@adminide-stack npm compromise: an Ethereum dead drop that leads to a Node RAT persisting through npm and editor startup files

· Greenflagged ·

20 min read Original article ↗

What happened

Updated 2026-11-04 21:00 UTC. npm has removed all twelve versions. We fetched stage 2 from the C2. It is a loader for a Node RAT that patches npm's own lib/cli.js and the startup files of VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, Discord and GitHub Desktop. See the update and the host checks.

  • Three npm packages got a new version within 11m38s on 2026-11-03, from 22:00:33 to 22:12:11 UTC.
  • All three were published by the npm account clockbook-app.
  • Each new version is the previous release’s tarball with one change: a \t ×157 + eval(atob("…")) appended to the entry file’s last code line.
  • The base64 blob is 50,336 chars in all three. It decodes to the same 37,751-byte script.
  • The script reads the latest transaction sent by an Ethereum wallet, turns the to address into an IPv4 C2 address, and fetches and runs the next stage from it.
  • It runs when the package is required. There is no install script.
  • All three were published under the dist-tag next. latest stayed on the previous, clean release.
  • At 22:48:15 UTC, clockbook-app published a fourth version: @adminide-stack/[email protected]. It uses a different obfuscation (no eval, no atob, no tab padding), and its stage 1 does the same thing with the same wallet and C2 paths. See Second variant.
  • 0.0.16-130 moved both latest and next. A plain npm install @adminide-stack/utils resolves to it.
  • At 23:05:19 UTC, @adminide-stack/client-redux latest moved to the malicious 0.0.16-18. A plain npm install @adminide-stack/client-redux resolves to it.
  • At 23:16:58 and 23:20:57 UTC, clockbook-app published two more first-variant versions as latest: [email protected] and @adminide-stack/[email protected]. Both decode to the same stage 1 as the first three.
  • At 23:34:37 UTC, clockbook-app published @adminide-stack/[email protected] as latest. It decodes to the same stage 1. The previous release was 2022-10-17.
  • From 04:51:26 to 07:28:20 UTC on 2026-11-04, a second npm account, pubngo-stack, published five more versions: @adminide-stack/[email protected], @adminide-stack/[email protected], [email protected], @cdmbase/[email protected] and @pubngo-stack/[email protected]. See 2026-11-04 releases.
  • All five carry the second variant. Every injected file decodes to the same stage 1 as [email protected], byte for byte (SHA-256 c963e920…): same wallet, RPC endpoints, C2 paths and XOR keys.
  • pubngo-stack also published the previous, clean release of four of the five.
  • Four of the five are "type": "module" packages. Under Node, the loader’s (global, require) call throws ReferenceError: require is not defined in ES module scope before it runs. We checked this with a harmless file of the same shape on node 26.3.0, not with the payload, and not in a bundler. cdeops is CommonJS on its require path.
  • At 2026-11-04 18:05 UTC, all twelve versions still returned HTTP 200 from registry.npmjs.org.
  • By about 20:40 UTC on 2026-11-04, npm had removed all twelve versions from the packuments.
  • At 20:47 UTC on 2026-11-04, we fetched stage 2 from the C2. It is a loader, not the implant. It installs a Node remote-access trojan (RAT) and persistence through npm and editor startup files. See Update 2026-11-04.
  • No malicious release has been published since 07:28:20 UTC on 2026-11-04. Between 15:30 and 18:05 UTC, the 306 related packages we watch got three releases, all clean.

Affected versions

PackageBad versionPublished (UTC)Previous versionnpm weekly downloads (10-27 → 11-02)
@adminide-stack/utils0.0.16-12922:00:33.0880.0.16-128 (2019-10-30)35
@adminide-stack/client-redux0.0.16-1822:05:45.8490.0.16-17 (2018-07-22)21
server-hemera-mongo0.0.1522:12:11.6300.0.11 (2018-01-31)7
@adminide-stack/utils0.0.16-13022:48:15.7170.0.16-129 (malicious, above)35
server-hemera-mongo0.0.1623:16:58.2360.0.15 (malicious, above)7
@adminide-stack/health-api-server0.0.18-alpha.46523:20:57.7700.0.18-alpha.464 (2021-04-12)29
@adminide-stack/user-activity-browser1.1.3-alpha.11423:34:37.5101.1.3-alpha.113 (2022-10-17)27
@adminide-stack/forms-core5.1.9-alpha.311-04 04:51:26.6805.1.9-alpha.2 (2026-10-20)91
@adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser12.0.19411-04 05:18:13.21612.0.193 (2026-10-29)354
cdeops13.5.3111-04 05:44:03.12213.5.29 (2026-10-26)933
@cdmbase/wiki-browser12.0.18-alpha.5311-04 06:58:37.33312.0.18-alpha.52 (2026-04-08)29
@pubngo-stack/help-browser12.0.23-alpha.311-04 07:28:20.86112.0.23-alpha.2 (2026-02-27)8

Dist-tags as of 2026-11-04 18:05 UTC. All five 11-03 packages are back on a clean latest:

