To disclose or not to disclose, that is the question. For a long time, telecommunications and marine affairs regulators all over the world have struggled about whether and how much to disclose about the locations and status of malfunctions or damages — natural or man-made — to undersea cable systems in their jurisdictions. Saying too much may cause confusions and misunderstandings, or even invites even more copycat disruptions. But, withholding information may allow disinformation to flourish and can also hurt public confidence.
Nonetheless, few, and I suspect if any, regulators in the world would disclose about undersea cable issues in as many details as the Taiwanese government, under a public webpage in the website of the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), entitled “Status of Submarine Cable Obstacles.” The page is in Chinese only, but it can be easily translated rather accurately to English by Google Translate or any other AI tools.
As you see, the information listed include the names of the cable systems affected, the dates and brief descriptions of the occurrences, alternative routings and their expected repair dates. Also, it shows the latest disruption was on January 3, 2026, for the Apricot Submarine Cable, which “broke approximately 47.7 kilometers from Toucheng, Yilan,” most probably due to the December 27, 2025, earthquake near the coast of Yilan in northeast Taiwan.
Back in August and September, 2025, a viral message circulated on social media, claiming that nine undersea cables connecting Taiwan were simultaneously cut (「台灣9條 #海底電纜 同時斷線」). Shortly afterward, Chunghwa Telecom, the Taiwan Factcheck Center, the digital ministry, and even President Lai Ching-te himself, came out to dispel the rumor. The incident must have prompted the government to provide the data on its own to avoid false narratives taking over.
At the same time, in accordance with Taiwan’s strong tradition for grassroots open data efforts, a civil society project, smc.peering.tw, has also come online to provide a more dynamic representation of the real-time status of Taiwan’s connectivity, based on public data.
Indeed, such level of transparency does not exist elsewhere in the world. A quick survey at the other critical chokepoints of undersea cables and areas of frequent damage incidents, would reveal that most of those governments simply do not provide such level of details of incidents, including countries such as those in the Nordics, Ireland and the United Kingdom (key transit points for traffic between North America and Europe), and Canada and the U.S. Some of these countries, such as the U.S., only provide information based on regulatory outage reporting, but the information is usually not public. Most countries, such as the Nordics, would only report such incidents in press releases as they happen.
One possible reason for their passivity is because, unlike Taiwan, the level of concern about undersea cable damages causing widespread disconnection is still relatively low for these countries. That may change, as global geopolitics may cause more incidents including grey-zone attacks in these region, and eventually the disruptions may be felt by the public. Being more transparent may be a good move, in part as education, and in other part as a preemptive move against disinformation campaigns. Taiwan’s lead is a good example for the rest of the world.