Australian Federal Police and FBI nab underworld figures using encrypted app
abc.net.auThe Australian Broadcasting Corporation is covering it in more detail than the Reuters article, including some of the mechanics of how it was pulled off:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-08/fbi-afp-underworld-cr...
Apparently it revolved around duping Hakan Ayik, one of Australia's most wanted drug dealers now operating as an international kingpin from Turkey, to trust the app and recommend it to his associates. It's a double whammy, in that the network has been blown wide open and the AFP is now telling Ayik to hand himself in to avoid recriminations from his associates. No doubt there will be a movie about this one.
You have to respect this type of policing approach, the ironey is just delicious when you consider: 1) They socialy engineered their target just like scammers would 2) They got the target to install and trust some 3rd party app they supplied 3) Then the victim pyramid pushed the scam app onto others.
We often read (1) and (2) all the time with various scams from call centres, now the law has used that approach against a criminal and taken it too another level.
I have a lot of respect for this approach against such criminals on many levels.
But one take away from all this - IT security is often limited by humans and this highlights that perfectly. Just nice too read about criminals falling foul to the law who have taken one of their play-books and used it against them. Sure makes a change from reading about some old person loosing all their savings as somebody convinced them to install some random app just because they said they was from the bank/Microsoft etc.
> They got the target to install and trust some 3rd party app
I just heard on the radio (I’m an Aussie) that it’s not a phone app, it’s some kind if dedicated device that doesn’t do sms, mail or voice, only encrypted messages (that the law enforcement had the keys to).
> it’s some kind if dedicated device that doesn’t do sms, mail or voice, only encrypted messages (that the law enforcement had the keys to).
I gotta be honest, I would find the idea there kind of appealing ...
Yep! And you could only get one of these devices via a recommendation from another crook who already had one, and they cost between 1.5k-2.5k, paid in BTC apparently.
It's pretty interesting! Can't wait for more details on the scheme.
Aka customized (and backdoored) Android firmware.
Oh that's even more delicious - it's like a modern version of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Clothes story or the drug dealers new phone in this instance - That the dealer was sold on the aspect that it would be invisible to the law. It just get's better and better.
It was much more than drug dealers.
Generally drug dealers are servants of their community, providing goods and services to people in a collegial manner.
These were viscous, murderous, gangsters. Their greed and hubris bought them down as much as cleaver policing. Which is not to minimise the cleverness of the coppers, very cleaver, very smart. Get these parasites out of our communities.
Where do you think the "servants of the community" dealers get their supply from?
For drugs like MDMA from cooperative chemists
For drugs like cannabis from neighbourhood indoor growers.
For drugs like synthetic opioids (ad Ketamine) directly from the pharmaceutical companies.
For drugs like cocaine and natural opiates they are imported from revolutionary groups mostly. This one is tricky, as the other end of the trade tends to be fairly brutish, so there is a thriving "middle man" business.
I do not get your point.
My point is that dealing illegal drugs is a community service. The laws are complete bullshit, no body with half a ounce of sense thinks they are socially useful, they are maintained for reasons of brute power and political lag. They are failing
Ok, we'll change to that from https://www.reuters.com/article/australia-crime/australian-p... above. Thanks!
The Vice and the NYT articles are better, and of course there's a Wikipedia article about it. This article is too focused on the Australian part of the operation with too little detail about how it actually worked.
https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shie...
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/world/australia/operation...
Well this 145 second animated explainer by the Australian Federal Police covers it pretty well https://youtu.be/qq9wnMXvgOc
So they got to this most wanted man and instead of arresting him they fed him an app to help catch all his buddies while at the same time put a target on his back? Pretty daring move.
It seems like kind of an evil move for law enforcement to put a target on his back like that. But I assume all of the bad guys knew which guy was pushing the phones, so he was probably going to be a target no matter what.
>> It seems like kind of an evil move for law enforcement to put a target on his back like that.
This is actually a very old method of getting criminals to cooperate with law enforcement.
The FBI used to do this with mob guys all the time in the 1980's. Show up, arrest them publicly, put out false newspaper articles saying he was close to flipping. He starts getting heat from the outfit and sooner or later, distrust is sown and suddenly he becomes a marked man. Word gets back to him they put a hit on him, or things get dicey with the underbosses and suddenly, he's like a cat in a cage with nowhere to go - so he turns on his associates in order to save his own life.
Cops used to do the same thing with low level drug dealers. Pressure them to flip on their supplier by pseudo arresting them, taking him away. They'd drive around a bit, then drop him off without cuffs in the middle of the neighborhood in broad daylight. Word gets around what happened, and suddenly the heat gets turned up because now he was seen getting out of a cop car with no cuffs? Must mean he's turned informant. Same thing, he gets too much heat and feels he needs to save himself and flips anyways.
Great insight, thank you.
Fun.. I guess that's one way to figure out if someone is guilty or not. Either he's innocent and nothing happens or he's guilty and he dies or flips. The whole side stepping the judge/jury to go straight to the executioner part seems like it should violate some kind of law.
I think it is more accurate to say that this is simply a risk of engaging in activities with people who will kill you if they think you will tell the truth.
Yea.. I can see some people thinking that, but that sentiment kind of goes against the rule of law. If all of the criminals committed crimes that everyone agreed should be punishable by death I could see it being more acceptable, but if these are lesser crimes that wouldn't be punishable by death but where the individual could be killed by other criminals that believe them to be a snitch, having law enforcement risk a person's life seems to go against the rule of law.
>> having law enforcement risk a person's life seems to go against the rule of law.
Most criminals who engage in any kind of criminal activity are usually living dangerous lives as it is. Working with the mob? Drug dealing with Mexican cartels? Finance crimes with sketchy people like Jeffrey Epstein? Engaging in credit card fraud with Russian mobsters?
I would say a majority of profitable criminal activity involves dealing with some form of violence or violent people to begin with. Criminals know the inherit risk with what they do or who they're involved with.
Yes, criminals do criminal things, but normally we don't just execute criminals that are involved in bad organizations. Even criminals are afforded rights here and it is one of the things that makes this country so great. Having law enforcement decide that they get to pass judgement on criminals is an incredibly slippery and ugly slope. Without everyone getting a right to a fair trial, those that are innocent can be impacted as well (e.g.: this is why one of our founding fathers defended the british soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre [1]).
Why is it ok that law enforcement get to decide what punishment a criminal should receive? You don't think that has a risk of trending society towards a police state where law enforcement power is not checked at all?
Innocent people getting thrown in jail happens. Say the police give this type of public exposure to an actually innocent person and that innocent person gets convicted. Say a newspaper article reports on the lie that the given innocent person was cooperating with police and that article is read by a big audience. That innocent person runs the risk of being murdered in jail because they have been marked as a snitch by law enforcement.
But he's not innocent, you missing the boat here jimmy ?
The point I'm trying to make is that we have judges and juries for prosecuting criminals and deciding sentences for guilty criminals. You don't think it's a little bit wrong that law enforcement is side stepping that and deciding for themselves that the criminal is guilty and that they should get the death penalty? Iirc, the fifth amendment grants individuals the right to refuse to testify against themselves, but this behavior is effectively removing that right for the accused.
law enforcement isn't doing the executing
That's like saying a hitman's customer isn't committing murder. Try another
It's not, because again, the police aren't paying or soliciting others to do the executing.
I don't think that was the story.he fled to Cyprus and escaped prison there. Someone somehow got him to believe the app is safe, he took kickbacks for the distribution, even. My main question is, how is this man living free in Turkey despite there being an interpol warrant?
If he is living in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is actually a different country than Turkey and not recognized by other countries, it would be nearly impossible to extradite him without Turkey's cooperation.
I doubt that Turkey would extradite her own citizen as well.
Living free in Turkey doesn't necessarily mean he isn't in hiding, and/or hasn't paid off enough locals to be protected from extradition or capture.
>the AFP is now telling Ayik to hand himself in to avoid recriminations from his associates
The Australian Federal Police premise that he would be safer from reprisals in prison is an extremely shaky one [1]
Although if they can cut him off from all funds, it might become true.
[1] edit: https://www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/tandi103.... - "homicide rate ... is up to 7 times higher [than outside]"
That study computes that you're 7x more likely to get murdered in prison than in the "comparable non-prison community", but "comparable" here seems to be only for age/gender.
I imagine the homicide rate is a wee bit higher than average for drug kingpins, particularly those seen to have ratted out 100+ people, even unintentionally.
Yeah this guy presumably had a wide ranging network of people who he knows, who haven't been caught, but may be exposed ... by him. This dude now poses a risk to a lot of very worried people right now and presumably the people he relies on are running for cover / maybe less likely to protect him.
> "homicide rate ... is up to 7 times higher [than outside]"
This is based on assumption that a regular "free" person has not made thousands of criminals at the same time.
He would be going to Golbourn Gaol, very very high security.
Prison sure kept Carl Williams safe. Safe from dying of old age!
Can they actually just pin that on him just to get him? They need a scape goat and may as well
Not to say that they might not "may as well", but why exactly would the police need a scapegoat for arresting criminals?
Many times it comes out much much later that the kingpins were in on it. The spy world equivalent of the double agent.