Packagelatestnext
@adminide-stack/utils0.0.16-128 (was 0.0.16-130 from 11-03 22:48)0.0.16-128
@adminide-stack/client-redux0.0.16-17 (was 0.0.16-18 from 11-03 23:05)0.0.16-17
server-hemera-mongo0.0.11 (was 0.0.16 from 11-03 23:16)0.0.11
@adminide-stack/health-api-server0.0.18-alpha.464 (was 0.0.18-alpha.465 from 11-03 23:20)none
@adminide-stack/user-activity-browser1.1.3-alpha.113 (was 1.1.3-alpha.114 from 11-03 23:34)none
@adminide-stack/forms-core5.1.9-alpha.14 (clean)none
@adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser12.0.195 (clean)none
cdeops13.5.30-alpha.66 (clean)none
@cdmbase/wiki-browser12.0.18-alpha.54 (clean)none
@pubngo-stack/help-browser12.0.23-alpha.3 (malicious)none

At 18:05 UTC, a plain npm install @pubngo-stack/help-browser still resolved to the malicious version.

By about 20:40 UTC, npm had removed all twelve malicious versions. @pubngo-stack/help-browser latest is now 12.0.23-alpha.0. @adminide-stack/utils latest and next are 0.0.16-128.

[email protected] (2026-08-04) is listed in npm time but is gone from versions. Greenflagged rejected it on 2026-08-04 as part of the keyv/cacheable preinstall: node setup.mjs worm. 0.0.13 and 0.0.14 never existed.

The packages carry 18 maintainers, most with @cdmbase.com addresses. We checked every version published since 2026-10-27 across the 190 packages those 18 accounts maintain (npm search API, 2026-11-03). At 22:40 UTC there were 109 versions, and only these 3 carry the payload. [email protected] came after that check. In that window, clockbook-app published 45 other versions, all @adminide-stack/yantra-mobile, and all clean.

A second check at 2026-11-04 15:37 UTC covered every version published since 2026-11-03 23:00 UTC across the same 190 packages: 23 versions, 8 with the payload (three from 11-03, five from 11-04). The other 15 are clean. They include cdeops 13.5.32, 13.5.33 (pubngo-stack), 13.5.37 (adminide-stack-user, identical to 13.5.29 except version) and 13.5.30-alpha.64 (admin-layout).

Hashes

ArtifactSHA-256SHA-1 (npm shasum)
Decoded stage 1 (first variant: all six)c4b3cea95faf1294294285dd17b9e64fec6df8ad129204e7259868d4af4734f7
utils-0.0.16-129.tgz5e57897f83fd8db73358c55b6a326a0fcd94ce5bcecd69cb6106f159de0869efcd3e284a76691a23e5d23622e7c7337305dc6251
utils lib/index.js292a7692b10b3c93f1757d2a0f24148c1da6dc71d1f352acb5d5e9ff2661adee
client-redux-0.0.16-18.tgz9fdf793027f1141841b4317278c3122ed8e8d9e0b5750d8903ffdf5d0f6e587ec520ac849901716c258722e942e74fabcb70077e
client-redux lib/index.js8af9dc07a761d2d4ffe51bdbd075c2c5e5d4dd391adbb546169b425beefc8469
server-hemera-mongo-0.0.15.tgz6e25f29e5a43217a0e73e01c1f855ab6ba773bf80998f980bde2f91767dffb6014fa5e60b68c0d1b31f34a488c5eee8eafe94ff5
server-hemera-mongo dist/main.js98966503fcaf6b8fdb7d2c9bac65d9139a4815c8ebc1a84c78c29946bd2464a7
utils-0.0.16-130.tgz (second variant)2e2e4e2b2e4c6796bb49a73927f132b4e0768d31521226d595fd5a8c64737013d790058a822abd3390fe81fc34e0208280dbd313
utils lib/index.js (second variant)82bcbf53406943004d532c08f896320fc19eced1ad209d0463f03e74ee2efdf3
server-hemera-mongo-0.0.16.tgz7187bcd215355f8862c59caf0c7d4b965ae55553f48e7c2ad48685ecb40aaeb6a7e311d6e4bce389fceabe97148598f5aa69341b
server-hemera-mongo dist/main.js (0.0.16)754acd19646c02fc2ce047fe50d364ca3b69391b9764a196191c304fa12d7442
health-api-server-0.0.18-alpha.465.tgz73220fc6cff9da291e9b5d3c843e687e27580d7f9c4dc38a7d9724ec819ef778be4c3f521f0fc90da5a9b499d8df3a0467fe1cad
health-api-server lib/index.js84389aa75056f840f330acf9c2a3e554056c3dda261874a455bfdc90d773ce0e
user-activity-browser-1.1.3-alpha.114.tgzb52a7bca8d163ca18af48d453f44c50982b9a161c08f109c540ab3c76d92557bf1c27c1a1d86486322e98157d96852240888019c
user-activity-browser lib/index.js17a0e369d6ca936f648e5302e9be398787a801cc61cc6c4901888ff008dfee22
forms-core-5.1.9-alpha.3.tgz8bc14b32126705d354689fe310917b0dc092d326fc4f77089bc89e137b5f0fade430e731027843fde2db3d4790f5f3875892c9c2
forms-core lib/index.js2368f49f46c62ae55a92dcbf8d259489833a9a74bf41d7fcc69963860ca6b3bb
yantra-help-browser-12.0.194.tgzda09d75d25ac2f9065072e06911bdc039ad9e37a855683254e1f4a0504595fb9bfd45ff3110d34f4e1ff1371feef4d693e11af7c
yantra-help-browser lib/index.js254caf85c93b3c4ef4a6f318ea72e99db28c993a790fc53ab2a7ac076f08600e
cdeops-13.5.31.tgz672d3c4b8a606443598cf965934666ee90a37682f0a33690f56b656aa67981470a878543e3c66ea4d991837f15e600734ad1edcf
cdeops client.js397331bbb42843d4690f85f3c820622271ad2828ca087dd0028e175a117ca512
cdeops server.jsdeafe5140bf7a739e45d0fb54c43df194c4fff57d9298a3167092544d36a1056
cdeops src/index.jse1b0e2c2724aa485550baf7605e440acf01f4c54eb51d68e60033221f3fda89f
wiki-browser-12.0.18-alpha.53.tgzd6ca548b73ce5bef7a498675b2868152f78aa9f4de553aa98266e88ff191280f68a85bce425e14a8c973328e838c39110480296c
wiki-browser lib/index.js28cbb941d6fc07231a11a6e40d344045457831c672ff278e52f47c4ba9f219a5
help-browser-12.0.23-alpha.3.tgzc7ca484d29f8c0bec1d03753fdc4b0a297bf6d47e28c8ec649c56e70e8b0f3628f681af0166afd1e35dad5e3a178d430ac407fa2
help-browser lib/index.jscc4fbe09f72dad3586461a2c51a136e4f83a91c8d0ba74ce19881c957aa499d8
Decoded stage 1 (second variant: all eight injected files)c963e920baa12f4a5ea2be53bc4640d29263b247665a90846738ac64ff0e1911

