    "llm-context-compressor",
    "mnemonic-safety-check",
    "model-switch-router",
    "node-setup-helpers",
    "project-init-tools",
    "prompt-engineering-toolkit",
    "solidity-deploy-guard",
    "token-usage-tracker",
    "wallet-backup-verifier",
    "wallet-security-checker",
    "web3-secrets-detector",
    "workspace-config-loader",
    "cryptowallet-safety",
    "data-pipeline-check",
    "defi-risk-scanner",
    "env-loader-cli",
    "eth-security-auditor",
    "git-config-sync",
    "solidity-build-guard",
    "move-analyzer-build",
    "move-compiler-tools",
    "move-project-builder",
    "sui-framework-helpers",
    "sui-move-build-helper",
    "sui-sdk-build-utils"
]
PACKAGE_VERSIONS = [
    "env-loader-cli@0.1.0",
    "env-loader-cli@0.1.1",
    "eth-security-auditor@0.1.0",
    "sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0",
    "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.0",
    "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.1",
    "PyPI/eth-security-auditor 0.1.0",
    "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0",
    "async-pipeline-builder@1.0.0",
    "build-scripts-utils@1.0.0",
    "chain-key-validator@1.0.0",
    "crypto-credential-scanner@1.0.0",
    "defi-env-auditor@1.0.0",
    "defi-threat-scanner@1.0.0",
    "deployment-key-auditor@1.0.0",
    "dev-env-bootstrapper@1.0.0",
    "eth-wallet-sentinel@1.0.0",
    "llm-context-compressor@1.0.0",
    "mnemonic-safety-check@1.0.0",
    "model-switch-router@1.0.0",
    "node-setup-helpers@1.0.0",
    "project-init-tools@1.0.0",
    "prompt-engineering-toolkit@1.0.0",
    "solidity-deploy-guard@1.0.0",
    "token-usage-tracker@1.0.0",
    "wallet-backup-verifier@1.0.0",
    "wallet-security-checker@1.0.0",
    "web3-secrets-detector@1.0.0",
    "workspace-config-loader@1.0.0",
    "cryptowallet-safety@1.0.0",
    "data-pipeline-check@1.0.0",
    "defi-risk-scanner@1.0.0",
    "git-config-sync@1.0.0",
    "solidity-build-guard@1.0.0",
    "move-analyzer-build@1.0.0",
    "move-compiler-tools@1.0.0",
    "move-project-builder@1.0.0",
    "sui-move-build-helper@1.0.0",
    "sui-sdk-build-utils@1.0.0"
]
FILES = [
    "trap-core.js",
    ".cursorrules",
    "CLAUDE.md",
    "build.rs"
]
DOMAINS = [
    "ddjidd564.github.io"
]
PROCESS_PATTERNS = [
    "npm -> node trap-core.js",
    "python -> node -e",
    "cargo -> build.rs"
]
NETWORK_PATTERNS = [
    "developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io",
    "post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation"
]
PROFILE = {
    'packages': PACKAGES,
    'package_versions': PACKAGE_VERSIONS,
    'files': FILES,
    'domains': DOMAINS,
    'process_patterns': PROCESS_PATTERNS,
    'network_patterns': NETWORK_PATTERNS
}

def main() -> int:
    try:
        runtime_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "scanner_runtime.py"
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("hp_scanner_runtime", runtime_path)
        if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
            print(f"scanner runtime not found: {runtime_path}", file=sys.stderr)
            return 2
        runtime = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(runtime)
        args = list(sys.argv[1:])
        if os.environ.get("LOG_ROOT") and "--log-root" not in args:
            args.extend(["--log-root", os.environ["LOG_ROOT"]])
        if os.environ.get("OUT") and "--out" not in args:
            args.extend(["--out", os.environ["OUT"]])
        return runtime.main(args, PROFILE) if args else 2
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"scanner execution error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
        return 2

if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Hunt Manifest: local repository and exported telemetry scope

Show tested hunting scriptscripts/local_repository_and_exported_telemetry_scope_2.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generic IOC scope scanner for trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer.

Searches repository trees and exported logs for literal IOC values from iocs.json.
Exit codes:
  0: no matches
  1: one or more indicators matched
  2: execution error
"""
import argparse
import fnmatch
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path

