This essay is part of the Pathfinder series, a coproduction between Breaking Defense and the Center for a New American Security. Click here to find out more.
Cyber threats to America’s electricity grid are real and intensifying, and policymakers discussing grid security often focus solely on them. However, the US electric grid has a far more fragile and underdiscussed vulnerability: large power transformers (LPTs) and the shrinking workforce needed to sustain them. These machines, the backbone of the grid, are few, enormous, and irreplaceable on short timelines. If just a handful were sabotaged, entire regions of the United States could remain without power for months — cascading into the failure of healthcare services, transportation networks, water treatment, and communications systems.
This is not a hypothetical risk. In December 2022, coordinated attacks on substations in Moore County, North Carolina, cut power to 45,000 residents for nearly a week. In February 2023, two men plotted to destroy multiple Baltimore-area substations with the intent of plunging the city into chaos. Such low-cost, low-technology attacks suggest blueprints that adversaries may replicate. Meanwhile, sophisticated actors such as China, Russia, or Iran could target multiple high-voltage transformers simultaneously. Recovery would take not days or weeks but potentially years.
Addressing the national security shortfalls of US critical infrastructure demands a whole-of-government response involving not only the technology sector but also education, law, and robust public–private partnerships.
America’s Transformer Supply Crisis
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy sector, whose “assets, systems, and networks … are considered so vital … that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” Transformers are a crucial component of the energy sector and are one of the most irreplaceable assets. The United States imports roughly 80 percent of its large transformers, mostly from South Korea, Germany, and even China, creating an external dependency that adversaries could exploit.
A single LPT can weigh up to 400 tons, requires custom engineering, and takes 18–24 months to manufacture. According to a 2023 GAO report on electricity grid infrastructure, the lead time for LPT delivery in some cases has doubled, with some utilities reporting a delay of two to four years. The United States also maintains only a handful of domestic facilities capable of producing LPTs. If one is destroyed, it cannot be easily replaced.
The Shrinking Skilled Workforce
Security of LPTs also depends on the workforce maintaining them. If the skilled labor pool continues to shrink, deployment and repair capacities will be compromised. The electric utility workforce (linemen, grid engineers, field technicians) has a median age over 50, with about half expected to retire in the next five to ten years, according to a 2017 Department of Labor industry profile cited in a 2018 report. Job growth in transmission and distribution could require as many as 105,000 new skilled workers by 2030, yet trade schools and apprenticeship programs are producing barely a quarter of that number annually.
Utilities consistently face widespread job vacancies, especially in rural and underserved areas. Training opportunities are limited, the work is physically demanding, and safety risks are higher than in many commercial sectors. Without a robust pipeline of skilled technicians, transformers and spare parts are useless. In a crisis, slow redeployment means extended blackouts, undermining national security (e.g., military bases, sensors, communications), economic stability (e.g., financial markets, supply chains, hospitals), and public trust in the government’s ability to protect citizens. Grid resilience must be a bipartisan priority, whether one emphasizes deterrence or community protection.
Policy Solutions: Securing Supply And Workforce Capacity
Transformers and the workforce behind them must be treated as strategic national assets, on par with oil reserves or semiconductor supply chains. Policymakers should adopt a two-pronged strategy that secures supply and grows capacity in ways that resonate across party lines. First, Congress and the Department of Energy, in partnership with FEMA and utilities, should establish a Strategic Transformer Reserve (STR), modeled on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), with LPTs purchased and positioned in regional hubs before they are needed. This would reduce dependence on imports and ensure replacements are available after sabotage or disaster rather than waiting years for foreign production.
Second, Congress should fund a national grid apprenticeship surge through existing infrastructure dollars, partnering with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union, community colleges, and veteran transition programs to train tens of thousands of linemen, technicians, and engineers. This builds on apprenticeship models already receiving federal support through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. This approach creates middle-class jobs, particularly in underserved communities, while leveraging existing administrative frameworks. Funding could come through regular appropriations with cost-sharing by private utilities. For Congress and the executive branch, the price is a manageable, predictable line item; for the average American, it means minimal additional burden but significant protection against blackouts that could cost billions in lost economic output.
Grid Resilience As A National Priority
Cyber risks rightly dominate headlines, but adversaries recognize that America’s grid can be broken as easily with rifles as with malware. LPTs are a systemic weak link as they are rare, expensive, and nearly impossible to replace quickly. The shrinking skilled workforce supporting them magnifies this danger.
With the right motive and person, targeted attacks could become antigovernment protests or even proxy-conflict actions, escalating local disruptions into national crises. Without intervention, this vulnerability could prove catastrophic in the next crisis, crippling entire regions and threatening national security. An STR and a nationwide apprenticeship surge are two mutually reinforcing, bipartisan approaches that are ambitious yet practical.
In the 20th century, America secured its leadership by building interstate highways, establishing the SPR, and advancing nuclear deterrence. These initiatives were not optional; they were foundational to national power. In the 21st century, the same level of commitment must be applied to the transformers and skilled workforce that keep the grid functioning.
Ensuring grid resilience is not merely an infrastructure investment—it is a strategic imperative that will determine if the United States can continue to project stability and strength at home.
Juliana Fleming is a congressional staffer focused on foreign affairs, defense, and trade policy. She is pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School, concentrating on US national security. Her background spans FEMA disaster response, AmeriCorps leadership, and public service roles dedicated to strengthening America’s security and community preparedness.