The diff

The tarballs were diffed file by file against the previous version. Each has exactly two changed files and none added or removed.

PackageChanged fileBytes before → afterPayload lineEqual to previous with the appended blob removed
utilslib/index.js4,930 → 55,389138yes
client-reduxlib/index.js10,215 → 60,697292yes
server-hemera-mongodist/main.js3,398 → 53,906117yes
[email protected]dist/main.js3,398 (0.0.11) → 53,906117yes (157 tabs)
health-api-serverlib/index.js22,364 → 72,846580yes (131 tabs)
user-activity-browserlib/index.js21,238 → 71,720595yes (131 tabs)

package.json changes: version in all three. In utils only, scripts.jest also went from ./node_modules/.bin/jest to jest.

The payload line, client-redux lib/index.js:292:

/******/ });<157 × \t>eval(atob("Z2xvYmFsLmkgPSAnQTEwLW5wbV9pbmplY3Qn…"));

The line before it (291) is blank. The line after it (293) is //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map.

Second variant ([email protected])

Diffed against 0.0.16-128, the last clean release:

  • package.json: only version changed.
  • lib/index.js: 4,930 → 21,215 bytes, 60 lines inserted after line 138 and nothing else changed. The longest line is 15,072 chars.
  • No eval, atob, base64 or tab padding in the file.

The inserted code, in order:

  1. var z = '-II';
  2. Two six-number keys: NX = [6912847, 367, 20411, 613, 43759, 5019283] and SX = [5283741, 241, 41953, 187, 56129, 4738901].
  3. spin(src, c), a keyed character-swap permutation. peel(blob) is spin(blob, SX). splitLane(blob) is spin(blob, NX) split on ^.
  4. splitLane("c^mejb^tro") decodes to r, object, m. These set global.r = require and global.m = module.
  5. peel("hqersxluvwacdjbymgorzfkociptrutnstonc") decodes to constructorabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz. Its first 11 chars, constructor, give peel["constructor"], which is the Function constructor.
  6. Forge('z', peel("<15,000-char permuted string>"))(z) builds and runs a function from the decoded string.

The decoded string is readable JavaScript (472 lines), not minified. Compared with the first variant:

First variantSecond variant
Markerglobal.i = 'A10-npm_inject'global.i = 'A10', global.z = 'A10-II'
Sec-V headerA10-npm_injectA10-II
Wallet, RPC endpoints, indexersamesame
C2 paths, XOR keys, x-payload-b64samesame
Stage runnerdetached node -i, code on stdinsame
Publish fingerprintnpm 11.16.0, node 24.18.0same; gitHead 63ef6dd0… again

2026-11-04 releases

Each tarball was diffed file by file against the previous release. No file was added or removed. Each loader is a pure insertion: removing the inserted lines gives the previous file back, except where the table says otherwise.

