We assess biological and chemical security risk at both the High
capability level (novice pursuing a known pathogen) and the Critical
capability level (expert pursuing a novel pathogen). Our threat models
focus on how AI may provide meaningful counterfactual uplift when viewed
across a full biological/chemical threat pathway, focusing on the key
bottlenecks identified by subject-matter experts as well as how these
bottlenecks might differ across different threat actors like lone
wolves, non-state groups, state programs, insider risks, and autonomous
agents.
At our High threshold, the primary pathway we anticipate threat
actors will try to use AI models to cause severe harm is via persistent
probing for dual-use biological and chemical content. As a result, our
safeguards approach has focused on proactively preventing such content
via a multilayered defense stack. We are less concerned about a single
model response bypassing one defensive layer because we hypothesize that
a threat actor would likely need repeated, tailored troubleshooting
across multiple steps to succeed. Thus, currently, we rely on refusals,
blocks, and bans to prevent severe harm in our General Access
products.
Our High safeguards cover a broad array of biological and chemical
risks. We also developed three representative scenarios to do a more
in-depth analysis, with each scenario considering a different pathogen
and threat actor. These scenarios are used to develop a comprehensive
“weaponization lifecycle” framework for testing the robustness of our
safeguards. While we do not share details of these scenarios publicly
because they may pose information hazards [12], we did share this material with select
trusted third parties for feedback and validation.
We are also beginning to prepare for crossing our Critical threshold.
We are developing four representative scenarios for a more detailed
analysis to inform our threat modeling and safeguards. As described in
the GPT-6 Astra system card, in addition to prior feedback from expert
reviewers and our Frontier Risk Council on these scenarios, we hosted a
two-day workshop to convene 25 scientific and biosecurity leaders,
including virologists, synthetic biologists, and AI-Bio researchers.
This expert engagement helped us better define our threat models for key
bottlenecks and what evaluations to use to monitor these: creative
ideation, novel design, wet-lab assistance, operational assistance, and
laboratory automation. It also helped expand our list of safeguards we
are considering in anticipation of future models that may cross the
Critical threshold.