OUT = Path(os.environ.get("OUT", "hp-trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer-ioc-scope"))
CONTENT_INDICATORS = [
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.0",
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor@0.1.0",
  "sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.1",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor 0.1.0",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0",
  "async-pipeline-builder@1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils@1.0.0",
  "chain-key-validator@1.0.0",
  "crypto-credential-scanner@1.0.0",
  "defi-env-auditor@1.0.0",
  "defi-threat-scanner@1.0.0",
  "deployment-key-auditor@1.0.0",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper@1.0.0",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel@1.0.0",
  "llm-context-compressor@1.0.0",
  "mnemonic-safety-check@1.0.0",
  "model-switch-router@1.0.0",
  "node-setup-helpers@1.0.0",
  "project-init-tools@1.0.0",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit@1.0.0",
  "solidity-deploy-guard@1.0.0",
  "token-usage-tracker@1.0.0",
  "wallet-backup-verifier@1.0.0",
  "wallet-security-checker@1.0.0",
  "web3-secrets-detector@1.0.0",
  "workspace-config-loader@1.0.0",
  "cryptowallet-safety@1.0.0",
  "data-pipeline-check@1.0.0",
  "defi-risk-scanner@1.0.0",
  "git-config-sync@1.0.0",
  "solidity-build-guard@1.0.0",
  "move-analyzer-build@1.0.0",
  "move-compiler-tools@1.0.0",
  "move-project-builder@1.0.0",
  "sui-move-build-helper@1.0.0",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils@1.0.0",
  "ddjidd564.github.io",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler.js",
  "npm -> node trap-core.js",
  "python -> node -e",
  "cargo -> build.rs",
  "developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io",
  "post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation",
  "env-loader-cli",
  "0.1.0",
  "0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor",
  "sui-framework-helpers",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers",
  "async-pipeline-builder",
  "1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils",
  "chain-key-validator",
  "crypto-credential-scanner",
  "defi-env-auditor",
  "defi-threat-scanner",
  "deployment-key-auditor",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel",
  "llm-context-compressor",
  "mnemonic-safety-check",
  "model-switch-router",
  "node-setup-helpers",
  "project-init-tools",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit",
  "solidity-deploy-guard",
  "token-usage-tracker",
  "wallet-backup-verifier",
  "wallet-security-checker",
  "web3-secrets-detector",
  "workspace-config-loader",
  "cryptowallet-safety",
  "data-pipeline-check",
  "defi-risk-scanner",
  "git-config-sync",
  "solidity-build-guard",
  "move-analyzer-build",
  "move-compiler-tools",
  "move-project-builder",
  "sui-move-build-helper",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils"
]
PATH_INDICATORS = [
  "trap-core.js",
  ".cursorrules",
  "CLAUDE.md",
  "build.rs"
]
EXCLUDE_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "vendor", "dist", "build", ".venv", "__pycache__"}

def _iter_files(root):
    root = Path(root)
    if not root.exists():
        return
    if root.is_file():
        yield root
        return
    for current, dirs, files in os.walk(root):
        dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in EXCLUDE_DIRS]
        for name in files:
            yield Path(current) / name

def _path_matches(path):
    text = str(path)
    matches = []
    for indicator in PATH_INDICATORS:
        if not indicator:
            continue
        if indicator.startswith(("/", "~")):
            candidate = Path(os.path.expanduser(indicator))
            if candidate.exists() and path == candidate:
                matches.append(indicator)
        if indicator in text or fnmatch.fnmatch(text, indicator) or fnmatch.fnmatch(path.name, indicator):
            matches.append(indicator)
    return matches

def _content_matches(path):
    try:
        content = path.read_text(errors="ignore")
    except Exception:
        return []
    return [indicator for indicator in CONTENT_INDICATORS if indicator and indicator in content]

def _scan_roots(roots):
    matches = []
    for root in roots:
        if not root:
            continue
        for path in _iter_files(root):
            for indicator in _path_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: path matched {indicator!r}")
            for indicator in _content_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: content matched {indicator!r}")
    return matches

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Scan files and logs for Halting Problems IOC values")
    parser.add_argument("roots", nargs="*", default=["."], help="File or directory roots to scan")
    parser.add_argument("--log-root", default=os.environ.get("LOG_ROOT", ""), help="Optional exported log directory")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    OUT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    indicator_lines = sorted(set(CONTENT_INDICATORS + PATH_INDICATORS))
    (OUT / "ioc-indicators.txt").write_text("\n".join(indicator_lines) + "\n")

    roots = list(args.roots)
    if args.log_root:
        roots.append(args.log_root)
    matches = _scan_roots(roots)
    if matches:
        (OUT / "ioc-scope-matches.txt").write_text("\n".join(matches) + "\n")
        print(f"[!] Found {len(matches)} IOC matches; details written under {OUT}")
        return 1
    print(f"[+] No IOC matches found; indicator inventory written under {OUT}")
    return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        sys.exit(main())
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"[-] Execution failure: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(2)

Provenance & Sources

Provenance & Sources
Source	Type	Reliability	Claims	Evidence

Socket	Security Researcher	95%	1	TrapDoor is an active cross-registry supply-chain campaign using npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time execution, and Rust build scripts to steal developer, cloud, SSH, and crypto wallet secrets.
docs.rs	Security Researcher	95%	1	TrapDoor is an active cross-registry supply-chain campaign using npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time execution, and Rust build scripts to steal developer, cloud, SSH, and crypto wallet secrets.
osv.dev	Security Researcher	95%	2	TrapDoor is an active cross-registry supply-chain campaign using npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time execution, and Rust build scripts to steal developer, cloud, SSH, and crypto wallet secrets.
GitHub	Security Researcher	95%	1	TrapDoor is an active cross-registry supply-chain campaign using npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time execution, and Rust build scripts to steal developer, cloud, SSH, and crypto wallet secrets.