PackageInjected fileBytes before → afterInserted linesvar zOther changes
[email protected]lib/index.js1,786 → 18,07160, before line 1'-II'package.json: version only
[email protected]lib/index.js238 → 16,52360, after line 2’s code'-%'The trailing //# sourceMappingURL comment moved below the loader. package.json: version only
[email protected]client.js693 → 16,97760, after line 7'-E'
server.js2,553 → 18,83861, after line 13'-E'
src/index.js665 → 17,08060, after lines 7 and 8'-E'package.json: version, and scripts.prepublishOnly and scripts.tslint removed. client.mjs, server.mjs, src/index.mjs: trailing newline removed
[email protected]lib/index.js242 → 16,53661, after line 1'-1234567890'package.json: version only
[email protected]lib/index.js238 → 16,53261, after line 1'-1234567890'package.json: version only

The NX and SX keys are the same in all eight files. Each blob is 14,567 chars and the longest line in each file is 15,072 chars. Stage 1 sets global.z = 'A10' + z and sends it as Sec-V, so the header is A10-II, A10-%, A10-E or A10-1234567890.

FieldPrevious releaseMalicious release (2026-11-04)
_npmUserpubngo-stack (four), adminide-stack-user (wiki-browser)pubngo-stack (all five)
_npmVersionlerna/8.2.0/[email protected]+x64 (linux) (cdeops), lerna/8.2.0/[email protected]+arm64 (darwin) (forms-core), lerna/8.1.9/[email protected]+x64 (linux) (yantra-help-browser), lerna/8.2.0/[email protected]+x64 (linux) (wiki-browser, help-browser)11.16.0 (all five)
_nodeVersion24.20.0 / 22.17.024.18.0 (all five)
gitHeadsetsame as the previous release, in all five
Provenancenonenone

Publish fingerprints: clean vs malicious

FieldPrevious releases (2018–2019)Malicious releases (2026-11-03)
_npmUseradminide-stack (all three)clockbook-app (all three)
_npmVersion3.10.10 / lerna/3.13.4/[email protected]+x64 (darwin) / 6.1.011.16.0 (all three)
_nodeVersion8.8.1 / 10.15.3 / 8.9.424.18.0 (all three)
gitHeadnone / 63ef6dd0… (utils) / nonenone / 63ef6dd0… (utils, same commit as 2019) / none
Provenancenonenone
dist-taglatestnext

What stage 1 does

Statically decoded (string-table rotation and an index offset, nothing else). We did not run it.

  1. Sets global.i = 'A10-npm_inject', global.r = require, global.m = module.
  2. Calls eth_blockNumber against the first responding RPC endpoint: ETH_RPC_URL from the environment if set, then the four public endpoints in the IOC table.
  3. Scans recent blocks in multiples of 1,000 (BLOCK_MULTIPLE = 1000n, NONCE_FANOUT = 12) for the latest transaction sent by the wallet. It uses eth_getTransactionCount and eth_getBlockByNumber.
  4. Fallback: https://eth.blockscout.com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=<wallet>…&sort=desc&filterby=from.
  5. Takes that transaction’s to address. Bytes 0–3 become the primary IPv4 C2 and bytes 4–7 the secondary.
  6. Sends GET http://<C2>:443/0x/cls: plain HTTP on port 443. Headers: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 and Sec-V: A10-npm_inject.
  7. Reads the next stage from the response header x-payload-b64, base64-decodes it, and XORs it with the key q4FZkxX{!h,Sr3=@.
  8. evals it in the host process, then also hands it to a child process (step 10).
  9. Sends GET http://<C2>:443/0x/ls, the same way, with XOR key y-p_>d$0B&@^1aQk. This stage goes only to the child process.
  10. The child process is spawn("node", ["-i"], {detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: pipe}). It writes process.stdin.removeAllListeners("end"); and then the stage onto the REPL’s stdin. Code run this way never touches disk.
  11. Each stage is prefixed with global['_V'], _H, _H2, _t_s, _t_u (C2 URLs), ___filename='[eval]' and ___dirname=process.cwd().
  12. Every error is swallowed (catch {}). A failed lookup or fetch returns silently, so require succeeds normally.

When this section was written (2026-11-03), we had not contacted the C2. We fetched stage 2 on 2026-11-04. See Update 2026-11-04.

The dead-drop wallet

Sender 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3, from the Blockscout API at 2026-11-03 ~22:50 UTC. It has 226 transactions: 225 sent and 1 received, from 0x4e5b2e1dc63f6b91cb6cd759936495434c7e972f on 2026-10-14. Every sent transaction has value 0. Each to address is the C2 IP twice, then the ASCII bytes helloipbot!!.

to addressDecoded C2First seen (UTC)Last seen (UTC)Txs
0xa658864ba658864b68656c6c6f6970626f742121166.88.134.752026-09-04 05:182026-09-12 11:2161
0x67b38fdb67b38fdb68656c6c6f6970626f742121103.179.143.2192026-10-14 01:522026-10-16 02:0728
0x171b0d48171b0d4868656c6c6f6970626f74212123.27.13.722026-10-14 04:522026-10-14 04:521
0x5f87b5975f87b59768656c6c6f6970626f74212195.135.181.1512026-10-16 05:002026-11-03 21:34 (current)135

The current address is re-posted about every 3h20m. At 2026-11-03 ~22:50 UTC, the most recent was nonce 224, tx 0x117ce8e3ae87d47b88b40b464049954e915554df8d4bf5b33d93abddbda87441.

The dead drop is still live. The wallet reached nonce 230 at 2026-11-04 17:39:23 UTC, tx 0x0b4be71d4a65b292915fcaf430546d82067e6f346f575060edf726c17650fad6. Every transaction since still encodes 95.135.181.151 twice plus helloipbot!!.