As to how the FBI got access to the messages, Vice says[1] after Vincent Ramos of Phantom Secure was arrested in 2018, a confidential human source offered Anom, which the source was developing, to the FBI (probably in exchange for immunity or a reduced sentence, in my opinion). The source then seeded Anom phones to his existing distributors as a replacement for Phantom Secure phones, and from their they made their way into criminal organisations.
[1] https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shie...
Makes you wonder how many commercial VPN services are just FBI honeypots?
One of the (publicly unspoken) conditions to offer VPN services in western countries is to keep logs and provide on their request, regardless of the marketing stories. There are several verifiable cases where Nord has cooperated with FBI and Interpol and provided logs, but this is a fairly small lie, compared to the time when they tried to keep quiet about a breach.
Not saying that having a VPN service from Russia or China is a better solution...
Generally speaking, they all have to have relatively short term logs to operate and protect their services. This tends to defeat things like piracy, where commercial actors need time to file paperwork and get subpoenas, by which time the logs are gone, but obviously the feds can move a lot faster and tend to get what they need to catch serious criminal activity.
This would, to me, suggest VPN services are a general societal good, as they prohibit annoying corporate IP enforcement behaviors, while not meaningfully helping pedophiles and terrorists.
Russia and China would in fact be a better solution as most Westerners are never going to be subject to Russian or Chinese authorities.
> most Westerners are never going to be subject to Russian or Chinese authorities
Coercible locals are a valuable asset. Not sure why countries with zero rule of law would be attractive to someone valuing a principle like privacy.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say, especially with the "coerciable locals", other than trying to say China and Russia have "zero rule of law".
His point is that foreign states could blackmail you or exert pressure in other ways, even if they aren't gonna extradite and throw you in jail following due process. Thus, Russia/China would have "coercible locals" in western countries.
In the US a "coercible local" is given a far less scary descriptor of confidential informant, or state's evidence. There are far more of those than there are "coerced locals" in the service of Russia or China.
Any locals in any country are coercible to their government, if it really wants to.
Sure until you visit a geopolitically aligned airport and get detained and propositioned by a foreign intelligence agency. Then you end up spying against your own country because your VPN provider was just a honeypot for a foreign intelligence agency. Blackmail, forced detention, "crimes against the Chinese state", jail without due process or civil rights, who knows. Maybe you didn't even break US law but Chinese or Russian law.
I would never willingly trust a country like Russia or China with my information.
That stuff already happens to people in the West, and people who visit non-Western but Western aligned countries. The fact of the matter is that if you are a Westerner, you are going to spend more time in the Western sphere of influence, of which Russia and China are not a part of.
I think the West generally respects and understands due process, rule of law and those general ideas. You will likely get a fair trial. Not so for some of the opposition.
This is exactly why I tend to use VPNs from country's with which the US is not in good terms with : Russia, Iran, Belarus, China
If I was a US intelligence agency I would specifically establish colocation presences with ISPs in Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, china, etc, on commercial ISP terms, and admin the servers remotely to set them up as a commercial vpn service. There's plenty of datacenter operators in Russia that will take your money.
> There's plenty of datacenter operators in Russia that will take your money.
Wouldn't they have some uncomfortable questions to answer when Putin finds out they've been cooperating with the Feds?
Presumably the feds wouldn't say who they were and would pose as common criminals, because they wouldn't have any reason to suppose that the datacenter operator would keep quiet if they were open about their identity.
But yours assumes that Russia doesn't do counter-intel and wouldn't be looking for exactly these kinds of infiltrations. If it is obvious to us that these things would be targets, I'm pretty sure it is obvious to Russian intelligence services.
Bellingcat appear to routinely buy data from Russian blackmarket data brokers.
Replace 'buy' with 'receive' and 'Russian blackmarket data brokers' with 'intelligence assets' and you're correct.
Shady fly by night data hosting doing counter-intel, or better, Putin spending his precious rubles on running counter-intel ops for shady fly by night hosting companies, are both hilarious.
Russian govt has always held counter intel to be a top priority and they devote an enormous amount of resources towards it, so why is that hilarious?
The feds would pose as a slightly shady hosting/Colo company or similar.
First-order strategy (do something that works as long as the other side hasn't also thought of it) only works until the other side thinks of it. My guess is that the intelligence complex (CIA +) thought of this around 1995, and the domestic law enforcement complex (FBI +) around 2005.
Very plausible. A lot of "western" VPNs are run by Chinese companies.
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252466203/Top-VPNs-secre...
I'm confident the big ones like Nord are just that. And even if they're not, they can just be taken over or backdoored - nobody will ever be the wiser.
Especially VPN services that got acquired, like Private Internet Access, acquired by what many people describe to be a malware company.
Wait, what? What did I miss?
It was acquired by Kape Technologies, which used to go by the name of Crossrider and has a sketchy history
https://hiddenrouter.com/private-internet-access-vpn-to-be-a...
Thoughts on ProtonVPN?
There are few real use-cases for any commercial VPN which claims to sell privacy, they are generally snake oil. The one possible exception is to get around geo-blocking, and in that case you just want to go for one with the most numerous and reliable servers in the location you want to appear to be visiting from.
For privacy, the gold (and imperfect) standard is still Tor, and even then you are at the mercy of the owners of the exit node. Freenet and I2P are also interesting.
1, but this is exactly the point. Use them for netflix not to coordinate heroin sales.
Or even foreign state actors
The FBI, from the viewpoint of 95% of the world, is “a foreign state actor”.
Not country-wise. The US has many first world allies that cooporerate with the FBI on a second party basis.
So Vice says that an external source came to offer the app, while the Australian Police "said the plan to use an encrypted app was hatched overseas over a few beers with FBI agents in 2018, before police figured out how to decrypt all messages."
I wonder how this all ties together. As someone mentioned here, there surely be some movie about it.
It’s likely the FBI mentioned they had an app they could leverage, Australia noted that there was a gap in the local market after Phantom had been taken down, and the two agencies decided to seed the app into the Australian criminal underworld to see how far it would spread.
Yep, sounds plausible.
The AFP says that this Mr Ayik should turn himself in for his own safety, but surely the one with an enormous target on their back is this person. It can’t be too difficult for these criminal organizations to piece together who that is.
What we've learned is only what was in Austrlia's piece of the cake, given they started their day already. New Zeland had theirs already, too. I imagine thousands of arrests are still happening worldwide and several press conferences are going to be held today. Looking at the seal of the operation (https://www.anom.io/trojan_shield_seal.jpg), following countries participated in the operation: Canada, Australia, US, Sweden, The Netherlands, Lithuania, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Austria, UK, New Zeland, Estonia, Scotland, Germany, Denmark.
I expect this to be bigger than Panama Papers. Way bigger. I expect a few prominent politicians to be soon either arrested or "convinced" to step down. I expect the US to have gained a lot of intel and leverage over those from the countries who did not participate in this. We will absolutely not learn about everything they discovered. CIA will and the respective intelligence agencies will.
EDIT: Europol will hold their conference live on YouTube at 10 AM CST: https://twitter.com/janoorth/status/1402164252266409987
EDIT 2: given how Serbia was in the top 4 of messages sent, I really hope that the info gathered will help Interpol fight child trafficking and exploitation in the EU.
From the VICE article (https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shie...) quoted elsewhere here:
"Additionally, the review of Anom messages has initiated numerous high-level public corruption cases in several countries. The most prominent distributors are currently being investigated by the FBI for participating in an enterprise which promotes international drug trafficking, money laundering, and obstruction of justice."
"Late Monday, the FBI said that it would be holding "a news conference announcing a massive worldwide takedown based on the San Diego FBI’s unprecedented investigation involving the interception of encrypted communications" on Tuesday."
Hee hee! The parent domain now has a useful form for criminals to turn themselves in with: https://www.anom.io/
"To determine if your account is associated with an ongoing investigation, please enter any device details below:"
and then it asks for your username, country and IMEI....
The police are so considerate. Not that long ago they were offering to test your meth to see if it contained coronavirus ;-) https://www.news4jax.com/news/weird-news/2020/03/03/is-your-...
That is a law enforcement mic drop and it's well earned by doing good police work.
I giggled, but then realized former an0n users might take it as an opportunity for cooperation. Whether or not it is, it may be effective in getting some to turn themselves in for that reason.
Honey pot?
Sweden just announced 155 arrests: https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/europol-berattar-om-det-o...
Note that 155 is the grand total over the entire duration of the operation. The tally (given in your linked video) is:
* 70 yesterday in Sweden
* 5 yesterday in Spain (related to Swedish investigations)
* 80 earlier, candidly
I believe 70 is the figure that should be compared with the 800 total [1].
> A series of large-scale law enforcement actions were executed over the past days across 16 countries resulting in more than 700 house searches, more than 800 arrests [...]
1: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/800-criminals-ar...
Which amounts to almost 20% of those arrested. Maybe it's partly due to Sweden historically having strong computer literacy. Only time will tell.
Also just a lot of organized crime right now
Europol press conference is available for playback now at https://youtu.be/e443mE8l-_0
There is another press conference at 09:00 PDT too (FBI I believe).
Side note: Scotland is recognised separately from the UK in the list of participating countries. ;)
The first 14:30 of that video has no audio and basically B-roll footage. I'm sure a lot of people wont watch the whole thing and miss the actual conference.
Scotland has a separate police force.
The comments on the video of the people who call this operation communist and so forth are infuriating, i must say.
I think you're drawing an extremely long bow on this.
