Ukrainian counterintelligence veteran Viktor Yagun believes that Paladins is not a final project from a counterintelligence perspective. It is a test of a model — an attempt to probe channels and prepare for further expansion. New names and forms will appear in the future, but the structure itself will remain the same. This is not a one-off operation but a long-term hybrid campaign.
Yagun’s main conclusion is that the Paladins network represents a slow-acting threat. It does not aim for quick victory but for exhaustion and systemic erosion. For Europe, this means the risk of strategic erosion; for Ukraine, it means the danger of losing the support of external partners at a decisive moment.
Interview with Major General Viktor Yagun
If we look at a 40-year-old interview with the Soviet KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov, it is clear that the plans to undermine the West had a very strong intellectual foundation. There were people involved who knew how to work with propaganda professionally and systematically. I doubt that Dugin or Malofeev could produce anything comparable. Is anything truly fundamental being done now in the GRU or the FSB?
At present, ideology in the Kremlin is overseen by Sergei Kiriyenko. Dmitry Kozak dealt with the supervision of the post-Soviet space. Vladimir Medinsky is also there.
But in general, there is a preference for reusing old schemes and solutions. The financing of such events is, of course, carried out through Russian intelligence services.
When activities abroad need to be financed, it is arranged through embassies and foreign intelligence officers. Not through military attachés, but through people whose official positions relate to culture or other “soft” activities.
How is the money moved? Through cryptocurrency that is later converted into cash, or is it simply brought in diplomatic suitcases that are not inspected?
Both cryptocurrency and diplomatic mail can be used. But one million dollars is ten kilograms of cash if we are talking about hundred-dollar bills.
At the same time, there are always ways to earn and legalize money in other ways. For example, two Russian illegal agents were recently exposed in Slovenia. These were officers who left Russia under deep cover via Argentina.
There they legalized their status and obtained Argentine passports. Their children did not even know what their parents actually did. They then moved to Slovenia and opened an art salon there — a very good cover: a private gallery. Through it, paintings were sold on Russia’s behalf at astronomical prices.
This is essentially the legalization of cash. Criminal structures connected to intelligence services can also engage in “laundering” cash. Incidentally, the mafia always takes its percentage.
There are also schemes in which the required amount is handed over in Europe while trusted individuals in Russia are paid in rubles.
You mean hawala? It is a system thousands of years old that has traditionally been used in the East. Are Russian intelligence services now using it as well?
Yes, they use it actively. For example, you go to a specific person in New York, say a code word, and hand over the money. Your agent is paid at the same time in another country.
A similar system also operates through the church. The Russian Church earns very large sums in Russia that are not subject to taxation. They take certain items out and bring others in.
In reality, almost anything can be legalized if the right scheme is used. For example, almost all large Western monasteries subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church also have Russian private schools. Some of the larger ones even offer secondary-level education. But it is not only education that takes place there; ideological influence is also exercised.
According to our estimates, until 2014 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate transferred up to one billion euros to Moscow in cash or valuables.
Local churches in Europe do not generate such sums. Returning to Paladins — what should be done about them now?
They are deliberately decentralized and do not maintain direct contact with each other. The only center capable of connecting them is Russia. And that is precisely the danger.
This complicates the work of pan-European security services, because viewed separately these groups appear local. In reality, it is a single system that, if necessary, can coordinate its activities from a single signal and begin actions or protests simultaneously.
Could this mean sabotage, or rather marches and demonstrations?
I do not think they will be used for sabotage. This structure is already visible to the public and unsuitable for such work. However, it is very effective for influencing, for example, elections to the European Parliament.
At some point, the whole of Europe could be filled with protests featuring Nazi symbolism — as we have already seen. These groups do not communicate directly with each other. They communicate either through a coordinator at a Russian embassy or through a special intermediary who does not attract attention.
What are European intelligence services doing now?
In fact, it is understood that counterintelligence needs to be strengthened. Attention must begin to be paid to areas that were previously considered harmless: cultural centers, so-called sports diplomacy.
Many sports clubs run by people from Russia function as channels of influence for intelligence services. This concerns combat sports such as sambo, but also ballet schools.
If they are run by people from Russia or from former Soviet states, this does not mean they should be closed or punished. But it is necessary to look at what is actually happening there. There are plenty of such examples.
If an agent is identified in a certain position in one EU country, it should be checked whether someone similar occupies the same position in your country. If your neighbors uncovered a particular scheme, it is worth checking whether the same pattern is being used with you.
If these fragments are assembled into a complete picture, the work becomes much more active and effective. Russia uses the same patterns everywhere, hoping that at the level of a single country they will simply go unnoticed.