Update 2026-11-04: stage 2 from the C2

All times in this section are 2026-11-04 UTC, measured by us.

How we fetched it

  • We fetched stage 2 from a throwaway remote server with no link to our infrastructure.
  • We executed nothing. We decoded with base64 and XOR in Python, and decompressed the RAT’s string table in Python.
  • This post quotes only short identifying strings from the payloads. It does not publish their source.

What npm and the dead drop look like now

  • npm has removed all twelve malicious versions. By about 20:40, none was in its package’s packument.
  • @pubngo-stack/help-browser latest is now 12.0.23-alpha.0. @adminide-stack/utils latest and next are 0.0.16-128.
  • The dead drop is still live. The wallet reached nonce 230 at 17:39:23 (tx 0x0b4be71d4a65b292915fcaf430546d82067e6f346f575060edf726c17650fad6).
  • It still re-posts about every 3h20m. Every transaction still encodes 95.135.181.151 twice plus helloipbot!!.

The C2 answered

  • At 20:47–20:48, 95.135.181.151:443 answered plain HTTP. Its responses carry X-Powered-By: Express.
  • It served /0x/cls and /0x/ls, the two paths stage 1 asks for.
  • The payload was in the X-Payload-B64 response header and also in the raw body.
  • Both decoded with the XOR keys stage 1 uses (see IOCs).

What stage 2 is

Stage 2 is a loader, not the implant. It pulls more stages from the same C2.

PathWhat it servesDecoded SHA-256
/0x/clsStage 2 loader (XOR key q4FZkxX{!h,Sr3=@)dc45f264c338c024b67c666cea25ffb247e0e4261cf40af6a4ddd2627ccc722f
/0x/lsSecond stage 2 loader (XOR key y-p_>d$0B&@^1aQk)228f3c5924325161c398a6c2b66334397b850b6d9248fd1a6ccd65ba1b567eda
/0x/npm-migratePersistence through npm, plain JS3bf784a4857b20260a15f317d4b2534c3823ff9d5b13fe44e135676b11d43ebb
/0x/clbJSON: body (the RAT, XOR with the cls key) and inzbody: 8252068e04cad13c326fb7b833c4db8f45522a52984b7315c089b8b914babce1
/0x/cbFallback: the same RAT body, XOR8252068e04cad13c326fb7b833c4db8f45522a52984b7315c089b8b914babce1
/0x/jsFallback: the same file as inz9aa477d1b5ea243aaa71e044de2cb6301c585259319e2913befe06dc0a86838d
/$/bootFetched by /0x/ls. Returned 404 to us

/0x/cls, in order:

  1. Fetches /0x/npm-migrate and evals it as plain JavaScript.
  2. Spawns a persistent child process.
  3. Fetches /0x/clb. The JSON body is XORed with the cls key. The inz field is a second payload.
  4. Falls back to /0x/cb for the body and /0x/js for inz. inz starts with the marker /*RS260605*/.
  5. On failure, POSTs [tag] hostname$username / OS release plus the error to <upload URL>/verify-human/<tag>. The upload URL is the C2 IP on port 80 (see inz). The default tag is A4.

/0x/ls fetches <_H>/$/boot with the request header id: hostname$username. It decodes the answer with a third XOR key, ThZG+0jfXE6VAGOJ. On our fetch, /$/boot returned 404.

/0x/npm-migrate: persistence through npm

Every later npm command on the machine relaunches the implant. It does this in four steps:

  1. Writes ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.json with the keys _V, _t_s and _t_u. The default C2 base is hardcoded as http://95.135.181.151:443.
  2. Writes ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws-runner.js. This is a loop that refetches /0x/cls. It keeps its pid in ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.pid and its errors in ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.log.
  3. Appends a “kick” snippet to npm’s own lib/cli.js, padded with 200 spaces and followed by the marker /*M260630A*/. The padding pushes it off the right edge of most editors.
  4. On Windows, also drops an npm-cli.js shim marked /*NPM_WS_SHIM*/.

It patches every npm it can find:

  • npm root -g and the lib paths under npm prefix -g
  • the npm next to process.execPath
  • %APPDATA%\npm\... on Windows
  • every ~/.nvm/versions/node/*

/0x/cb: a Node RAT

  • It is about 156 KB of obfuscated JavaScript.
  • Its string table has 573 entries, compressed with LZ-String (UTF-16). We decoded it.
  • It installs [email protected] into a hidden npm cache directory (prefix nm-npm-cache-). It runs npm with --ignore-scripts --omit=dev and takes a lock file, .npm-install.lock.
  • It talks to its operator over socket.io.
  • Command names in the string table: ss_info, ss_eval, ss_eval64, ss_inz, ss_inzx, ss_connect, ss_stop, ss_exit, ss_exit_f. The table also holds ss_ip, ss_cb, ss_upf, ss_upd, ss_dir and ss_fcd. We have not traced what those do.