Qantas was just implicated as being corrupted from within, complaining that no one had told them who or what corruption until the day before this was announced.
There isn’t much of a stretch of the imagination required to see that there is a deep rabbit hole that just got filled with cement.
I was thinking about that same story when I saw the mention of “trusted insiders”
The shield and your comment list the UK and Scotland separately here, which (at least for now) is not accurate as I'm sure you're aware. Are there separate agencies involved that merit including both flags?
Scotland has an entirely distinct legal system with a single unified police agency (with it's own serious and organised crime division). There has never been a connection between the legal system in Scotland and that of England and Wales. Scots laws are primarily passed by the independent Scottish Parliament with only a small number of matters reserved for the UK Parliament in London which passes distinct statutory instruments for Scotland to create approximate equivalence between the 'English' and 'Scottish' laws. These result in anomalies like the violent imagery laws in Scotland are more strict than those of England, meaning a cartoon image in England can be legal to possess but have strict liability severe punishment in Scotland; Scotland retains a right to silence upon arrest but in England remaining silent can be considered by a court to be an admission of guilt (sorry US readers, there is no 5th amendment in England and Wales; you do not have the option of "never talk to the police").
The difference has long irritated 'the English Establishment' so much that an informal verse was sung at one point as an adjunct to what is now the UK National Anthem (but was not officially added contrary to some popular belief[1]).
It also gave rise to the deeply racist phrase "Scot Free" in relation to people being acquitted in trials - during 'show trials' to crush anti-establishment figures, Scots juries would regularly return 'not proven' verdicts as it was necessary for all parts of an indictment to be 'proved' and juries used the verdict to rebel against unjust trials of English opponents. The phrase was used to denigrate those thus freed by juries and persists throughout the English speaking world today and is in common usage despite it's origin as a racist epithet towards Scots and the Scottish legal system.
[1] http://www.sath.org.uk/edscot/www.educationscotland.gov.uk/s...
To save everyone a google, the etymology of scot free is not based in Scottish juries.
The phrase in its oldest form literally refers to getting away without paying tax. Scot is cognate with the Danish (Scandinavian) word skat which means both tax and treasure - the latter meaning incidently being why it can be used as a term of endearment.
This later was broadened to mean getting away without any punishment. I could find no reference online to its use for show trials.
Sources:
https://www.etymonline.com/word/scot-free
https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/scot-free.html
https://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-27...
For those interested in what the gp could be referring to: There is a Wikipedia article and other sources on the "not proven" verdict of Scottish juries which was/is in practice an acquittal. It's apparently still used in roughly 1/3rd of cases. There is a list of significant cases for which the verdict was used, though none seem to be related to political protest.
> There has never been a connection between the legal system in Scotland and that of England and Wales. Scots laws are primarily passed by the independent Scottish Parliament
To add some important context here, the Scottish Parliament came into existence in 1999. So it’s by far not the case that the majority of laws in effect in Scotland were passed by the Scottish Parliament.
Bitcoin price might take a hit or two.
It already dropped significantly after the Feds announced that they'd seized most of the Colonial Pipeline ransom [1]
Right now $31,916/BTC, down over 11% from ~$36,100 24 hours ago... and falling.
[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/08/bitcoin-btc-price-slides-as-...
> I expect a few prominent politicians to be soon either arrested or "convinced" to step down.
Won't happen because the media and FANG runs cover for politicians in the west as opposed to reporting on them.
They keep burring anything that can be slightly damaging to politicians while they dox private individuals with impunity.
> I expect this to be bigger than Panama Papers. Way bigger. I expect a few prominent politicians to be soon either arrested or "convinced" to step down.
I highly doubt it. The main drug operations run with state approval. If anything this was just an attempt to either clean the country from competition or just keep law enforcement busy. If you read the reports, what they have collected, this is nothing if you compare what kind of volumes are being moved every day.
For example, in the UK alone it is estimated that yearly volume of illegal cannabis sales is in the region of 6 billion of pounds and the haul of entire operation was like how much, a 100 million?
What it is going to achieve is a slight vacuum, new youth "get rich quick type" will take place and resume operations.
If this wasn't announced in the media, I doubt drug consumers would have ever noticed something happened. If someone is using illegal market, they have plenty of alternative contacts if their main dealer goes bust.
Also these things are already included in the pricing, so this will be just written off as cost of doing business.
> If you read the reports, what they have collected, this is nothing if you compare what kind of volumes are being moved every day.
I saw this. Watched the whole Europol conference. Those numbers are indeed low: 9 tons of cocain, 5 tons of cannabis/hashish. Some guns and 15m USD, if I remember correctly.
I still don't think I exaggerated. There's no way that's all they got from it after 3 years of eavesdropping. There's just no way that those tens of thousands of messages only incriminated some drug lords. What they did with these press conferences was a pure PR, they just wanted something for the press, but I still believe that the actual aftermath of this will much larger.
In other words, police and customs forces never bother to measure their “success” (seizures) in percent.
If they did, they’d get defunded. We’d get more off the streets by just buying it.
When you put a bounty on dead rats, you don't get a reduction in the amount of rats in your town. What you do get is people breeding rats, to turn in for the bounty.
Drug markets will operate with similar incentives.
If you want to kill the drug trade, what the government needs to do is to start selling drugs. When drugs are cheap, violence and interest in the drug trade plummets. Nobody wants to go to jail over their drug dealing 'job', when its earning them $8/hour.
> When you put a bounty on dead rats, you don't get a reduction in the amount of rats in your town. What you do get is people breeding rats, to turn in for the bounty.
The "Cobra effect".
Does anyone find it funny that each criminal group could have been better off relying on a "kid who knows computers" level of expertise and bog standard devices running open source software which at least wouldn't be trivially systematically turned against them all at once quite so easily.
> anyone find it funny that each criminal group could have been better off relying on a "kid who knows computers" level of expertise and bog standard devices running open source software which at least wouldn't be trivially systematically turned against them all at once quite so easily
Tradeoffs. Traditional tradecraft would inhibit such discovery methods. But it's slow and expensive. Your competitors would outmaneuver you in the short term.
To enable the "kid who knows computers," you also need to train your people in opsec and digital sanitation. That might similarly be expensive and growth inhibiting enough to invite more daring competition.
To add, we are just looking at one of a thousand aspects of tradecraft. They aren’t just dealing with this. They are dealing with moving goods, moving goods across borders, in person meetings, transferring money, recruiting new members, avoiding physical police bugs, avoiding police tails, securing good and money against other criminals, and on and on and on. Each one of those things has a learning curve and takes time, energy, and money.
Of course after a bust, you could go back and say “well obviously they should have done this differently and doubled their security here” but they can’t double their security everywhere and they can’t know every single possible way that every single aspect of everything could become compromised.
Nothing wrong with inhibiting growth in return for long term stability. Does it matter if your competition is more daring—if they aren't going to last very long? If anything, they might serve as a useful distraction.
> Nothing wrong with inhibiting growth in return for long term stability
For long-term plans to pay off, they must survive a series of short terms. Criminal gangs and dictators don’t ignore the long term because they’re stupid. They ignore them because they must. A drug gang practicing classical tradecraft would be decimated by one coördinating electronically. The latter will be caught faster. But a series of short-term motivated actors is the equilibrium state of illicit and physical trading systems.
I can't help but imagine that what you're describing are the criminal gangs we know about; the ones which are well documented. If there are criminal gangs which we don't know about, that aren’t well documented, perhaps they're better at maintaining long term stability.
Criminal gangs that authorities don't know about are the ones that don't do significant activities.
Any criminal activities needs customers and so communicate about its activities.
Your thinking like a lifestyle business criminal enterprise when you should be thinking like a hungry startup. If you go slow and steady someone will try and eat your lunch. Big criminal enterprises have all the same scaling issues that regular companies do.
Yes, we are seeing precisely this in action. The short term guided organization has gone down and the long term stable strategy remains uncaught and now has one less competitor.
This whole things makes me wonder why the criminals don't just put their communications in an envelope and wack a 50c stamp on it.
"Kids who know computers" are still vulnerable to evil maid attacks and badUSB and stuff. The kid's gotta sleep and eat and do whatever else kids do when they're employed by cartels.
There's a reason that classified processing and data storage employs layered physical security too. There's that old saying about what happens when you give someone physical access to the machine.
Still, the damage is purely local and limited and much more likely to be detected. Human intelligence operations are among the most risky and expensive.
I wonder about this too. What sort of people do international criminal organisations hire to manage their info-sec? A criminal that became a computer expert or a computer expert that became a criminal?
Well the criminal organizations can offer a whole range of addictive non-monetary incentives that a computer expert may desire, so I'd guess that's the main path in.
There's more unemployed tech people out there than many here realize though. People that don't present well in interviews, people that didn't stay employ-ably current in tech, hardware guys replaced by the cloud, people in less hot locations for tech, etc. Criminal organizations are much less picky and judgmental than your average tech startup and in some cases may be the only one's willing to give them a chance.
In some countries, getting into tech is impossible if you're not lucky to have the right credentials. In France for example, any even remotely technical job will require years of higher education and experience (yes there's an obvious catch-22 here). You can have perfectly serviceable skills that would put you at a junior/mid developer or sysadmin level and be completely unemployable - at this point crime doesn't sound that bad if you have no other alternative despite otherwise having no propensity/attraction to participate in criminal activities.
