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Running Secure Server Software on Insecure Hardware Without Parachute
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What this talkis about u The web is changing — consolidation at the edge u Fundamental assumptions about server security are wrong u How do we design server software with the worst case in mind? u Distinguish between long and short term secrets u Devise approaches for protecting each 2
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Traditional server threatmodel u Assume server is secure u Add layers of protection to keep attackers out u Network layer protection u Operating System Level: principle of least privilege u Protection against maliciously installed code u More advanced barriers 11
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Globally distributed servers uLess jurisdictional control = less physical security u Physical access trumps static defense layers ! u Traditional defenses helpful, but not ideal u Cannot rely on security of keys u Single break-in results in immediate compromise 12
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Approach system securitythe ‘DRM way’ u Assume attacker has bypassed all static defenses u Goal is to refresh secrets before they are compromised u Split system into long-term secrets and short-term secrets u Focus on renewability of secrets 14
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Secrets must besplit into two tiers u Long-term Secrets u Useful for attacker for long period of time u Do not store at the edge ! u Short-term Secrets u Expire after a short period of time u Cannot be re-used 15
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Example: Traditional TLStermination u TLS handshake with nginx and Apache u SSL keys on disk u Read from disk, use in memory ! u Cryptographic elements at risk if server is compromised u Private key u Session key 16
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TLS revisited foruntrusted hardware u Long term secrets u Private key ! u Short term secrets u Session key u Session IDs and Session ticket keys u Credentials to access private keys 17
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Short-term secrets —threat model u Must live on machines in unsafe locations u Memory u Control Flow u By the time a secret is broken, it should be expired u Don’t keep secrets in a useable state u Impose computational cost to retrieve the original secret u Expire secrets quickly ! 19
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Techniques from DRMare applicable u White-box cryptography u Code obfuscation 20
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White-box cryptography u Hidethe cryptographic key from everyone u Protect against key extraction in the strongest threat model ! u Takes time to extract key — lots of math u Choose difficulty based on secret lifetime 24
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Code obfuscation u Makingreverse engineering difficult u Compile-time control-flow modification u Data transformation in memory u Anti-debugging 27
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Keyless SSL u SSLwithout keys? Surely you’re joking. u SSL without keys at the edge. That’s better. 32
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How Keyless SSLWorks u Split the TLS state machine geographically u Perform private key operation at site owner’s facility (in HSM, etc) u Perform rest of handshake at edge u Communicate with signing server over mutually authenticated TLS 33
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Conclusion u Untrusted hardwarerequires a new approach u Split secrets into long-term and short-term u Design for rapid renewal — replace secrets faster than they can be broken u Leverage short-term secrets to access long-term secrets 37