What it can do, from its strings:

  • Run shell commands.
  • Upload files as multipart HTTP (HTTP upload succeeded).
  • Read the clipboard: powershell Get-Clipboard, pbpaste, xclip, xsel.
  • Geolocate the host through http://ip-api.com/json.
  • Run a Python stage: Request._code, _sign, _target, _V, urlopen, User-Agent Python-urllib/3.12, path fragments /6x6/ and /x2/. On Windows it uses curl.exe from System32 or Sysnative.
  • Inject the inz payload into the startup files of Electron apps (desktop apps built on Node and Chromium). The table lists macOS, Linux and Windows paths for each:
AppFile it injects
VS Codeout/main.js, node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js
Cursorout/main.js, node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js
Antigravitynode_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js
Discordmodules/discord_desktop_core/index.js
GitHub Desktopmain.js
  • Injection leaves .inz.cjs, .inz.orig and .inz.tmp files. It writes the markers /*C250617A*/, /*C250618A*/, /*C250619A*/, /*C250620A*/ and /*C260511A*/.
  • On Windows, it checks the tasklist process list against the MD5 9a47bb48b7b8ca41fc138fd3372e8cc0. A match reports Blocked by security.
  • It holds two ID-like strings, EV-CHQG3L42MMQ and EV-4A6OE6M0E2D.
  • It contains the strings github-runner, buildbot, buildkitsandbox, sandbox-pool-, cloudchamber and microsoft-standard-WSL2. These are consistent with checks for CI runners and sandboxes. We did not trace the control flow, so we have not shown what it does with them.

inz: stage 1 again

inz is the stage 1 loader again. It is re-obfuscated with a second, custom string cipher, and bloated to 1.5 MB. It starts with /*RS260605*/.

This is the copy the RAT writes into npm’s cli.js and the editor and app startup files. So every launch of a patched app resolves the C2 from the chain again.

How we observed it (2026-11-04, ~21:10 UTC). We ran inz on the same throwaway remote server, contained in layers:

  • nftables dropped all outbound traffic. We checked that the C2, 1.1.1.1, IPv6 and DNS were all blocked.
  • It ran in its own empty network namespace, as an unprivileged user with no_new_privs.
  • It ran inside a Node vm context. There, require, process, child_process and http(s) were fakes. They logged each call and never performed it.
  • The fake Blockscout answered with a made-up transaction. Its to field pointed at 192.0.2.1, a reserved documentation address.
  • The fake C2 answered with a harmless marker string.

What inz did:

  1. Loaded node:http, node:https, node:zlib, node:url and node:child_process.
  2. Read process.env.ETH_RPC_URL.
  3. Created keep-alive http and https agents (keepAliveMsecs 30000, maxSockets 64).
  4. Sent GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3&startblock=0&endblock=99999999&page=1&offset=20&sort=desc&filterby=from, with Accept: application/json and Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br.
  5. Decoded the IP from the to field. Sent GET http://<ip>:443/0x/cls with the Chrome 131 User-Agent and Sec-V: A10-npm_inject.
  6. Did not eval the reply in its own process. It spawned a detached child, process.execPath -e "<prelude><decoded /0x/cls>", with stdio ignored.
  7. The prelude sets _V, e='NPM', _t_s='http://<ip>:443' and _t_u='http://<ip>:80'.

_t_u is the upload and report base. It is the same C2 IP on port 80. This is where /verify-human/<tag> goes.

Not traced: the paths inz takes after other replies. Its Electron-specific behaviour, for example whether it needs ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE.

Stage 2 hashes

ArtifactSHA-256
/0x/cls decodeddc45f264c338c024b67c666cea25ffb247e0e4261cf40af6a4ddd2627ccc722f
/0x/cls raw bodyd2699a2bfb0ed1bb412d7fd1545924b99eee1efd4abf9fd5a32e94ea741f7ccb
/0x/ls decoded228f3c5924325161c398a6c2b66334397b850b6d9248fd1a6ccd65ba1b567eda
/0x/ls raw bodycfc4c9a9222671481fe84ec1820e753d100bb352d965c59dfa02c3fd801f9ca9
/0x/npm-migrate3bf784a4857b20260a15f317d4b2534c3823ff9d5b13fe44e135676b11d43ebb
/0x/clb raw body760853205b30f22ca6f271e931940be53aa71e268527d1234537393d7c2cebac
/0x/cb raw body5f168fd341cc545172c5c9dedc0905f672eea732f566518c47f79b13d2ce32a7
RAT (clb body and cb, decoded)8252068e04cad13c326fb7b833c4db8f45522a52984b7315c089b8b914babce1
inz (clb field and /0x/js)9aa477d1b5ea243aaa71e044de2cb6301c585259319e2913befe06dc0a86838d