For what it's worth, I would still be completely unemployable in France despite having 7 years of successful commercial experience under my belt in some well-known companies. Thankfully I played my cards right and managed to move to a saner country where tech is still more or less a meritocracy.
Tbh, illegality aside, creating a very highly secure system like this from scratch as an one or two person project sounds very exciting and fun.
> People that don't present well in interviews
Those are the worst. There was this one candidate who gave all the interviewers mousepads with his picture and aol email address on it. Who even wants that kind of stuff? The best ones give some candy, like there was someone who gave us gum with a custom printed wrapper “Hope I ‘stick’ in your mind!”
Never mind people who struggle to get a job in IT because of a previous criminal record. Those people may also have been in prison and made connections while inside.
I suspect that people don't fall into such neat categories. You could pose a similar question re: lawyers whose bread and butter is protecting and representing people associated with organised crime (the kind of individuals represented by Maury from The Wire or Neil Mink from The Sopranos). Are they lawyers who developed a slippery version of ethics & morality, or people with loose ethical standards who entered law?
I'd bet good money that the truth is usually quite banal: these individuals make a series of small and highly contingent decisions over time that gradually push them in the direction of criminality or culpability, reinforced over time by social & financial reward for doing so.
What? Representing criminals is not unethical or 'immoral'. Period. Protecting criminals legally is not unethical unless you are knowingly doing something illegal yourself.
I imagine that most layers are just doing their job and getting paid for it. Bringing morality into that equation makes no sense in a legal system that has little to nothing to do with morality.
Representing criminals is fine, but aiding them in committing future crimes isn’t. If you do that, you’re just part of a criminal conspiracy, and being a lawyer doesn’t give you an exception from moral culpability.
Doing their taxes okay, but representing them in court with the goal to free them is the purpose of the justice system...
I think the GP meant 'aiding them in commiting future crimes' in the literal sense (e.g. helping launder money, abusing attorney privilege etc.) rather than implying that by defending them in court the lawyer would then be culpable.
I haven't seen all of The Wire, but as to the character cited as an example, Wikipedia says, "[Maury] is corrupt and unscrupulous, willing to aid his clients in furtherance of their criminal activity." So he crosses your line, and I think that's what the GP post meant.
You don’t get to declare what is unethical by adding the sentence “Period.” after your claim. Ethics is a matter of opinion; I believe that knowingly aiding violent criminals is wrong; if you feel otherwise, that’s just like, your, opinion, man.
They aren't criminal until the court system declares them criminal. The lawyer is defending them before they are declared criminals. That is what "presumption of innocence" means. Everyone has the right to be represented in court, even people that later on will be convicted. Otherwise we can just go back to use pitchforks and similar (and actually it's happening on social media, and it's not looking good)
Everyone is entitled (in the US) to due process and a lawyer to defend them. There is nothing unethical or immoral about it. It's a fundamental right.
It is a thin line, most of these groups are in contact with lawyer teams before they start the operations and the lawyers are in the know. These groups do risk assessment before going ahead.
Again, ethics are a matter of opinion, laws are a matter of fact. Yes, in the US you have the legal right to an attorney. Whether that attorney is behaving ethically depends on the attorney’s behavior and the person making the judgment on the ethics. You and I don’t have to have the same opinion on what’s ethical. We can each advocate for our own ideas of ethics to be codified into policy.
Lawyers, even in the United States, are bound by rules of conduct, and will stop being lawyers very quickly if the overstep the rules of ethical conduct.
The standards of ethics they are checked against are not yours or mine, they are the rules they agreed to. To pretend like ethics aren't a thing for lawyers is surprisingly uninformed for HN.
What happens when you are accused of a heinous crime, the evidence points at you, and yet you are innocent?
I bet you change your mind about the ethics of having a lawyer represent you.
I’d highly recommend that you study formal ethics. Ethics is not built on a platform of opinions.
Unless you are the sort of person that claims that reality is just an opinion, too, in which case you should also study formal philosophy.
Which is good and fair. I think the example was Tony Soprano though and the (imaginary) lawyer in question knew full well the kind of shennanigans he was up to, these lawyers know they're defending murderers and people that ruin lives.
But that’s the point of lawyers. When they defend a guilty party, most of the time they know that the party is indeed guilty. They need to, to prepare a good defence.
Rhetorically, yes he/she/they do get to do that.
Ethics is a matter of philosophy, which has a bit more going for it than just being composed of raw, uneducated opinion.
Lawyers have a code of ethics. Written down and codified. Not a matter of opinion.
You are thinking of morals. That is a matter of opinion
Your life as a human being can't have little to do with morality unless you are a sociopath. On the one hand we need someone to provide all accused with adequate representation to ensure we don't wrongly convict innocent men however at the mob boss level we are virtually always talking about trying to protect horrible people everyone knows are guilty from punishment.
A system that didn't need to hold a trial or give the mob boss a lawyer would be irredeemably immoral but one in which they go free is a shittier world. I don't envy anyone trying to remain moral while walking that line. I don't see how anyone who specialized in such clients could live with themselves.
Or, as the line from Breaking Bad went - you don't need a criminal lawyer. You need a criminal lawyer.
Codefellas https://www.wired.com/2003/12/mafia/
Kids born after that article are nearly finished with high school. I’m pretty sure the dynamic has changed a little since then. Interesting to at least see how it used to be though.
Nice! Is there some follow up story after years?
You hire people you can burn is what you do.
Shipping coordinators got busted? How sad.
Over my life Ive met people who while they seem competent and can tie their shoe laces appear to make bad decisions because they have trouble with judging likely outcomes. Those are the people getting hired to do this sort of work.
From 2003, an inside look at the mafia IT: https://www.wired.com/2003/12/mafia/
"Organised crime" is a bit of a oxymoron.
These people are organised in that they make deals with each other in friend networks. But the people involved are not the sharpest knives in the draw. They get their positions via violence and intimidation more than cunning and planning.
There are cleaver crooks, but we do not often hear from them. A lot of them work at Wall Street, which contains the biggest and most profitable criminal gangs
The cleverest crooks are in Capitol Hill and Downing Street and Brussels, not Wall Street.
I think we probably disagree on "cleaver"!
I would imagine its more of a computer expert who then becomes a criminal because of the money.
Watch "Start-up" in Netflix (American version, not the Korean one).
For what it's worth: some do. Signal (and Wickr) are used extensively.
Yep, and for some reason wickr is Imo even more popular than signal in those circles. It's curious since I've basically never heard of wickr here or in any cybersec community & signal seems to be the daily messaging app for tons of people. I guess it's something to do with the phone verification required by Signal... and I'd guess both apps are pretty similar when it comes to security?
I've heard that in Russia and Kazakhstan drug dealers use Telegram. It just might be a local fashion, when few people started using it and spread it around. I don't think that it's difficult to find phone number tied to unrelated person. Just ask some homeless guy to buy one.
Western naivety. Unbound / fake data SIM cards are sold in boxes by carrier’s employees.
You can still buy SIM cards in Sweden in stores without presenting an ID.
Even in countries where you can still buy a SIM card without ID, once you use your bank card to buy more credit for the SIM (and in Sweden you always will, because cash is basically dead there), it is trivial for the authorities to link the phone number to your real identity.
Iceland as well.
People do. Lots of people.
These ones, who were busted, are greedy violent thugs. They do not know who to trust because they are untrustworthy.
Good riddance to bad rubbish.
Protip to the cartels - pay top dollar to some world class engineers to setup a dark web market and you'll make buckets.
Most if not all markets until now have been run by geeks with limited knowledge and skills, wading in to the criminal underworld and inevitably making rookie mistakes.
Both Ross and the guy in Bangkok had their personal emails tied to the markets. Some kids running a big market from Germany connected to the server on their mom's wifi. The list goes on.
We don't know how Ross and other dark web folks were caught, despite all the official stories. We know what the FBI _tells_ us was the security issue. However, the Snowden doc's reveal that they are instructed to construct other legitimate stories for how to implicate a criminal after the have compromised him in order to not reveal their tactics. The exact term they used in the docs escapes my memory, but we only know that Ross _was_ captured, but we have no clue how. Perhaps he had perfect op-sec, but the real security issue was a raft of 0-day attacks and then they signed up something in his name, later legally gagging him. We really have no clue.
Ross did post on shroomery and stackoverflow with identifiable information ... In the case of the former it was clearly linked to the site. And those posts are still up.
The guy in Bangkok had his personal email in reply-to headers of the the "welcome" emails being sent out. If that wasn't true, everyone who received the mail could have proven that.
Parallel reconstruction may have been a occurred, it's true we won't know.
>The exact term they used in the docs escapes my memory
Parallel reconstruction is the phrase you're after.
Setting up a dark web market is something most people would want to get anywhere close to...
Imagine being responsible for facilitating murder-for-hire, sex trafficking and so on...
Imagine having employer, who has no qualms about killing people and for whom you are a loose end.
You need to be either professional criminal (skill set completely orthogonal to IT, so chance of somebody possessing both at professional level is miniscule), or a moron.
I'm sure there are plenty of people who wouldn't care. Anyone who buys diamonds has blood on their hands too.
I think there is a material difference between buying a diamond and directly facilitating the activities of the drug cartels. In theory everyone buys things that are made by people in shitty conditions because there isn't much direct visibility on the front end as to what kind of nastiness happened elsewhere in the supply chain.
If you want that to change you have to make it illegal to do business with such folks not hope consumers fix it for you via the magic of the market.
It's unclear to me those shitty conditions (e.g. those of iphone manufacture) are net harmful to the poverty-stricken areas they affect - but I'm not sure that's not true of diamonds.
I think it's also more jarring that diamonds are otherwise useless symbols of status. At least iphones trickle down in some way (e.g. allowing the proliferation of older gen smartphones even in poor countries).
This is how police should get around the problems presented with encryption. This is real policing.
The PR barrage and faux posturing by the FBI to weaken encryption has always seemed like just lazy policing to me.
If anything, the hacking attacks on industrial centers has better illustrated than anything why encryption is necessary, and this new triumph has demonstrated that police can continue to function, even thrive in a world that permits encryption.
> This is how police should get around the problems presented with encryption.
By adding a backdoor to E2E encryption? That is pretty much what they have been asking for :)
Amazing that criminals still pick some unknown device over an existing solution with a proven track record.
This is not the first time something like this has happened:
> By adding a backdoor to E2E encryption? That is pretty much what they have been asking for :)
Not really. At least in Australia's case they asked for the ability to access data on the end point while it is unencrypted, which it must be when a human consumes it. They didn't want to backdoor encryption, just bypass it. And they didn't just ask for it - they got it.
Specifically, the Assistance and Access bill (2018) [0]. The "Assistance" in the title allows them to demand assistance from a software company (eg, Google / Microsoft / Apple) in developing an app (or a modified version of an existing app) that that won't trigger the OS's warnings while it provides access to data while it is unencrypted. The "Access" in the bills title refers to the fact they can they demand the software developer force the app to be "upgraded" to the "spy" version on targeted devices via their normal security patch mechanisms.
As you can probably gather from the date of the bill, this law has been in place or about 2 years now. But it probably wasn't in place when this started, as the law was passed New Years Eve, 2018, which explains all this social engineering cloak and dagger stuff.
When I first saw the story I thought it was odd they publicising a hack that only works when nobody knows about it. But now I think about it, my guess is they publicised it because they won't need to use it again. They've legislated far easier ways to spy on a phone.
[0] https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/natio...
tl;dr hacking is allowed, abusing gov't authority to compel is cheating.
I don't think it's really the same as "what they were asking for" at all.
a.) they didn't compel a company to secretly do it for them
b.) the back door is targeted, I.e. not mass surveillance
As far as I understand, they did the work themselves (modified android OS), and their methods were targeted. A "bad guy" could only get this special, hacked phone, from other "bad guys". This wasn't the same thing as, sending a mole to get work at Cisco and install an undetectable zero-day in all communication infrastructure switches world-wide. And it's definitely a far cry from forcing apple to make a modified iOS on their behalf.
No, they pretty much did what hackers do, and as far as I'm concerned, that's fair game.
Agreed entirely. This sort of thing is how it should be done, and clearly quite effective to boot. Hopefully this sends a loud message.
The lesson here is complete trust in modern computing platforms is misplaced and impossible. Your hardware has backdoors, so does your OS, and encryption clients. In addition, popular apps, especially in the US, can always be commandeered by 3-letter agencies.
You're only anonymous as long as you're not actively targetted, despite using "secure" apps and stuff like Tor, which media makes it seem are unbreakable.
Not quite. They were using an app developed by the police as a honeypot. Someone else had even discovered this and blogged about it[0]. If they had used email and PGP they likely wouldn't have been caught in this way. 3-letter agencies are not going to use their trump card of backdoored OS or hardware to catch drug runners.
[0]https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:PwQXt6...
True.. however the three letter agencies are going to pass along any relevant information that they stumble across while filtering for money laundering in relation to terrorism.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction?wprov=sf...
If they used email and PGP, they wouldn't have been caught this way...
That is because the usability of PGP is so bad, they wouldn't have any time to actually operate their criminal enterprise.
Also - email, PGP or not, leaks metadata, and the police will happily end your whole criminal career based on metadata.
> Your hardware has backdoors, so does your OS, and encryption clients
None of these were exploited to retrieve this data, and the third party app that was installed was not intended to encrypt conversations given that it was a honeypot.
> popular apps
This was a small app unknown by anyone outside of criminal orgs. It had no "legitimate" non-criminal users.
> especially in the US
The app was deployed in Australia.
> can always be commandeered
Why distribute a random app when they could have gotten the criminals to use Signal or Telegram and bust them there?
> as long as you're not actively targeted
How long did it take to find Bin Laden?
> despite using "secure" apps
This was not a secure app and any audit would have revealed this (audits such as the ones that Signal and friends have undergone).
> and stuff like Tor,
Tor was not involved.
> media makes it seem are unbreakable.
None of the apps hyped as "unbreakable" were broken here, so...point still stands, I guess?
Honestly, if anything, the recommended approach from this incident would be to use the walled garden - an FBI-backed honeypot would have a lot harder time getting from the App/Play Store onto a user's phone if it was obviously a scam to collect user conversations, asked for a bunch of permissions, had no reviews, and no apparent update history. Who would download some random chat app that nobody uses?
> How long did it take to find Bin Laden?
Bin Laden used couriers in place of digital communications. And the trail that led to him began with his most trusted courier.
Allegedly, al-Kuwayti was uncovered, some of his communications were intercepted, and then he was followed up to Bin Laden's refuge.
> Who would download some random chat app that nobody uses?
The only thing that slowed the capture was using a courier network. Are you a criminal? Do not use a phone.
Seriously, criminals should know better, whether they are petty drug dealers or major terrorists.
Misplaced faith in cryptography is the gift that keeps on giving.
Agree with most of what you said but:
> > especially in the US
> The app was deployed in Australia.
Australia has an even worse equivalent of US National Security Letters, allowing individual workers to be compelled to plant backdoors etc..
Not without notice of the company, and not for wide spreaed distribution, ie targeted enforcement.
I was also under the impression this can be served to individuals without the knowledge of their employer, leaving the individual in a position where they can consult a single lawyer about the legality of the request and face jail time for discussing the request with anyone else (including employers).
I would need to re-read the act, but the gov website[1] indicates you are correct that these requests are served to organisations and not individuals excepting sole traders.
[1] https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/natio...
> Not without notice of the company
Oh? The reports I read were that they could compel an individual to do something and not tell their employer.
The reports you read were likely based on commentary from techies who have no understanding about law, plus a handful of lawyers involved with digital rights organisations that have an incentive to play up the significance of the legislation a bit / talk about worst-case scenarios, worst possible interpretations of a dangerous law and the broadest possible interpretation of who constitutes a "designated communications provider". The government has stated that's not how they interpret the legislation, as the service provider will be the employer not the employee, and I don't think government lawyers are in the habit of arguing that the government _doesn't_ have power to do something.
I'm as suspicious about the Assistance and Access Bill as anyone, but the "telling an employee to implement a backdoor without telling their employer" is really a red herring and I don't know why the Australian tech community was so keen to go along with that.
> I don't think government lawyers are in the habit of arguing that the government _doesn't_ have power to do something.
Eh, from where I'm sitting, that's a pretty common tactic to pacify opposition to legislation that grants the government too much power.
Why would such a law target an employee, when as you claim, it targets the employer indirectly too?
Why not leave it at the employer? Just because won't cut it.
>The lesson here is complete trust in modern computing platforms is misplaced and impossible
For me the lesson here is the same old lesson - Your security is only as good as the humans that interact with it.
I've been reading a lot about these "encrypted phones recently". What really shocks me is how in the last years police has been going after operators of such services under the premise that they would help criminals.
- Sky ECC (Shutdown, owner is facing criminal charges)
- Phantom Secure (Shutdown and owner got 9 years in prison)
- Encrochat ("Hacked" by french police)
So it seems like those "Encrypted phones" were very effective for Law Enforcement to put such an effort to go after them.
I think that criminal organizations will now rely on a do it yourself technique. Not buying phones online which is a very bad idea as law enforcement could just trap the phones at the postal facility, something they already do.
Going to an old fashion phone retailer, then removing the camera and GPS module yourself and installing some encrypted open source software.
Probably they are also going to fake messages. For 2 purposes:
- Talk about a fake huge drug deliveries or an imminent mass shooting to verify if the network has been compromised, I am pretty sure police has no choice other than to act in such a situation.
- This could be used as a strategy defense, if some messages turn out to be fake, then they can use plausible deniability on the others. And perhaps even claim police has faked them.
> Talk about a fake huge drug deliveries or an imminent mass shooting to verify if the network has been compromised
Surprised this wasn't done more. It's the classic tactic you see in the movies: give false intel to the suspected mole and see if they snitch on you.
> I think that criminal organizations will now rely on a do it yourself technique.
Ya, acknowledging the role of compromised encryption feels like burning their source.
Speculation: Churchhill chose to let Coventry get bombed rather than disclose that German encryption had been cracked.
Wouldn't the long game be to allow criminals to believe their communications remain secure, for law enforcement to do parallel construction for their cases?
I can't imagine the calculus that goes into these decisions.
It s not that they were so effective that police forces got scared of them, it's that the ratio criminals vs normal users is so high that it's a no brainer to spend a few millions on hacking/infiltrating them to collect a huge reward.