IOCs

TypeValue
Marker stringA10-npm_inject (first variant), A10-II, A10-E, A10-%, A10-1234567890 (second variant): global.i/global.z, and the Sec-V request header
Second-variant file stringsvar NX = [6912847, 367, 20411, 613, 43759, 5019283], var SX = [5283741, 241, 41953, 187, 56129, 4738901], peel[ctor], Forge('z'
Ethereum sender (dead drop)0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3
C2 (current)95.135.181.151, HTTP on TCP 443
C2 upload and report base (added 2026-11-04)http://95.135.181.151:80 (the _t_u prelude value; takes /verify-human/<tag>)
C2 (earlier)166.88.134.75, 103.179.143.219, 23.27.13.72
C2 paths (stage 1)/0x/cls, /0x/ls
C2 paths (stage 2, added 2026-11-04)/0x/npm-migrate, /0x/clb, /0x/cb, /0x/js, /$/boot, POST /verify-human/<tag> (default tag A4)
C2 server header (added 2026-11-04)X-Powered-By: Express on plain HTTP, TCP 443
Response header carrying stage 2x-payload-b64
XOR keysq4FZkxX{!h,Sr3=@ (/0x/cls, and the /0x/clb and /0x/cb body), y-p_>d$0B&@^1aQk (/0x/ls), ThZG+0jfXE6VAGOJ (/$/boot, added 2026-11-04)
Request header (added 2026-11-04)id: <hostname>$<username> to /$/boot
Persistence files (added 2026-11-04)~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.json, ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws-runner.js, ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.pid, ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.log
Patched npm file (added 2026-11-04)lib/cli.js of every npm install found, with a 200-space-padded snippet and /*M260630A*/; on Windows, an npm-cli.js shim with /*NPM_WS_SHIM*/
Patched editor and app files (added 2026-11-04)VS Code and Cursor out/main.js; VS Code, Cursor and Antigravity node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js; Discord modules/discord_desktop_core/index.js; GitHub Desktop main.js
Injection markers (added 2026-11-04)/*C250617A*/, /*C250618A*/, /*C250619A*/, /*C250620A*/, /*C260511A*/, /*RS260605*/ (inz)
Injection side files (added 2026-11-04)*.inz.cjs, *.inz.orig, *.inz.tmp
RAT dependency install (added 2026-11-04)[email protected] in a hidden npm cache directory named nm-npm-cache-…, --ignore-scripts --omit=dev, lock .npm-install.lock
RAT command names (added 2026-11-04)ss_info, ss_eval, ss_eval64, ss_inz, ss_inzx, ss_connect, ss_stop, ss_exit, ss_exit_f
RAT network (added 2026-11-04)socket.io to the C2; http://ip-api.com/json; User-Agent Python-urllib/3.12 with /6x6/ or /x2/ paths
Other RAT strings (added 2026-11-04)EV-CHQG3L42MMQ, EV-4A6OE6M0E2D, MD5 9a47bb48b7b8ca41fc138fd3372e8cc0, Blocked by security
Stage 2 hashes (added 2026-11-04)See Stage 2 hashes
RPC endpoints queriedhttps://1rpc.io/eth, https://eth.drpc.org, https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, https://eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io
Indexer fallbackhttps://eth.blockscout.com/api
User-AgentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Processdetached node -i child of a Node process, code on stdin
npm publisherclockbook-app ([email protected]), pubngo-stack ([email protected])

Detection notes

  • In the files: a run of 100+ \t before eval(atob( on a single line. A line-length check catches it, and so does a grep for \t{50,}eval\(.
  • The second variant defeats both of those greps. Its file signals are a computed ["constructor"] lookup on a function, one string literal over 10 kB that is not base64, and a 4.3× size jump in a release that changes only version.
  • The payload line starts with ordinary bundler output (/******/ });). Any viewer or tool that cuts lines at a fixed width shows only that prefix. Our own finding snippet cut at 120 chars. See below.
  • On the network: plain HTTP to port 443, Sec-V request header, x-payload-b64 response header. Ethereum JSON-RPC from a server process that has no reason to make it.
  • On the host: node -i with piped stdin and no TTY, whose parent is another node process.
  • On the host (added 2026-11-04): a node process running ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws-runner.js. Any npm command that starts it.
  • On the host (added 2026-11-04): an npm install of [email protected] into a directory named nm-npm-cache-… that no project asked for.
  • On the network (added 2026-11-04): plain HTTP to the C2 on port 80 as well as 443.
  • On the host (added 2026-11-04): a node process spawning a detached node -e child with stdio ignored, right after an HTTP fetch.
  • On the network (added 2026-11-04): socket.io traffic from a Node process to 95.135.181.151. Requests to http://ip-api.com/json from a Node or Python process.

Host checks

Added 2026-11-04. These only read files. Removing the malicious versions from npm does not undo any of this on a machine that already ran stage 2.

The persistence files:

ls -la ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws* 2>/dev/null

The marker in every npm cli.js. The /*M260630A*/ snippet sits at the end of the file, after 200 spaces. Do not run npm to find these paths: on a patched machine, any npm command relaunches the implant.

grep -l -F -e 'M260630A' -e 'NPM_WS_SHIM' \
  "$(dirname "$(command -v node)")"/../lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  /opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  ~/.nvm/versions/node/*/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js 2>/dev/null

The markers in editor and app startup files. These are the macOS paths from the RAT’s string table:

grep -l -E 'C25061[789]A|C250620A|C260511A|RS260605' \
  "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/Resources/app/out/main.js" \
  "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/Resources/app/out/main.js" \
  "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/Antigravity.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/GitHub Desktop.app/Contents/Resources/app/main.js" \
  ~/Library/Application\ Support/discord/*/modules/discord_desktop_core/index.js 2>/dev/null

On Linux, the table lists /usr/share/code/resources/app/…, /usr/share/cursor/resources/app/…, /usr/share/antigravity/resources/app/…, /usr/share/discord and /usr/share/GitHub Desktop/…. On Windows, it lists Programs\Microsoft VS Code, Programs\Antigravity and Discord’s modules\discord_desktop_core-1\discord_desktop_core\index.js.