Whatsapp or Telegram which your grandma uses would be very low reward compared to amount of conversations to parse.
Makes me wonder if those aren't already compromised.
WhatsApp is trivially compromised to law enforcement already if you have backups setup which most people have for message recovery and switching phones. The backup is not encrypted with a private key.
> I am pretty sure police has no choice other than to act in such a situation.
if the crying wolf method worked, terrorists would have a much easier time executing their plots.
>imminent mass shooting may prompt interdiction
Pulse night club comes to mind as a counterpoint. A lot of people died to keep an informant happy. I think a more cynical outlook on law enforcement is appropriate.
I find this a bit concerning. Catching bad guys is all well and good but I wonder whether the various governments are overreaching.
Selling a bugged phone to a known criminal is likely fine (cite: The Wire).
But is it acceptable to sell a bugged phone to unknown/unidentified/random people and then use the phone's communications to determine if the owner is a crook and the owner's identity? The sole basis of suspicions seems to be "bought phone", or maybe "bought phone using bitcoin", or even "bought phone on TOR using bitcoin".
It will be interesting to see how many of these cases hold up in court.
I suspect it was likely a multi-step process to actually get authorization to track a new phone and decrypt messages. For example:
>Step 1: Confirm known bad guy has phone through some other means.
>Step 2: Decrypt phone messages of known bad guy. Confirm they are criminal activities.
>Step 3: Note all previously unknown phones that exchanged criminal messages with known criminal.
>Step 4: Those phones are now considered belonging to known criminals. Return to Step 2.
Now, its totally possible they were just saying “someone bought a phone through TOR, they are probably bad so we can decrypt their messages” but that doesn’t have to be true for them to have worked their way through this criminal network.
Yes, and the court documents released include FBI reasoning based on previous sampling of users showing that the people who bought these phones were criminals. They're not ordinary phones, and distribution is intentionally limited. Drug smugglers don't want to let just anybody buy a phone for their encrypted network, you know
> Drug smugglers don't want to let just anybody buy a phone for their encrypted network, you know
I mean, if it’s well encrypted, it should be strong enough to not worry about any random being on the network too, no?
I guess that’s too counterintuitive for those sweating right now.
I haven't read the court documents, but this seems theoretically solvable by just only accessing the backdoor on any particular phone once you've seen it send an incriminating message to a phone you are already accessing (and getting judges to sign off on warrants for it, paperwork is probably a nightmare).
You start with the head honchos phone, someone texts him about a drug shipment, so you get a warrant to access the backdoor on that phone as well, and so on.
As long as there aren't isolated cells, you get every cell phone. Since you're relying on the head honcho to push the phones, there probably aren't isolated cells.
These phones weren't "normal" in a way that non-criminal would just happen to buy/use - all of their functionality was stripped out except the ANOM app which was disguised as a calculator app and you needed to input a code to access it.
I'd also assume they don't just take orders from anyone, I'd imagine you'd need a referral.
Log it all, and use network discovery and the legal process to access each new device? The main problem for the feds is that the data will be gone. Since it's not gone, they can use the legal process at their leisure.
From what I read you could only buy/activate this phone(or app?) if you knew someone using one and they were only sold on the black market by people who knew the criminal organisations
I'm happy they are catching criminals, but now I wonder how many of my encryption and privacy software is actually an FBI front.
That is why effective end to end encryption is so important. It doesn't matter who is behind it. That is the whole point. No trust required.
The app can just leak your keys to a central database? Using code other people wrote/compiled always requires trust.
The three requirements for effective end to end encryption:
1. All cryptographic keys controlled by the users.
2. Some way to confirm you are actually connected to who you think you are connected to.
3. A way to confirm that the code you are running is not leaking keys/content.
Could the OS lock down the app's permissions to prevent that?
Like, this app can ONLY send/recv e2e encrypted messages, and not log anything or talk to other apps.
The app could still send your keys _as_ an e2e message (to the app author). OS enforcement would need to be pretty intrusive to stop this (e.g. a pop-up for every message sent, displaying the actual destination of the message). I bet users would get pretty blind to such pop-ups, and it would be easy to trick them into accepting the leaking of their private keys.
If you trust the OS, it could hypothetically be built into the OS such that the app only gives what needs to be encrypted to the OS and gets back an encrypted payload to send, then the app wouldn't need to access your keys?
Of course at that point the OS has to either provide good key management itself, or a good API so that the apps can still make things seamless while still not accessing the keys directly.. and probably other problems I haven't thought of.
Makes sense. OS already does key storage (eg, secure enclave [1]) so its not hard to imagine en/decrypt without the key leaving storage.
[1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certifica...
Yeah good point, for that matter you need to trust the app isn't cc'ing the FBI on every message you send.
Text of TFA uses the term "infiltrating" in lieu of "cracking". Not that I necessarily expect Reuters to keep their infosec terminology straight but I wonder if this was a novel hack or if was a simple matter of a judicial gag order, seizing the developer's account and then pushing out a malicious update that enabled MITM or something.
from what I understand they developed the app themselves... marketed and pushed the app to certain "dark markets" and let them use the apps and devices as if they were secure. they were in fact real time monitoring every transaction.
amazing really. and pretty funny if you asked me :-P
Not funny. Pretty much worse fucking case scenario.
Imagine Signal, Telegram, or any other app that touts themselves as a secure app is really just the creation of the FBI, NSA, CIA, and NRO.
Remember, yesterday’s conspiracy theory is today’s reality.
They covered themselves by ensuring that the devices could only be ordered after private referral from another user. All of whom were underworld figures (the devices were initially “seeded” to “underworld influencers”).
I’m sure that added to the credibility of the device among criminal groups, but it also ensured that the platform wasn’t adopted by your average privacy-conscious user.
If moxie marlinespike is a deep cover agent he's been cultivating a whole character and persona for a very long time. I'd lean towards the "not a NSA plant" view myself.
Food for thought: Telegram estimated costs for 2021 based on 675 million monthly active users (MAU) are $220 Million. Yet, the app is somehow free to use. Where does the money to cover the costs come from?
$220M is not pocket money, but Durov's net worth is apparently $17.2B, so he could afford it for a few more years
He was listed on the Forbes Billionaires List in 2021, with a net worth of $17.2 billion. His fortune is largely driven by his ownership of Telegram
- Wikipedia.
So billions from Telegram, a free app. What am I missing?
That's a valid point. It's free now but they do have some plans for monetization (ads in channels with huge numbers of subscribers etc.)
Thanks for this, what about Moxie? Who covers those costs?
Signal is funded by a $50M donation from Brian Acton, who made billions selling WhatsApp to Facebook.
Telegram isn't end-to-end encypted except for some 1:1 chats. The unencrypted chat data is likely being sold, as their privacy policy allows.
At least the story of them being dodgy (in terms of origin/funding) and playing up encryption which is not enabled by default is pretty well documented by now. I get that people really like the UX of the app, but I wish more of them approached Telegram with "Russian gov has access to my unencrypted messages, but maybe the encrypted ones too" mindset.
If that is the case normies living outside of the sphere of Russian influence have little to worry about surely. Better Russia than your own government.
I'd say it's just a good argument for using a popular app (like one you mentioned) because it is likely to be subject to the critical eyes of security researchers.
If you're not already operating under the assumption that TLAs have full access to your entire online history, there's really no point in trying to start now. Use secure apps like Signal to hide your information from hackers, thieves, and generic script kiddies, not to hide from national security agencies. Especially when said agency can send a van to your house to take all your digital equipment (fully legally if backed by a warrant) until you comply and give up all your passwords and encryption keys.
You cannot defeat the legal system through technical means, your only hope is having some kind of escape submarine or private jet to get yourself extracted to a non-extradition country like Russia (or, if you're Snowden, trolling journalists with your flight so all the goons get on the wrong plane).
For a slightly humorous take on this, James Mickens' paper _This World of Ours_[0] is enjoyable:
> In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. In summary, https:// and two dollars will get you a bus ticket to nowhere.
[0] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
This is pretty much my understanding too. We have not progressed one iota in civilization and everything comes down to torture and murder when the going gets tough.
My only hope for a future for humankind lies with this socialist software ideal I have been musing about...
Many people like me wish to hide from Google and Microsoft, not from NSA. Because of two widespread reasons.
- I don't want to have a personalized experience on the net.
- I don't want Google algorithms to hide my new bike frame invention because I also posted an opinion about bing censoring tank man, or about Google cache as commons.
Yeah, sometimes I wonder if Tor is already co-opted like this.
Except that we can see exactly what is being sent from our devices since Signal is open source. Even if the servers are run by the FBI, at best they have a whole bunch of encrypted messages (which they could get by wire tapping anyway).
And that is why open source is important (and Signal's server and open source integration should be viewed very skeptically).
Sounds like they busted down an established provider of secure comm devices and then took over it's distribution network to push their own devices.
If I present some device to my local street dealer and tell him to "use this it's secure I swear" he'll probably punch me cause he suspects a trap.
Amazing that these "world class" criminals fall for this stuff.
Not if you're his supplier. This whole thing works on pre-existing connections.
Can't find the article but Mexican drug cartels hired Cisco certified experts to setup their encrypted communications. Not just your average CCNA guy from test king, but industry experts working for Service Providers and Government.
If by "hired" you mean kidnapped and made them decide between killing their families and them or paying them to secure their networks then you are correct.
Drug cartels over here are terrible.
Reminds me of the character from Narcos who was working to secure the Cali cartel's communications. No doubt lots of work for people who know how to harden networks for criminal orgs.
Seems like duplication and infiltration is becoming a more common tactic amoung LE.
There's some pretty convincing speculation Dream market was setup as a similar operation to this. [0]
If this proves anything it's that the fear mongering by LE about encryption was overblown and they're just lazy lol.
So the big question is if would have been better to strike fast, silently gain more intel och strike in some kind of statistical analysis maner to not blow their cover á la Alan Turing and the enigma
Well, in hindsight, this is not a big question any more, they are all in jail now and will drag most of the supply and micro distribution chain with them. More careful actors are still out there and conducting business as usual. I have read a book on one of the main Italian groups, they have very efficient micro storage procedures to avoid big losses and at least the higher ups will not use phones or computers, they will meet in person. They have or used to have rules of conduct which are very strict, like, stay home with family and don't be seen in bars etc. The opposite of the green horns flaunting the cars and watches, or the Turkish guys wife documenting their lifestyle on Instagram up until yesterday. Sure, mass arrests happen in Italy as well, and some other countries the whole network works different. But using phones is too dangerous and it is avoidable to run efficient logistics. Not only for traceability, but a compromised or confiscated phone will have a lot of let's say problematic evidence on it. Even the Mexican and Colombian groups operate from remote areas, even if affiliated with some parts of governments. I think the usage of digital devices is just lazyness, another attribute like the flaunting of the illicit gains.
Random nitpick, but I think it's à la. Do correct me if I'm wrong though.
it is indeed a grave accent, just as you say
It’s been running for three years. I suspect something changed recently (perhaps some imminent threat) that meant they needed to act now.
One of the warrants they were using to legally collect the information ran out today.
I think this is very problematic.
Let's say police claims you did something with only the chat log as an evidence and they run the chat software. Then they could very well have just faked it, because they have a high incentive to do so.
If the messages were on a third party platform you would at least have a neutral third party involved.
I don't think it will hold up in court if the only evidence is chat logs. After all, it's basically impossible to prove who was holding the phone when a message was sent. But this should be enough information to make arrests and collect additional evidence, e.g. a stash of illegal firearms.
I wonder how the police linked the devices to real world identities, the exact procedures would be interesting to know.
Perhaps if the WLAN module was not disabled they could have used the mac addresses of the WLAN router. But that's a good question.
Indeed, sure some might have shared personal info etc, and this case shows that the English guy recently arrested because of a cheese image was a lie, but finding the real user behind the device must have taken a lot of work, the authorities seem hesitant to share this info. Each one had also to pay a subscription and make a payment, perhaps this helped a great deal.
Jokes on you, my WLAN MAC is B00B1E55:B00B1E55:B00B1E55:B00B1E55 and yours should be too.
This doesn't help a lot if you have a neighbor WLAN in reach. They would just used that one to locate you.
It seems like there is a bust of these "safe" devices every other month. And the groups trust them again, when will they learn, do not use a phone or computer. One of the last Italian capos would pass on messages on pieces of paper or verbally. And still got busted, but after a life time.
I wonder how much crime would be left if the drug trade were legalized
Alcohol and tobacco are legal in many countries and yet you still get counterfeits and illegal production.
Also drug use is often not down to that user having a fair happy reality and oh so often the product of bigger issues that go untackled and addressing those social injustices would do far more to address crime overall than just legalising drugs.
Now if they legalised drugs and used that tax income to address those social issues, then we would see progress and more so, some fairness restored.
We’ve legalized marijuana in Canada. While the illegal market is still pretty big (likely over 50% by volume), the illegal prices have cratered.
So you don’t just have a big shift out of the black market, but what’s left of the black market has also been decimated, and spends more on marketing/quality/experience.
Depends if the legal version ends up really expensive, compare cigarettes which are still smuggled because of the sin taxes.
The fact that a small black market will still exist does not negate the argument that legalizing drugs would end the gargantuan black market that currently exists, and most of the ills that come along with it.
Black markets exist and are extensive for products that are available through legal means.
To a much lesser extent though. I cannot think of any time I've used a black market for something that was otherwise available on the regular market.
It's not common, and not very profitable.
Also has anyone ever been shot or had their arm chopped off with a chainsaw over cigarette smuggling to avoid sales tax?
I take it you didn't see the video of the high speed multi-vehicle heist attempt that devolved into a shootout on a South African highway a couple weeks ago? Because that was all over a legal shipment of cellphones. [0]
[0] https://abc11.com/south-africa-armored-truck-heist-pretoria/...
Looks like the app’s domain was also seized.
Funny how that form is essentially asking users to dox themselves. I wonder how many will take the bait.
My mother-in-law better watch out
Overall, a very clean website source. No trackers in the source at all.
Countries list is interesting. Lists Puerto Rico, American Samoa and Virgin Islands (US). Didn't know PR seceded, thank you FBI for confirming. Lists various French territories. Missing South Sudan. Missing Kosovo. Includes Taiwan. Includes Palestine.
"To determine if your account is associated with an ongoing investigation, please enter any device details below:"
Seems like they're flexing.
It probably directs to a static page saying "YES" because after entering all that information your account will be under investigation for sure ;)
Can someone explain what flag in the top left corner is? There’s probably another non-country flag I missed in there too.
Europol: https://www.europol.europa.eu/
The Europol logo.
It’s bizarre, because news reports state that the entire app and monitoring system was created by the FBI and Australian Federal Police.
If it’s their system, why would they need to seize its domain?
The whois shows no updates for 11months:
Updated Date: 2020-07-07T06:01:35.21Z
If they were trying to get criminals to start using it, hosting it on the (seized) website of some reputable criminal organisation might have been helpful?
Love the AFPs effort at branding Operation Ironsides
From what I understand they targeted a high ranking member of the gang and he promoted the app, which was developed by the police to others. Since a high level member endorsed it, it become widely used.
You're broadly correct though they are saying this app ended up being used by criminal organisations all over the world. Arrests took place across 18 countries including NZ, Australia, the UK, Germany, and the US.
From the Vice Motherboard article: https://www.vice.com/amp/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-...
"This data comprises the encrypted messages of all of the users of Anoms with a few exceptions (e.g., the messages of approximately 15 Anom users in the U.S. sent to any other Anom device are not reviewed by the FBI),"
Any ideas as to why?
The FBI can't inspect data about Americans without a warrant, which they presumably don't have. The other countries who were in on this have no such restrictions and will read the messages by American citizens just fine. They may or may not decide to tip off the FBI if there is evidence of crime in the messages, and the FBI at that point would have "reasonable suspicion" and could acquire a warrant based on that.
Maybe undercover agents? Diplomats?
They might have been IDed as non-criminal. You get the odd crime/drugs reporter who uses the devices, e.g. this interview was conducted on a SkyECC phone https://www.vice.com/en/article/93wj5d/prison-drug-dealer-cr... (another CDSC platform that was recently hacked).
There are more details in a recently unsealed search warrant against a GMail user: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.casd.70...
An informant (confidential human source, or "CHS") helped the FBI and AFP (Australian Federal Police) develop and distribute Anom to criminal gangs (transnational criminal organizations, or "TCOs"):
> The CHS offered this next generation device, named “Anom,” to the FBI to use in ongoing and new investigations. The CHS also agreed to offer to distribute Anom devices to some of the CHS’s existing network of distributors of encrypted communications devices, all of whom have direct links to TCOs.
Anom was specifically designed from the ground up with an encryption backdoor:
> Before the device could be put to use, however, the FBI, AFP, and the CHS built a master key into the existing encryption system which surreptitiously attaches to each message and enables law enforcement to decrypt and store the message as it is transmitted. A user of Anom is unaware of this capability. By design, as part of the Trojan Shield investigation, for devices located outside of the United States, an encrypted “BCC” of the message is routed to an “iBot” server located outside of the United States, where it is decrypted from the CHS’s encryption code and then immediately re-encrypted with FBI encryption code. The newly encrypted message then passes to a second FBI-owned iBot server, where it is decrypted and its content available for viewing in the first instance.
Naturally, the FBI can't spy on domestic communications without a warrant, so they got the AFP to do it for them:
> FBI geo-fenced the U.S., meaning that any outgoing messages from a device with a U.S. MCC would not have any communications on the FBI iBot server. But if any devices landed in the United States, the AFP agreed to monitor these devices for any threats to life based on their normal policies and procedures.
Closing Sky Global and Encrochat drove criminals to Anom:
> Since March 12, 2021, as a direct result of the Sky Global charges, there are now close to 9000 active Anom users. The criminals who use hardened encrypted devices are constantly searching for the next secure device, and the distributors of these devices have enabled criminals’ impenetrable communications on these devices for years.
Finally, the FBI quite directly admits their goal is to shake confidence in encrypted messaging:
> A goal of the Trojan Shield investigation is to shake the confidence in this entire industry because the FBI is willing and able to enter this space and monitor messages.
There's also a number of sample conversations in the warrant application showing criminals openly talking about moving drugs and other illegal activities with absolutely no code. Definitely worth a read.
Thanks for sharing really cool stuff. Criminals discussing logistics of shipping 1.5t of cocoine in banana boxes or tuna cans
Wonder what other chat apps like Encrochat and this one does exist. Might be fun to take a closer look.