Leftover injection files:

find ~ /Applications /usr/share -name '*.inz.cjs' -o -name '*.inz.orig' -o -name '*.inz.tmp' 2>/dev/null

Any hit means the machine ran stage 2. Treat it as compromised: the RAT can run commands, upload files and read the clipboard.

How Greenflagged handled it

Time (UTC)Event
22:12:11.630[email protected] published
22:12:21Greenflagged imports it from the npm change feed (+10 s)
22:23:43–22:23:47Static analysis: maintainer-change HIGH, publisher-changed HIGH, and two source-diff HIGHs on dist/main.js (obfuscated-file-transition, encoded-string-file, artifact eval-atob). Risk 100
22:30:00AI reviewer rejects [email protected], confidence 97
22:37:35@adminide-stack/utils and @adminide-stack/client-redux imported on request during triage. We had not mirrored either package before
22:48:15.717@adminide-stack/[email protected] published
22:57:34Greenflagged imports it from the npm change feed
23:02:36–23:02:37Static analysis: publisher-changed HIGH, obfuscated-file-transition on lib/index.js HIGH, no-comparable-baseline HIGH, dormant-publish MEDIUM (3,104 days). Risk 91
23:07:59AI reviewer defers [email protected], confidence 55. It stays in needs_review and is not served
23:08:29[email protected] rejected by hand
23:16:58.236[email protected] published
23:17:08Greenflagged imports it from the npm change feed (+10 s)
23:17:10–23:17:11Static analysis: maintainer-takeover, publisher-changed, encoded-string-file and obfuscated-file-transition on dist/main.js, all HIGH. Risk 100
23:17:11AI reviewer rejects [email protected], confidence 97. 13 s after publish
23:20:57.770@adminide-stack/[email protected] published
23:26:39Imported on request. We had not mirrored this package before
23:26:41–23:26:42Static analysis: Semgrep eval-with-decoded-input HIGH, eval-usage MEDIUM. No baseline version was greenflagged. Risk 38
23:27:07Rejected by hand
23:28:14AI reviewer approves at confidence 85. The approve is refused because a human already rejected the version; it stays rejected
23:34:37.510@adminide-stack/[email protected] published
23:44:49Imported on request. We had not mirrored this package before
23:44:59–23:45:02Static analysis: Semgrep eval-with-decoded-input HIGH, eval-usage MEDIUM. No baseline version was greenflagged. Risk 68
23:45:07Rejected by hand
23:50:54AI reviewer approves at confidence 80. The approve is refused because a human already rejected the version; it stays rejected
11-04 00:11–00:12forms-core, wiki-browser, help-browser and cdeops imported on request during triage. Their latest versions at the time were clean
11-04 04:51:26.680[email protected] published. Imported at 11:26:39. Not scanned: importing a package scans only its latest version, and this one waited in pending, not served
11-04 05:18:13.216[email protected] published. Imported at 11:26:39
11-04 05:44:03.122[email protected] published
11-04 06:58:37.333[email protected] published. Imported at 06:58:42 (+5 s). Not scanned, pending, not served
11-04 07:07:55[email protected] imported from the npm change feed (+1 h 23 m 52 s)
11-04 07:07:55–07:07:57Static analysis: obfuscated-file-transition HIGH on client.js, server.js and src/index.js; dormant-publish MEDIUM
11-04 07:13:18AI reviewer rejects [email protected], confidence 88
11-04 07:14:49Its three rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL. Risk 100, rejected
11-04 07:28:20.861[email protected] published. Imported at 07:28:29 (+9 s). Not scanned, pending, not served
11-04 11:26:47–11:26:49[email protected] static analysis. No finding names the loader. Risk 63, the same as the clean 12.0.193. It is in needs_review and is not served. No version of this package was greenflagged, so there was no baseline to diff against
11-04 15:43:45[email protected] rejected by hand
11-04 15:43:47–15:43:55[email protected], [email protected] and [email protected] scanned on request. Each gets obfuscated-file-transition HIGH on lib/index.js. Risk 28, 61 and 51; all three needs_review, not served
11-04 15:44:26–15:44:28All three rejected by hand. All twelve versions are now rejected
11-04 17:43:11@adminide-stack/[email protected] published by admin-layout, with the clean fingerprint (lerna/8.1.9, node 22.17.0, new gitHead). No loader
11-04 18:05All twelve malicious versions still return HTTP 200 from registry.npmjs.org. @pubngo-stack/help-browser latest is still 12.0.23-alpha.3
11-04 ~20:40npm has removed all twelve malicious versions. @pubngo-stack/help-browser latest is 12.0.23-alpha.0
11-04 20:47–20:48We fetch stage 2 from 95.135.181.151:443, from a throwaway host. See Update 2026-11-04

Greenflagged

No client installed any of these versions through Greenflagged. Get started with Greenflagged today at https://greenflagged.dev