This seems to be just a messaging app, but is there a market for more full-featured ERP, CRM and project management software for criminal enterprises?
I'm sure they would benefit from those just the same way legitimate enterprises do. The only difference is that they do more illegal stuff and use more violence, but the fundamental business dynamics should be the same.
I'm sure the FBI is keen to come up with a suitable product offering.
Maybe some IBM consultants can help them sort out their tech business strategy.
Trello?
The only aspect that would stand out to use a "criminal specific" CRM would be hosting & security.
What the fuck is wrong with you.
I think this comment is unnecessarily hostile. OP is not offering to build services; he's just asking. It's a valid question. Did you know ISIS had what amounts to an "HR department" ?
Oh boohoo. Calling out a completely immoral business idea isn’t hostile. It’s moral.
To recycle your phraseology, "what the fuck is wrong with you?"
There are plenty of things that are illegal but not immoral. Sounds like you'd have railed against a steampunk app that helped the Underground Railroad operate, or Jews evade German checkpoints in 1938.
Technology making end-runs around government laws is not, per se, wrong.
Making a software suite to help criminal enterprise (drug dealing, human trafficking, identify theft, etc) is nothing like building the kind of apps you are talking about. I’ve never seen such a long bow drawn on the Orange website before. This must be very embarrassing for you.
> Calling out a completely immoral business idea isn’t hostile. It’s moral.
That’s fine, but it’s not what you seemed to be doing.
Must be hard to keep up in a discussion!
ANOM seems like a shorter/sharper law enforcement version of the CIA's Cold War era intelligence operation when they purchased Swiss encrypted communication company Crypto AG.
So they seized 130 million, arrested 1800 people. Assuming even wealth distribution, that is 72k Eur. The distribution is of course not even, as some of the confiscation images show cars worth way more than that, also watched and many bags filled to the brink with money. Some of the arrest images show the bedrooms and they do not look better than a prison cell. This means many of the involved do this for very bad ROI ratio, considering that most will face 20plus years sentences.
Why is the burner on high heat in like the fourth photo?
Odds that this is how the US nabbed the key to the Bitcoin from the Colonial Pipeline ransom? That’d be pretty wild, but makes sense...
Well, both the warrant looking for an an0m user’s gmail account and the judge’s warrant for seizing the Bitcoin were from Northern California.
People were onto Anom already figuring out it wasn't what it pretended to be. Site got deleted shortly after the raid.
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3APwQX...
Further details on the background/history of the operation here: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/world/australia/operation...
I'm curious how this works constitutionally, in the US. Presumably the FBI did not have warrants for all the conversations they were listening in on, so it at least superficially seems like a fourth amendment violation.
They’re claiming not to have analyzed comms in the US:
> "This data comprises the encrypted messages of all of the users of Anoms with a few exceptions (e.g., the messages of approximately 15 Anom users in the U.S. sent to any other Anom device are not reviewed by the FBI)," the document reads.
From From https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shie...
Thanks.
Depends where they are prosecuted. In the US, we'll use the EU's copy of the data, vice versa (wish this was \s)
Nice one, but i guess if this whole operation was still a secret, we could pull this trick over and over again? Now will be hard to disguise an app like that.
Probably the next season of the "StartUp" TV series
This is already the third or fourth such app that was either infiltrated by the police, taken over by the police or outright constructed by them. Criminals have a vested interest in getting access to encrypted communications and they know that all of the common phone OSes and chat apps are compromised, so they will be looking to join such secure networks. This need for security is what makes the continued use of these operations by law enforcement viable, since criminals have no choice but to seek out these encrypted apps.
My impression is that in all those cases the root weakness was that those criminals liked to feel sophisticated, "in the know". So those special apps (special, from our perspective, as in euphemism for birth defect) could spread by fashion. The smalltimes like to imitate the big ones while the big ones try to stay ahead of the curve, eager to pick up anything new from upstarts before they become big.
It might be my Hollywood education speaking, but criminal networks are supposed to lean strongly on status and respect (how could they not, given the absence of law enforcement which makes trust the only option) and this makes them vulnerable to fashion as a malware vector.
I think it is also just a natural "feature of the terrain". Criminals need to communicate with their customers and each other to coordinate, but they cannot use "normal" apps because those can be presumed to be compromised by the police. This creates a natural funnel where criminals are driven to these custom apps, similar to how old-time armies would fight over things like river crossings and mountain passes because the opponent had no choice but to go there if they wanted to invade at all.
That’s what I’m thinking too. A lambo looks faster, but in reality the beat up Toyota will get you around faster. You can park it in the sketchiest neighbourhood, go over 3’ potholes without slowing down, take a dirt road, park 1’ away from the next car and bash your door against it to get out, etc.
Presumably it would’ve come out during legal proceedings anyway.
> legal authorities prevented the app from being covertly used for a longer time frame.
I can see how strong was the temptation to continue and see how far it could go.
The takings are just insane. In EU they seized 8 tonnes (!) of cocaine and 22 tonnes of marijuana.
8t, but global production is 1000-2000t per annum.
Wow. Had no idea. That's incredible.
One day we will realise the war on drugs was mostly destructive to ordinary people. It's important to realise the US has historically played a huge role in the global drug trade, and that really stopping the drug trade means going after banking executives, politicians and chemical corporations. However that is never done.
How would this be any different to creating a global back door in signal, wikr or slack?
The main difference is that by building their own honey pot, they did not have to rely on an external actor to maintain any secrecy.
If they dug their claws into wikr, they'd have to worry about leaks from every single person involved with wikr on top of all potential leaks from law enforcement personnel.
Also, I suspect it's easier to get the warrants needed to create a sting from the ground up than it is for several different law enforcement agencies around the world to each get separate warrants to access wikr/slack/discord/whatever's data.
Once the data legally exists in a law enforcement database, it is relatively simple bureaucracy to share it with allied organizations.
What I mean is they’re effectively breaching the privacy of any perfectly legit users. They’ve done this in the past with stuff like mobile tower spoofing. Why is this ok, and mobile spoofing not, ethically?
Wickr is almost certainly compromised anyway.
Never trust an app that neither charges for its use (like Threema), nor takes donations (like Signal Foundation).
Wickr's funding is a huge mystery. Approach with caution.
Never never use a mobile phone if you're a dirty criminal
They forgot to review the app's source code.
Next: "We've secretly been torturing people for the last three years — look at all the cases it helped us crack!”
Should've used signal
As is often the case with the FBI, they were apparently facilitating the crimes. It's easy to argue that the crimes might not have taken place without the FBI's help. Somehow this is never entrapment when the FBI is doing it.
not just Australia, it's world wide and likely led by the FBI (but possibly data being collected outside the US to avoid the need of having actual warrants)
The following thread looks at some of the opened court documents today:
https://twitter.com/ericgarland/status/1402100449013125123
(and points out that the Trump organisation might be in trouble ....)
Being outside the US doesn't avoid the need for actual warrants. That thread mentions several, both in the US and out of it.
Unless they found a pushover country and structured as much data to be sent there in the app. Have them get the warrant and review the data and inform you of anything good.
Arbitrage isn’t just for bankers.
The tweet says: "... remember that Dipshit McSonInLaw used these exact "technologies" to communicate with the Saudis and stuff. ... ".
But, I don't see how he the tweeter could be sure or know that Trumps used this app?
Eric Garland is a massive blowhard/self-promoter (and I say this despite sharing his dislike of Trump). Even when his claims are accurate he's so obnoxious and annoying that I can't be bothered to evaluate his other claims. I save a lot of time and mental agitation by ignoring e-personalities and assuming that if something is important I'll hear about it from a quality source before very long.
> I save a lot of time and mental agitation by ignoring e-personalities and assuming that if something is important I'll hear about it from a quality source before very long.
We’ve had 4 years of media personas announcing Trump’s imminent incarceration. Call me when something sticks.
I’m sure he has no idea. This is far from the only encrypted messaging system out there.
>(and points out that the Trump organisation might be in trouble ....)
Thanks for that line, I was starting to worry that there were things going on in the world that weren't about Trump.
> and seized more than 3,000 kilograms of drugs and $45 million in cash and assets.
Excuse me, but I can't stop laughing. Three years effort to catch a small fish and they sell it as if they got bust of the century.
Why don't they investigate politicians that facilitate prohibition and enable these gangs to work in the first place?
Police can't see they run fool's errands.
The big blow isn't the amount of drugs or cash taken, it's the grabbing of relatively high ranking people in the organization, and the absolute shattering of their communication.
I bet a bunch of them will go back to in-person communication only for a long while after this, slowing things down considerably.
Are they just catching nobodies though?
This was exactly my thought too. The numbers they quoted in the Europol press conference are a drop in the ocean.
Good that they arrested the culprits. But infiltrating the encrypted messaging app isn't the best thing I guess.
The argument, it is used by criminals is flawed. Because everything is - water pipelines, cash, facebook, and so on.
This was specifically seeded into the criminal world. It's not like they cracked Signal, or whatever.
It's not an infiltration of the app, it's an infiltration of the criminal organizations, using an app they made.
Makes me wonder if "invite only" could eventually be read as a red flag indicating possible honeypot? Guess no secret tool is forever.
maybe read the article ;)